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Cultural Hybridity and the Challenge of Reconstructing a National Identity in Algeria

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Statement of Originality

This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted for any degree or diploma at any university. The intellectual content of this thesis is a personal product and all the resources and assistance received in preparing it have been acknowledged.

KADA Wafa

Dedications

To My Beloved Family

Acknowledgements

Abstract

This study aims to uncover the optimal way of reconstructing a national identity in a postcolonial community. Taking Algeria as a case study, this thesis provides a thorough examination of the Algerian society prior to French colonization, as well as the prevalent educational system at the time. This research is deemed crucial given the fact that Algeria had the longest period of colonialism. After 132 years of French control and more than seven years of revolutionary war, Algeria obtained its independence, but with a heavy impact of the colonizing culture, touching identity. During the colonial period, and via education, France implemented the 'Frenchification' policy, which aimed to strike at the foundations of Algerian national identity so as to produce an individual who was easy-to- manipulate and easy to assimilate. Algeria, on the other hand, did not hesitate to fight this policy and regained its identity after restoring its national sovereignty. In so doing, it resorted to Arabization and Islam as being essential components of the Algerian identity. However, in the late twentieth century and because of the hegemonic dimensions of globalization, Algeria, similar to many other countries, has strived to put into practice efficient policies to preserve its national identity and reinforce citizenship.

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations:

MNA   Mouvement National Algérien

FLN   Le Front de Libération Nationale

OAS   L'Organisation de l'Armée Secrète

ENA   L'Étoile Nord-Africaine

MTLD   Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques

CNP   Conseil National des Programmes

CNRSE   La Commission Nationale de Réforme du système éducatif

GPRA   Gouvernement provisoire de la République algérienne

BC   Before Christ

AD   Anno Domini

AH   Anno Hegirae 'Year of the Hijrah'

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General Introduction

General Introduction:

Algeria, occupying the middle section of North Africa, is an undisputed national entity, as evidenced by geographical, ethnic, and historical realities. Algeria has a land area of 2.381.741 square kilometers and is bordered to the northeast by Tunisia; to the east by Libya; to the southeast by Niger; to the southwest by Mali, Mauritania, and Western Sahara; to the west by Morocco; and to the north by the Mediterranean Sea. This is the universally recognized truth with regard to Algeria. In particular, Algeria is more known as the country of a million and a half martyrs, or in other words, it is known for the war of liberation and French colonialism.

Whenever a discussion is held about the history of Algeria, a picture of Algeria and France as two inseparable elements must be drawn, and history continues to transmit the same stereotypical impression which may have been disseminated in some way or another by colonialists that Algeria did not have a past prior to France, to the point where French politicians believe to the present day that Algeria was void, and the arrival of the French is what gave it the honor of going down in history. Whether be it an act of denial or a planned scheme; Algeria, due to its position in the Mediterranean, has experienced multiple invasion attempts, which aided in the establishment of a powerful nation capable of confronting the world's most destructive Colonialism.

France had always placed around itself an aura of grandeur and noblesse, and allowed itself, after inventing the idea of civilization, to designate itself as the bearer of the message of civilization and progress. This was the usual justification France provided to invade various countries, including Algeria, under the guise of "la mission Civilisatrice," or more precisely, 'the white man's burden,' to display its efforts in the colonies as an act of sacrifice and a heavy burden so as to create an educated, conscious, and civilized individual.

According to colonial-era statistics and eyewitness accounts, it was uncommon to stumble upon a person in Algeria who could not read or write; in other words, illiteracy was nearly non-existent prior to colonization. This is what France sought to deny, or certainly what it aimed to achieve in order to carry on its colonial agenda known as 'the Frenchification policy.' This was a well-planned and well-researched policy that was

followed by governmental actions aimed at providing the people with a French education that would qualify them for the status of a French citizen who pays homage to France.

The execution of the plan proceeded with an attempt to give Algeria a French structure. France officially divided Algeria into three provinces known as 'les département d'Algérie,' where many Europeans and pieds noirs settled in the hope to spread French culture in a wider sense and create an atmosphere of coexistence, which would develop into an Algerian individual identical to the French self. This picture that France longed to create required more propaganda to be realized, thus, grand celebrations were held to mark the 100th anniversary of French-Algerian cohabitation, allowing France to make the problem of Algerian occupation a public issue, dividing people into supporters who accepted the fable of cohabitation and opponents who viewed it as a recurrence of prior oppression and a resurgence of colonial rule.

Surprisingly, these celebrations did not favor France. Following the subsequent clash of ideas, the state discovered that attempting to nurture a French person in a coexistenceist style was ineffective, and that underestimating the Algerian's loyalty to his Algerianness had the opposite effect. Following that, France decided to redouble its efforts by focusing on education with the hope of influencing the young student, who is easily shaped and fashioned as it desires. The new strategy is based on the concept of 'Assimilation' which involves adopting characteristics of the dominant culture to the point that the assimilating group is socially indistinguishable from other members of the society. Assimilation is consequently the most detrimental kind of acculturation, whether forced or consensual; it is almost impossible for colonized people to entirely regain their prior cultural standards.

At the outset of their educational plan, the French authorities decided that education would follow the Jules Ferry project (1882), which proposed that education be free, compulsory and secular. Religion was separated from education, which is considered the first obstacle to the project success and a major challenge to a society that regards religion as the most crucial component of its national identity. The second problem was a widespread misalignment of statements and deeds. Although education was intended to benefit all children of all ages and conditions, only ten percent received a

French education. Perhaps the underlying cause is the French concern of forming an educated elite that is superior to the French individual, and even worse, that this elite is the one to lead the people to liberty.

Algerian independence was both the golden grail and the horror that tormented France for many years later. Algeria was more than simply another colony through which France attempted to consolidate its power or expand its empire; it was France's colonial masterpiece and the Republican crown jewel. Losing Algeria was a stake in the heart of France, and the only way to relieve the agony was to sink into oblivion. As a result, France denied that the war had occurred; claiming that because 'Algeria is France,' it is impossible to call it a war, for no one can fight a war with himself. Despite this denial, independence triggered a crisis in the French political system that ultimately led to the Fourth Republic's demise.

After independence, the first task of Algeria was to restore the unity of the nation and try to repair the ruin left by colonialism. One of the things Algeria had sought to fix is its educational system. After a fierce war waged by France to fight Arab-Islamic education; its policy left an illiterate society with a rate of more than 80 percent. The beginning of the educational stage aimed, in general, at removing illiteracy and ignorance from society, so it followed an educational system that was identical to the colonial approach due to the lack of educational cadres and the resources necessary to complete the task of education. However, education methodology changed with the change of presidential eras.

This dissertation is, thus, focused mainly on answering four main questions:

- How did Algerian society and education fare before the French colonization?

- What was France's educational policy towards erasing Algerian identity, and how effective was it?

- What policies did Algeria use to reclaim its national identity, and how effective were they?

• What policies might be implemented to preserve national identity and reinforce citizenship within a globalized world?

To address these queries, this thesis is structured into four chapters. The first chapter is about pre-colonial Algeria. It is designed to show that Algeria journeyed as a segmented tribal order through 6 generations of colonial invasion prior to the French colonization and to refute the misleading assumptions about the cultural life in pre-colonial Algeria by providing facts and details demonstrating that Algeria had a well-balanced and well- planned educational system from which a class of educated elite emerged, as well as a highly educated society

The second chapter is devoted to profoundly examine the Frenchification policy and the colonial educational system in colonial Algeria, how the French endeavored to create a French citizen out of an Algerian and how they were resisted by an Algerian educated elite, ultimately leading to independence.

In the third chapter, an in-depth study of the Arabization policy is conducted, to demonstrate that Arabization went through different stages according to the different political eras and presidential mandates. Perhaps the most significant time in Algerian education was the post-black decade period, which saw a significant shift in policy and the adoption of the concept of partisan pluralism. Following that, Algeria entered a period of globalization in which trends and ideas, as well as educational system and curriculum, transformed.

In the fourth chapter, we'll discover how Algeria took a fresh approach to reclaiming its national identity by adopting a new way of education that aimed at generating an Algerian individual that cannot be shaken by winds of change or affected by attempts to disperse.

Chapter one:

Pre-colonial Algeria

(Background to French

Colonization)

1.1 Introduction:

Before the sixteenth century, Algeria was subject to numerous military invasions by the Phoenicians, Romans, Vandals, Spanish, and Arabs who diffused their forceful dominance over the Northern part of the African continent.

Beyond any shadow of doubt, these latest invasions had left their cultural and genetic imprint. However, it was the three centuries of the Ottoman dominance that helped to shape the country into what it is today. The North African region was, therefore, intertwined into a united territorial identity by the Ottoman regency; the fact that was accepted as a fixed institution by the French and the Algerian state forever after.

This chapter deals with crucial periods of the Algerian history; it serves as a preamble to Algeria from antiquity up until the French Colonization and a track to follow the trail of the different social insecurities experienced by the Algerian society.

1.2 History of the Berbers/Amazighs:

Since history is a chronicle of events and an aggregate of periods, it is compulsory to present the evolution of the Algerian society progressively. Therefore, the ancient past is at the outset of this discourse with an inclination to trace back the existence of human race in the region.

Due to archeological studies, the first traces of hominid settlement in Algeria would go back to about two million years BC. However, there is a common belief among historians that the Berbers were the first population to dwell in North Africa. This fact leads, accordingly, to inquire about their line of descent and genuine origins.

Much ink has been spilled on the topic of the Berbers' origins, resulting in large numbers of researches and studies that questioned their roots and genealogy. Despite the controversy hovering around this point of debate; this latter fascinated a significant number of historians to consult the archives and logically unravel its knotted puzzle.

Following the line of investigation through anthropology, archeology and etymology; scientists tried to determine the origins of the Berbers scientifically. Yet, their history has its own share of legends built over myriads of years, following stories of conquests, social stereotypes and cultural and religious upheavals that took part in the construction of the current identity.

1.2.1 A Legacy of Legend:

The word 'Berber' comes from the Latin 'Barbarus' and from the Greek 'Barbaros' meaning 'foreigners'. According to the Berbers themselves, they are designated to be 'Imazighen' or 'Amazigh' in the singular, meaning 'Free Men' that cannot tolerate submission or acquiesce. Berbers or Barbarians at the same time are names given by the Romans to all foreigners including the Amazighs in their conquests of countries of the Mediterranean basin. The horrific atrocities of the Roman Conquest were the reason that the name 'Berber' is rejected by the great majority. The lands inhabited by the Berbers or 'Berberia' are called 'Tamazgha' and North Africa 'Hifriks-u-gafa' which designates the inhabitants of Northern Sahara. (Boubakeur, 2017)

1.2.2 Semitic Ascendency:

The first reference to the Berbers goes back to Pharaonic periods. They were known to the Pharaohs by the name 'Lebu' 'Temehou' or 'Tehenu'. Also known as the 'Meshwesh' descendants of Iranian 'Medes' who transformed their names from 'Mazices' into 'Imazigher' or 'Amazigh'. (Boubakeur, 2018, p.08)

Several theories claimed that the Amazighs are of Arab Oriental origins. They migrated due to drought, climate change and frequent wars to North Africa and settled there. According to Al Kaak (2003):

> Most researchers hold that the Berbers are foremost of Semitic origins. That is: of the sons of Sam son of Noah… The Arabian Peninsula, the homeland of the Semites, was covered with snow in the North… when the snow receded, the heat intensified, the country deserted and its inhabitants dispersed. Thus, the Semitic branch of the Berbers moved to North Africa. (p.51)

In this regard, Ibn Khaldun, whose work remains the most valid script to be pursued in tracing the Berbers origins, believes that the Amazighs are descendants of 'Mazigh' who, in the Bible, is the son of 'Canaan', the son of 'Ham', second son of Noah. He stated in his book *al-Ibar, wa Diwan al-Mobtadae wa al-Khabar* (1377) that "The right and only thing to rely upon in their affairs, is that they are from the son of Canaan, son of Ham, son of Noah… and the name of their father is Mazigh" (p.191)

This assumption is approved by the Amazighi Saint Augustine when he aforesaid "if you ask our farmers about their origins, they will answer: we are Canaanites" (Gautier, 1952, p.139)

1.2.3 Hemite Ascendency:

By way of contrast, other researchers believe that the Berbers are of Hemite origins, meaning they are descendants of Ham son of Noah; who migrated from the Arabian Peninsula and settled in North Africa. The researcher Mohammad al-Shatibi says in his Book *Al-Juman fi Mukhtasar Akhbar al-Zaman* (1264 A.H) that biologists claimed that the sons of 'Sam' experienced a severe collision with the sons of 'Ham', and when defeated they immigrated to Morocco and procreated in it. (Asl al Amazigh, 2017)

1.2.4 The Dual Origins:

A great number of researchers say of the dual origins of the Berbers; they combine the Semitic and the Indo-European race. They migrated from their place of origin and met in North Africa; the fact that explains the different physical characteristics and dialects of the Berbers. (Hamdaoui, 2014)

These differing visions of the origins of the Berbers made it difficult to judge. Due to the lack of historical evidence based on scientific foundations; the above mentioned theories remained highly uncertain. Scientists, therefore, did not come to a final decision about their origins. This confusion was summed by Humbarci when he stated: "the Berbers, apparently, are one of the oldest races in the world and no one seems able to trace their origins". (As cited in Djabri, 1981, p.15)

The Berbers in Algeria are made up of four groups:

- The Tuaregs: are considered the smallest Berber community in Algeria, they dwell in the Ahagar Mountains and Tassili-n-Ajjer in the south of the country.

- The Mozabites: Mʾzabite, Mozabite, Mʾzab, or Beni Mʾzab, are the Berber people who inhabit the Mʾzab oases of Southern Algeria. They're members of the Ibāḍīyah subsect of the Muslim Khārijites, and are labelled 'the puritans of the desert' for their strict adherence to the teachings of Islam.

- The Shawias: The second largest Berber group in Algeria that resides in the Aurès Plateau region of the Atlas Mountains of Northeastern Algeria. They settled in the region since the Arab conquests.

- The Kabyles: are Algeria's biggest Berber ethnic group. They reside in large numbers in the mountains of Greater and Lesser Kabylie in the northeast, but a large number of them have spread across Algerian territory. These Kabyles who have expanded, have an inclination to maintain a sense of solidarity and ethnic identity. As studies and events throughout history indicate; among them exists the Francized group the most hostile to Arabs and who always call for the Amazigh language and identity of the Algerian people. (Saad, 1992)

In this regard, the Yemeni writer Muhammed Hussein al Farah argues (2010) that learning about the Berbers origins is a significant historical issue. However, most of the time, the purpose behind bringing it forward and make the public acquainted with; is no longer for knowledge sake. It is rather of unseen imperialist objectives that tend to conceal the facts to weaken the unity of the people in the Maghreb and a medium of animosity against Arabs and Arabism.

This view was endorsed by Othman Saadi is his book *Al-Amazigh 'Arabun 'Ariba* (1996), he stated that the whole thing is a Western plan to fragmentize the Arab world, based on sectarian and ethnic grounds:

> This conspiracy revolves around the Arabic language, the only strong factor that continues to bind the Arabs as people after the enemies of the Arab nation adjusted Arab politics and economy as they wished, through a brutal openness that has transformed the Arab world into a market for

Western goods… and a cheap oil well and around a thousand billion dollars deposited in Western banks. (p.06)

He went on to say that the issue of the Berbers is raised mainly to preserve their positions in the Algerian state and administration. The Berbers, who were francized, were enabled by the colonizer to occupy secondary positions in trade and administration. Since they were the only experienced cadres, when Algeria gained total independence, they were relocated to occupy senior positions vacated by the French with their withdrawal. Howbeit, as the surge of Arabization escalated in Algeria, they grew anxious about their rights and lifted slogans calling upon the Berber's culture. They, moreover, claimed to reform the components of the Algerian identity, stated in the declaration of independence, from the dualism embodied in Arabism and Islam to a trilogy that involves Tamazight.

This tripartite identity installs racist ideologies such as that of Izz al Din al Zaalani – a member of the Amazigh high Governorate – when he revealed to le Matin newspaper that "Tamazight for our people is an existence and Arabic, Islam and French are gains. Whatever elements are accepted to us, our identity is single… it has to be… Berber only and Arab and Islam supplement it." (p. 7-9) this means that Arabic and Islam were never viewed in terms of identity constructs, but as mere additional features that remain subject to change and replacement. Muhammad Hussein continues to say that this ideology is a tool for anti-Arabism and spreading separatism, while barbarism must be a factor in the unity of the people through sound historical knowledge of the oneness of Berber and Arab origins.

1.3 The Phoenician Era (100-146 BC):

The Phoenicians are 'Semites' like the rest of the Canaanites who migrated from the Arabian Peninsula and settled in the cities of Eidon and Tire (the Levant) that was then called 'Phoenicia'. The Phoenicians sailed in large numbers from Phoenicia and settled in the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea (North Africa). Due to their commercial nature, the Phoenicians monopolized internal and external trade of the Mediterranean coast; they initiated their business by establishing commercial ports and carried out their mercantile activities by shipbuilding and setting up repair workshops.

The first commercial station established by the Phoenicians was 'Carthage' or 'Cartagena' in 814 BC on the Tunisian coast. Ensuingly, they extended their dominance to include the Algerian coasts where they established coastal cities like: Rigius (Annaba), Risicada (Skikda), Cirta (Constantine), Ighilgili (Jijel) Saldae (Bejaia), Iol (Cherchal) and, chiefly, Icosium (Algiers). (Bouhouch, 1997)

Figure 1.1: Map of Phoenicia and its Mediterranean Trade Routes (Akigka, 2012)

The Phoenician settlement in North Africa was not a colonial endeavor as much as it was economic and commercial. They were able to consolidate their relations with the indigenous people and integrate them in their commercial business. The expansion in their land was not an objective; it was in their interest to maintain their existence and gain the locals' support rather than indulge in hostile quarrels (al Madani, 1986). Due to their lenient policy, the Phoenicians were able to fulfill their interests, culminating in the development of political and administrative systems that allowed them to enjoy centuries of uniformity and stability. On the flip side, the conditions of the local people were completely the opposite. Though the Carthaginians' intended to create a harmonious relationship through the expansion of trade links, the Berbers remained in a state of disorder and chaos. The territorial expansion led to the enslavement, military recruitment of some Berbers and the collection of tribute from others. At this point, the locals

discerned that the creation of friendly relations was a wittingly made trick to guarantee public safety and allow the continuum of their commercial prosperity.

After Carthage became a military power in the region, signs of discrimination and maltreatment of the indigenous people became more apparent. Overburdening them with taxes was present at the heart of the crisis; the thing that led to rebellious activities against the Phoenicians. It was until the interference of another monarchy that the conflict took another level and marked a change in the balance of power (Derdour, 2017).

From the beginning of 264 BC Carthage and Rome confronted each other during the so called 'Three Punic Wars'. The principal reason behind the conflict was the Romans desire to control 'Sicily' that was under the dominance of the Carthaginians. The colonial rivalry between the two world powers was amplified and led the collision to long term wars that extended from 246 to 146 BC.

It is of paramount importance to point out that the Berbers took a decisive role in these wars. For the sake of gaining their independence from the Carthaginians, they gave themselves up to the Romans. Supported by king 'Masinissa[1]' of Eastern Numidia, Rome was able to defeat the Carthaginian army in the battle of Zama (202 BC). In return, Masinissa was able to unify Numidia based on a covenant with Rome. During his reign, the country enjoyed a state of stability and developed economically, socially and politically.

After its defeat, Carthage was gradually able to rebuild itself and restore its maritime activities; the reason why Rome sensed the threat and worked to hinder the progress of the Phoenicians. It lured Masinissa to seize their land with the pretext that it belonged to his father. Masinissa, excited with the idea, complied with the commands of Rome and started his attacks on Carthage.

Ruefully, The Carthaginians were still in a state of recovery and couldn't afford another war. When Masinissa started his raids, Carthage complained to Rome and asked for the withdrawal of Masinissa's forces. In spite of that, Rome sided to its ally and held a

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[1] - Was the ruler of the North African kingdom of Numidia and an ally of Rome in the last years of the Second Punic War (218–201)

campaign that ended with Carthage being besieged. After a period of three years, Roman forces had the opportunity to enter the city when its inhabitants were out for defense.

The Romans started murdering the citizens and destroying the city of Carthage; those who witnessed the attacks stated that the streets of Carthage were full of corpses drowning in their blood; the city was set ablaze for half a month and those few ones left of its inhabitants were sold in the slave market. It was after the third Punic wars that Carthage collapsed in 146 BC and was, thereby, declared an official Roman state named 'Africa'. (Ferkous, 2003)

1.4 The Roman Conquest (146 BC – 429 AD):

Promptly after the devastation of Cartagena, the Romans tended to extend their political and military impact within the countries of the Maghreb in general, and Algeria in particular. They embarked their colonial scheme by converting the Carthaginian lands into Roman provinces separated from the rest of Numidia by a royal trench or a 'Fossa regia'. Then, in 46 BC they set their feet in Numidia and converted it as well into a Roman province known by the name 'Africa Nova' or 'New Africa'. This occupation threw the Berbers into a vortex of abuse and oppression never witnessed before. The Romans vigorously violated their lands and properties, imposed taxes on them and conscripted thousands of men into the Roman army.

When king 'Masinissa' died in 148 AD after spending his last days in the capital of Carthage under the Roman protection, he was succeeded by his three sons who agreed on the division of power between themselves. The eldest 'Micipsa' was appointed as an administrative governor, 'Mastanbal' as a governor of judicial affairs and 'Gulussa' as commander of African armies.

After the death of king Micipsa in 118 AD the throne was left to his two sons 'Adherbal' and 'Hiempsal' along with his nephew 'Jugartha' who was considered a legitimate heir. Encouraged by the royal surroundings, the latter was able to develop high skills in combating and army leading that made him a good governor prototype. When the three princes met to develop a plan for joint governance, they didn't come to an agreement,

mainly because Jugartha was not satisfied with any division that can serve the colonial policy and prevent the realization of his project aiming at forming a strong state.

Jugartha yearned for Numidia's unification and freedom. When Rome realized his power, it attempted to impede his progress by inciting his two cousins to isolate him from authority. Soon after, he came to the conclusion that for his plans to be successfully accomplished and to eradicate Roman influence in the region; he has to dispose of his relatives. He, thus, battled them valiantly and triumphed, and when recovered Eastern Numidia, he fulfilled his long-held dream and established a kingdom completely independent of Rome.

The unification of Numidia was not the sole objective of Jugartha; he rather long craved to restore its sovereignty, cease all attempts of foreign intervention, and lift oppression and tyranny over the Numidians. This heroic demeanor was conversely viewed by the Romans as an act of defiance and open resistance to the Roman rule. This prompted a new round of conflicts betwixt them. However, Jugartha was unanticipatedly able to defeat the Roman army, leaving Rome with little alternative but to entrust its army commander to negotiate a peace pact for a fortune to be paid to the senate. Jugartha's triumphs continued until crowned the throne of Cirta (Constantine) in 112 BC and announced the independence of Numidia.

Once again, Roman campaigns against Numidia intensified, forcing Jugartha to seek sanctuary with his father-in-law, King 'Bocchus'[2] of Mauretania, who had supported him in the early stages of his battle against Rome. But he was not trustworthy; he duped Jugartha into believing he was in a safe haven and turned him over to Commander 'Marius'[3] of the Roman army. He was, then, sent to a Roman jail, where he died in dubious circumstances in 104 BC. (Ferkous, 2003)

The stage was left empty for Rome after Jugurtha's death, and thus began implementing its infernal scheme by splitting the Kingdom of Numidia into two halves. It granted Western Numidia to Bocchus as a prize for his loyalty and Eastern Numidia to

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[2] - was the king of Mauretania in North Africa from about 110 to between 91 and 81 bc; he was the father-in-law of Jugurtha, king of Numidia

[3] - Gaius Marius was a Roman general and politician

'Gauda,' Jugartha's brother, who reigned until his death in 88 BC. His son 'Hiempsal II' succeeded him and guided Numidia to prosperity. During his rule, the agricultural system flourished, money was minted out of gold, copper, and silver, and commercial exchanges expanded between Numidia, Athens, Marseille, Southern Spain, and Rome.

After Hiempsal II died in 67 BC, his son 'Yuba I' took over as ruler of Eastern Numidia. He aimed to reduce Roman reliance by pursuing a program based on the building of a powerful army. Yuba I was a savvy ruler who capitalized on Rome's political squabbles throughout his reign. In doing so, he backed general 'Pompeius' in his fight with 'Julius Cesar'[4] since it posed less of a danger to his kingdom's independence. Unfortunately, with the help of the Mauritanian monarch 'Bocchus II,' Caesar was able to defeat the Numidian army. This setback resulted in Yuba I's suicide as he lost hope of preserving Numidia's independence, which was ultimately turned to a Roman state dubbed 'Provincia Africa Nova' in 46 BC.

'Yuba II,' the son of Yuba I, was adopted by Julius Caesar, who called him after his father. He was given a Roman education to ensure a cordial relationship in the future, and he was chosen to sit on his father's throne to make his devotion to the Romans even stronger. As governor, he made Yol (Cherchal) his capital and gave it a Hellenic touch to show off his wealth and splendor.

For the Romans, it seems that the wheel of luck was always rotating in their favor; when Yuba II was succeeded by his son 'Patolemée' who strived to control the Numidian tribes, he was assassinated by order of the Roman emperor 'Caligula' before accomplishing his mission. This incident resulted in the destruction of the Mauritanian Kingdom and was, thus, transformed into two Roman states: Mauretania Caesariensis (current Algeria) and Mauretania Tingitana (Tangiers). On account of this the Romans were able to take control over the whole North Africa sounding the alarm of a new conflict with the locals. (Ferkous, 2003)

The first initiative that objected this dominion was that of 'Takfarinas'; a Numidian Berber who was a previous Roman soldier. Though the well-being and luxury he was

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[4] - was a celebrated Roman general and statesman

experiencing as a Roman officer, he couldn't bear watching his people being enslaved. This situation prompted him to rebel and declare a revolution against the Roman occupation. During 7 years of continuous resistance; Takfarinas intended to sabotage Roman properties and to stir terror in the Roman armies' ranks, until was killed in 24 AD. It was followed by another revolution led by the Numidian prince 'Firmus' to start a chain of endless conflicts in the region. (Derdour, 2017)

Another effort was made in 313 AD by the Barbarian monk 'Donatus', who founded the Donatist Movement. From the outside, it was entirely religious, but from the inside, it was a political initiative aimed at liberating the Berbers from Roman dominance. After several desperate attempts, the Donatists were beaten by the Romans, who, as is customary, began a series of horrific homicides against the inhabitants.

The final meter, however, was ticking, and Rome's destruction was imminent. The threat of being isolated by Rome's power pushed the general governor of Rome at the time, count 'Bonifacus,' to declare his disobedience and arrange a deal with the Vandals to gain control of the kingdom of Africa. In exchange, they would receive Morocco and Algeria. On this foundation, the Vandals invaded Africa in 429 AD and ended the Roman occupation. (Ferkous, 2003)

1.5 The Vandal Conquest (429 AD – 534 AD):

The Vandals are a Germanic Barbarian group that landed in Northern Europe around the Baltic Sea. Their excursions began in the fifth century AD, first in Southern Germany, and eventually reached Spain around 409 AD. In 422 AD, their approach to Spain happened to coincide with internal tensions between Rome and Bonifacus, the Roman governor of Africa (Harech, 1992) who was sacked by Roman authorities in 427 AD. He was enraged by this order and sought about for help from the Vandals. Fortunately, in 429 AD, the Vandals responded to his call and crossed the Strait of Gibraltar to Africa.

The Vandals landed on Moroccan shores with a population of 80 thousand people, including an army of 50 thousand soldiers headed by King Geiséric, to continue their straggle to the East. The word 'Vandal' eventually became synonymous with devastation,

owing to their criminal activities in taking the lives of thousands of people and destroying everything they came across on their way to Africa. (Ferkous, 2003) During this time, St. Augustine, the Roman pope, attempted to broker a settlement between Bonifacus and the Roman government to return him to power. When the Roman governor finally agreed; Bonifacus, gently requested the vandals to depart Africa. As a response, the Vandals besieged the country for 5 years and occupied Bone (Annaba) in 431. In like manner, a war was fought to break the siege that culminated in the escape of Bonifacus to Italy and the murder of St. Augustine while defending Algeria.

After the fall of Bone, the Vandals occupied Carthage in 439 AD and tightened their grip on the locals; confiscated their lands and properties and were accordingly able to take hold of North Africa. After the death of their king Genseric; the Vandals grew weak due to internal intrigues and disputes over power. Thus; many barbaric revolts arose from Mauritania in the west to Tripoli in the east demanding full independence in 480 AD and continued until achieving victory in 483 AD. (Dedour, 2017)

1.6 The Byzantine Conquest (534 AD - 647 AD):

The Byzantine Empire, which formed the Eastern half of the old Roman Empire, dates back to around 330 AD and is regarded as a significant segment of the ancient Roman Empire. Thereby, it was named 'New Rome' or 'Byzantine'. The Western part of Rome collapsed in 476 AD while the Eastern part survived for more than a thousand years after. (Harech, 1992)

With the victory of Berbers against the Vandals, the Vandal king 'Hilderic' was overthrown and replaced by 'Gelimer'[5] in 530 AD. This unpleased king appealed to the Byzantine emperor to take his revenge and launched a revolution against the Vandals. A naval fleet led by the Byzantine commander 'Flavius Belisarius' was able to occupy Carthage in 834 AD and went further to seize the rest of Numidia. As their predecessors, the Byzantines applied on the Berbers the same policies of oppression and injustice enacted by the Romans and the Vandals which, once more, led to the outbreak of barbaric revolts resulting in the death of the Byzantine Commander 'Solomon' in 544 AD in the Battle of Cillium. (Derdour, 2017)

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[5] - was the last Vandal king (ruled 530–534) of the area called by the Romans "Africa"

These revolts were a stimulant that instigated the emergence of Berber emirates independent from the Byzantine rule. Gradually, the Byzantine Empire was growing dim due to anarchy and corruption within its ranks; internal conflicts in the Byzantine government smoothed the path for 'Gregorius' – the African governor at that time – to announce the separation of Africa from the throne of Constantinople (Byzantine). Shortly after, Islamic conquerors crossed the threshold of Africa as part of the Islamic conquests. They began their attacks by surrounding Gregorius in the South of el Kairouan. He was murdered by Abdullah Ibn Saad Ibn Abi Sarh in 27 H- 647 AD marking the end of the dark ages in Africa and the beginning of the Islamic age. (Ferkous, 2003)

1.7 The Arab Islamic Conquest (27 AH – 647 AD/ 160 AH – 776 AD):

When the Arabs first crawled into North Africa in 22 Hijriyah, they found that the Berbers have established a social and security system based on preparedness to deal with any kind of external invasions. Due to their sufferance from the ravages of previous occupations throughout the ancient times; it was brought up to the locals' imagination that foreign intruders by all means have some intentions of colonialism. It was soon that they turned into Islam and cling to Arabism.

The Arabs original homeland is the Arabian Peninsula. They settled in North Africa following the Islamic conquests, mostly during the time of Caliph 'Uthman Ibn Affan'[6]. In 27 A.H., Caliph Uthman instructed Egypt's ruler 'Abdullah Ibn Saad Ibn Abi Sarh Al Amiri' to conquer Africa. This latter, with an army of 20,000 Mujahideen (soldiers), launched war against the African governor 'Gregorius' and his 1600 army of both Berbers and Romans, only to triumph and end Roman control in the region. In the wake of this great victory, Muslims took Sbeitla (Central Western Tunisia), the capital of King Gregorius, leaving the Berbers with no option but to seek peace in exchange for an annual tribute to be given to the Muslims' treasury. With the very best of intentions; Muslims agreed to sign a nonaggression pact with the Berbers, but with their swift denunciation of the treaty, they paved the way for a second Islamic Conquest.

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[6] - was the third caliph to rule after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. He centralized the administration of the caliphate and established an official version of the Qurʾān

After the Martyrdom of Caliph Uthman Ibn Affan, the Muslim Ummah fell into a great strife and the Islamic expansions halted. When Caliph 'Mu'awiya'[7] succeeded to al Khilafah, he showed great enthusiasm for the completion of Islamic conquests in the Maghreb. In 670 AD/ 50 A.H, he appointed 'Uqbah Ibn Nafi' to carry out the task in question. He began his mission by constructing the city of 'al Kairouan,' which later became the base of the Islamic armies, the capital of Africa and the center of Civilization in the Islamic world. Following this victory, Uqbah Ibn Nafi considered moving forward and developing a separate policy that would allow him to achieve more success. So he followed a rigid policy that resulted in his dismissal.

He was succeeded by 'Abū al-Muhājir Dīnār' who, unlike him, adopted a clever policy focused on co-opting the Berbers which yielded impressive results in the long run. He took the city of 'Mila' a center of his military operations and started his campaigns by attacking certain tribal chiefs. 'Kusaylah' the Berber prince loyal to the Romans; collected his troops of Berbers and Romans for the fight; both armies collided, culminating in a tremendous victory for the Muslims and the fall of kusaylah, who went captive in the hands of Muslims.

After Mu'awiyah's death, the Caliphate devolved to his son 'Yazid,' who opted to restore 'Uqbah Ibn Nafi' to finish what was left unfinished. Uqbah returned much stronger and more determined, he rushed to re-equip his army and resume his military operations. The result was an endless run of triumph and a crushing defeat for both Berber and Roman soldiers. From this point forward, Islam began to expand, and people began to accept and cherish it.

Uqbah wanted to return to al Kairouan after his task, primarily the capture of Tangier, was completed. Unfortunately, he was captured by Kusaylah who promised his own vengeance and took use of the chance to terminate Uqbah's life in the battle of Vascera in 63 AH / 686AD. Following his triumph, he was able to evacuate all Arabs who had settled in Africa and established himself in al Kairouan.

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[7] - was an early Islamic leader and founder of the great Umayyad dynasty of caliphs.

The death of Uqbah weighed heavily in the heart of the Umayyad Caliph 'Abd al Malik Ibn Marwan'[8], when he succeeded to al Khilafah in 65 A.H/ 688 AD he appointed 'Zuhayr Al Balawi' as a governor of Africa and provided him with an army of 4000 soldiers to take his revenge. He immediately headed to al Kairouan and declared war on Kusaylah and defeated him. Lamentably, the Romans were an awful lot and the Arabs were not able to be on par with. Thence, they pounced on Zuhayr and murdered him in 61 A.H/ 695 AD.

After the martyrdom of Zuhayr, the Caliph Abd al Malik Ibn Marwan prepared a huge army led by 'Hassan Ibn al Nu'man'[9] to enter Africa and continue the Islamic conquests. He embarked his mission by recovering the cities of Africa and entered al Kairouan; he besieged Cartagena and sustained a campaign against the Romans after demolishing the city forts. With hands tied and pitifully helpless, the Romans made a gateway and fled from al Kairouan.

The Berbers, on the other hand, had no leader to guide them after the death of Kusaylah, so they gathered around a woman named 'Dihya' also known by the name 'al Kahinah' (priestess) or 'La Kahina, reine guerrière des Aurés.'

The Berbers sought shelter in al Kahinah because she seemed so powerful, in addition to the dissatisfaction she showed towards Muslim victories. Dihya desired greater authority after declaring war on Hassan and defeating him in multiple wars. She began murdering the Berbers and sabotaging their cities; they eventually came out against her, seeking assistance from the Muslims. With the arrival of aids from the Levant in 700 AD, Hassan was able to track down and slay the priestess in 82 A.H/701 AD. It is particularly noteworthy that since Hassan Ibn al Nu'man's emirates, a great agreement had begun to be established between the Arabs and the Berbers, as a result of which, he was eventually able to establish the rules of the Islamic regime after convincing the people of its supreme principles of brotherhood and equity. (Derdour, 2017)

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[8] - was the fifth caliph (685–705 CE) of the Umayyad Arab dynasty centred in Damascus
[9] - was an Arab general of the Umayyad Caliphate who led the final Muslim conquest of Ifriqiya, firmly establishing Islamic rule in the region

1.7.1 Khārijite Berber Resistance to Arab Rule:

Though domestic opposition was always at the heart of the society, external intrigues against Muslims were more hazardous. Warfare this time wasn't a tendency by non-Muslims against Islam; it was rather by a collective of Muslim people who exerted themselves to preserve Islam from the system of inheritance adopted by Arab rulers in their management of public affairs. Discordancy and disunity ruptured the body of the Islamic nation following the principles of 'the Kharijites'. It induced the creation of a system detached from the established path of the ruler. Their bigotry and fanatic zeal towards their faith community took a serious turn embodied in revolutionist movements by the Berbers against Islamic Emirates. The conflict then shifted from sectrist strife into fierce wars betwixt Muslims. The aforementioned incidents paved the way to the emergence of independent states in Algeria among which are the following:

1.7.1.1 Rustamid State (160-296 AH/ 776-909 AD):

The Rustamids were an Ibadi Dynasty of Persian Origins founded by Abd Rahman Ibn Rustam who reigned from the city of Tahit (Tiaret). The birth of this principality is related to the Berbers apprising against the Umayyads; the rebellion was supported by the kharijite Movement; the puritanical Islamic sect that proclaimed the dignity of the believers within the group and promoted insurgency against an oppressive government.

Abd Rahman Ibn Rustum was an expert in the fields of Management and politics permitting him to be one of the most prominent men in the history of Ibadi movement. He followed Caliph 'Omar Ibn al Khattab' in his governmental policy by creating al Shura council to ensure the establishment of a just state. The Rustamid state was a cultural and civilizational fount and a meeting spot for knowledge seeking. It contributed in the development of an Arab Islamic civilization. However, the storm of discord blew among the unions over the ruling and Shiite Daawah began to spread in favor of the Fatimids which marked the end of the Rustamid state. (Brett et al., 2016)

1.7.1.2 Fatimid State (296-387 AH/ 909 -996 AD):

In the closing decades of the 9th century the Ismaili sect of Shi'a waged battles against Sunni rulers of Africa and took hold over al Kairouan in 909 AD. The Ismaili Imam 'Ubaydallah Ibn Hussain al Mahdi' proclaimed himself a caliph and established 'al Mahdia' as his capital, announcing the establishment of the Fatimid dynasty as an attribution to 'Fatima' the daughter of the messenger 'Muhammad' peace be upon him.

The Fatimids moved westward to Tahit and destroyed its walls and conquered 'Sijilmasa' in Morocco. Then in the 11th century they moved to 'Ourgla' and 'Wed Mzab' where they tightened their grip on the locals and sustained their belief over centuries. The Maghreb was always under the threat of the Fatimids, but to occupy the East (al Mashriq) was their holy grail. Their dream was fulfilled in 969 by conquering Egypt and the state of Cairo was established by 'al-Mu'izz li-Din Allah', the 4th Fatimid Caliph in Africa. Due to this conquest the Fatimids renounced the rule of Africa and the rest of Algeria to the Zirids (972 A.H- 1148 AD) who founded the towns of 'Miliana', 'Médéa' and 'Algiers' and turned the rule to Banu Hammad in 1007 AD. (Daftary, 1999)

1.7.1.3 Hammadi State (389-547 AH/ 1007- 1153 AD):

Banu Hammad or the Hammadi Family is a Berber Muslim Family that ruled the Northeastern modern Algeria for more than a century. They rejected the Ismaili doctrine and restored the Sunni Maliki principality. It was established by 'Hammad Ibn Buluggin' who is famous for the construction of his capital the 'fort of Banu hammad' in 'Maadid' Northeast M'sila in 1007 AD. Yet, he moved his capital to Bejaia in 1090 AD. The age of al Hammadids was prosperous during which industrial, agricultural and cultural life was active. It collapsed in 547 A.H by Almohads. (Ferkous, 2003)

1.7.1.4 The Zayyanid State (633- 692 AH/ 1235- 1554 AD):

The 'Zayyanids' or 'Banu Zayyan' also called 'Banu Abd al Wadid' are a Berber dynasty from the tribe of Zenata that ruled in Western Algeria in the period between 1235-1554 AD. This dynasty was found by 'Yaghmuracen Ibn Zayan' who governed Tlemcen

under Almohads. On the collapse of Almohad Caliphate around 1236 AD, Yaghmuracen declared autonomy announcing 'Tlemcen' as his capital.

What is strikingly noticeable in the history of the dynasty is that the Zayyanids were in perpetual war with the Marinids and the Hafsids. Unfortunately, the debility of the Zayyanids military system rendered it impotent when confronted with the threats of the Marinids who besieged the city for several times. It was besieged for the first time for over 8 years during the reign of Sultan 'Yaakub Yusuf' but his successor immediately ended the siege. It was besieged again during the rule of 'Abu Al Hasan Al Marini' for nearly quarter of a century. Yet, in 760 A.H/ 1359 AD the zayyanid Sultan 'Abu Hammu Moussa II' restored the Zayyanid dynasty and sent the Marinids away.

Though the energy devoted to hold the state together, the Zayyanids never redeemed their previous prestige; as a matter of fact their state experienced a gradual ebbing throughout a century and a half until the 16th century when caught up in a conflict between the Ottomans and the Spaniards who seized it definitively in 960 A.H-1550 AD indicating the total demise of the dynasty. (Kasmi, n.d.)

1.8 The Spaniards in Algeria (1509 AD):

The fragility of the Zayyanid state left it greatly coveted by the Spaniards who managed to exploit the ongoing conflict over the seat of power. It all started when 'Abu Hammou III'[10] deposed and imprisoned the legal successor, his nephew 'Abi Zayyan III' and ascended to the throne of Tlemcen. The Spaniards while nourishing the quarrel, they devised a strategy for capturing Central Maghreb beginning with its coastlines and then simply crawling to the interior.

The Spanish incursion into Islamic territories wasn't carried out haphazardly; it was rather planned and stirred by the papacy that emerged victorious from the Christian Reconquista and summoned Christian rulers to embark on a crusade against Muslims. The papal preaching project found an executive tool represented in the union of the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile through the marriage of 'Fernando II'[11] (1479-1516 AD) to

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[10] - a Zayyanid sultan who reigned in Tlemcen in 1516 then from 1517 to 1518
[11] - was the king of Aragon and king of Castile (as Ferdinand V) from 1479, he joint sovereign with Queen Isabella I

'Isabella' queen of Castile (1474-1504). Isabella was influenced by a papal provocation against Muslims, thus, she misled her husband into launching a campaign against them, culminating in an attack on the coasts of Central Maghreb.

The invasion resulted in the death of 4000 Muslims, the capture of 8000, and the release of 300 Christian hostages. Since the Zayyanid authority was unable to repel the attack, the Spaniards advanced and conquered Oran in 1509 AD, Bejaia in 1510 AD, Mostaganem in 1511 AD, Dellys and Annaba and Hunain in 1531 AD and stayed poised to raid the interior, mainly Tlemcen. To make matters worse, Abu Hammou III declared his loyalty to the Spaniards in order to retain the kingdom of Tlemcen. The residents made an appeal to the brothers 'Barbarossa' to liberate them from their king. 'Oruç Barbarossa'[12] responded to the summons and set off towards Tlemcen. When his forces attacked Abu Hammou III, this latter escaped to Oran seeking Spanish protection.

Oruç returned the crown of Tlemcen to Abu Zayyan III, although he was assassinated by Oruç himself after turning against him. Oruç assumed responsibility for the throne from then on. Abu Hammou III, on the other hand, reclaimed his authority with the help of the Spaniards and seized Tlemcen for 6 months until they were able to break through. They pursued Oruç, murdered him, and returned the throne to Abu Hammou III.

Following Oruç's martyrdom, Algerians petitioned his brother 'Hayreddin Barbarossa' to lead al Jihad against the Spaniards, and he proposed seeking assistance from the Ottoman Empire. Algerians dispatched a delegation bearing presents to Sultan Selim in order to declare their allegiance to him. As a result of his assent, the Sultan dispatched 2 thousand and 4000 men to Hayreddin, proclaiming the beginning of the Ottoman mandate over Algeria. (Saadallah, 1982)

1.9 Ottoman Rule (1515 AD- 1830 AD):

The establishment of the Ottoman power is one of the repercussions of the destruction of Granada in 1492, the last Muslim Spain colony. At that point in time when Spain took the Reconquista across the Mediterranean trying to strengthen its strongholds in

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[12] - also known as 'Oruç Reis' was a Barbary pirate. He was Ottoman Bey (governor) of Algiers and Beylerbey (chief governor) of the West Mediterranean and the elder brother of Hayreddin Barbarossa.

the Maghreb, the brothers Oruç and Hayreddin known to the Europeans by the name 'Barbarossa' or 'red beard' were being victorious serving under the Hafsids. When called upon by the Muslims, they set up series of powerful posts to halt Spanish expansion and were successful in repelling Spanish attacks; therefore, the path was set for the Ottomans to control over Algeria.

With the Algerians' consent, the Ottomans rose to power. The Ottoman Sultan appointed 'Hayreddine Barbarossa' as the first Turkish ruler or 'Beylerbey' over Algeria, rendering it an official Ottoman state. Prior to this point Algeria was simply Central North Africa; a region made up of separate islands subjected to European attacks. However, under the Ottoman rule the regency of Algiers was established as its principal center and a force reckoned at an international level.

1.9.1 The Ottoman Administrative Division:

Algeria was administratively divided into 4 provinces (beyliks) made up of:

- **Dar Al Sultan:** Algiers and its suburbs and the Dey's place of residence
- **The East Beylik**: The Eastern province of Algeria with Constantine as its capital
- **The West Beylik**: The Western province of Mascara then Oran
- **Titteri Beylik**: Medea as its Capital

Figure 1.2: The Provinces of the Regency of Algiers (Ruedy, 1992, p.18)

It was ruled by the Ottomans from 1518 AD until the French occupation in 1830 AD. Throughout this period the rule passed through four epochs:

1.9.1.1 The Era of Beylerbeyis (1574-1587):

Because of the collaboration between the Sultan and Algerian people, this is regarded as the finest age of Ottoman authority in Algeria. This stage was marked by many achievements; such as the construction of the Ottoman fleet and the establishment of regional unity in the country. It witnessed the commencement of important events, most notably the large Portuguese and Spanish raids on Algerian ports, as well as the beginning of the French presence after being awarded the privilege of coral fishing in Annaba, al Kala, and al Kell.

Despite the might of the Algerian navy, which dominated European countries and compelled them to pay taxes in exchange for protection in the Mediterranean, It did not prevent the French from extending their presence, due to their strong ties with the Ottomans and their alliance against Spain as a common foe.

1.9.1.2 Pashas Era (1587-1659):

This era saw a change in the system of ruling. An Ottoman Pasha was appointed in each of Algeria, Tunisia and Tripoli instead of one ruler over the entire region, due to disagreements between Ottoman Janissaries and the Algerian naval forces (al Rayyas), and mainly because of the weak relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the governors of Algeria in the late era of Beylerbeys.

1.9.1.3 The Era of Aghas (1659-1671):

This era saw the rebel of the Janissaries against the Pashas as an objection on how they came to power. Therefore, it was decided to delegate executive authority to a leader of their class known as 'the Agha'. Despite the fact that this era was the shortest period of the Ottoman rule; it was characterized by major political turmoil, corruption and assassination up to a point that it was impossible to maintain security and internal stability in Algeria.

1.9.1.4 The Era of Deys (1671-1830):

This era represents the last stage of the Ottoman presence in Algeria. Following the assassination of 'Ali Agha' in 1671, such a system of rule was established, culminating in the abolition of the Agha regime. It is simultaneously a victory for the Rayyas, evident in the selection of the first 4 Deys from this sect. Soon after, the focus shifted to Janissary officers as a result of European campaigns on the Algerian coastlines which caused great damage to the Algerian fleet and weakened the center of al Rayyas.

What is notable about this era is that it lasted 159 years which is half the time of the Ottoman presence in Algeria. It was also a period of real independence from the Ottoman state in terms of managing both internal and external affairs; implying that the Algerian subordination to the Ottoman Caliphate became mere nominal.

Despite the aforementioned situation, internal circumstances were far from healthy. Continual turmoil and instability were typical of this period, while constant rivalry over power and tyranny contributed in the eruption of civil war and the prevalence of a sense of loss of protection and peace. (Bouzifi, 2016)

The dark side of the Ottoman Caliphate appears when going rigid on the Algerians by looting their properties through bribes and taxes. Continuously more, Algerians were not allowed to interfere in any political affairs or be recruited in administrative ports, while on the flip side, they empowered the Jewish community in the economic affairs being partly responsible for the French Colonization in 1830.

1.10 Cultural Life during the Ottoman Rule (Pre- French Colonial Education):

Particularly during the first two centuries of governance, cultural life was marked by great stagnation mainly because Ottoman rulers were themselves uneducated, spoke no other languages but Turkish, and had little interest in ruling other than power and money. As a matter of fact, prior to the advent of the Turks, most Algerian cities had a cultural and religious revival in the 15th century. The emphasis, however, was not on that specific era because Algeria's political boundaries were not yet established and did not refer to the

current Algerian republic. Thus, the Algerian culture during the Ottoman rule was a legacy inherited from their predecessors.

In practical terms, the Turks were oriented towards al Jihad and paid little attention to the cultural side because the language comprised an obstacle when compared to their humble cultural grounding. Yet, this fact didn't prelude the presence of an educational policy in Ottoman Algeria, based on a formal framework governed by traditional heritage. Despite the obstacles, the Ottoman strategy of 'containment and domestication' aided the fulfillment of an educational task, predicated on their awareness of the significance of the cultured Algerian elite. That if they guarantee their devotion, the loyalty of the entire people will officially be inevitable.

The cultural history of Algeria inherited by the Ottomans can be traced back to the 15th century, precisely during the Spanish presence in Algeria. Due to the weak political system of that period and the inflation of struggle between the Spaniards and Muslims, a new clout was build out mainly in the form of Zawiyah that was predestined to function as an authority of change within the Algerian society. Educational institutions were numerous and were regulated under an Islamic institution known as 'Waqf' or 'Hubus'. It is an Arabic word that translates for 'restriction' meaning that all property belongs to Allah. It is an endowment or charitable donation given to enhance societal conditions and promote local development (Hussain, 2010). Charities and donations for educational and religious purposes are a major concern of Waqf institution.

1.10.1 Educational Institutions in Pre- French Colonial Algeria:

1.10.1.1 Zawiyah:

It is a Sufi institution, often found in rural areas and mountains, consisting of a self-supported group of people and a teaching center administered by an avowed master in the Sufi order. It was expected to have chief prominence in the Algerian society, mainly in politics and culture. In addition to the utility of specific educational and religious practices provided; it had won popular legitimacy within the citizens. The 16th century witnessed the outset of large propagation of Zawiyah influence on a massive audience until afore the French colonization. According to statistics made by 'Dupont' and 'Coppolani', there were

23 Suffi orders and 349 Zawiyahs with 295.189 members. This strong background enabled Sufi institutions to influence the cultural and religious sentiments of nearly all Algerian citizens for roughly 3 centuries. Because of their affinity for Sufi institutions, the Ottoman Turks have aided and sped their progress, as well as incited the migration of other Sufi orders from the East and West.

The Algerian thought was heavily affected by al Qadiriyah (found by Abd al Qadir al Jilani in Baghdad) and al Shadhiliyah (found by Abi al Hassan al Shadhili in Morocco), implying that Sufism was not natively Algerian, but rather a product of Eastern and Western influencing paradigms. Several attempts made in the nineteenth century to inscribe the number of Sufi organizations in the region discovered that 13 of the 16 Sufi orders have roots in al-Shadhiliyah.

The friendly relationship between western Algerian states and sufi organizations in Morocco aided the spread of sufi institutions in the East, including: al Tijaniah, al Hansaliyah, al Rahmaniyah and al Shabiyah while al Isawiyah, al Qadiriyah, al Azayaniyah and al Darkaouiyah emerged in western Algeria.

Particularly, during the Ottoman rule the most prominent Zawiyahs were: the Zawiyah of Abd al Rahman al Tha'alibi, al Walid Dadah and Abdel Qadir al Jilani in the capital city of Algiers.

Lamentably, Sufism teachings sought the penetration of materialistic ideals and promoted fanatic and reclusive values of refraining from social and worldly life, which resulted in big loss of Sufi intellectual traditions, most notably its position in education.

Furthermore, this mindset promoted the development of a religious group unconcerned with scientific and philosophical procedures, rendering the practices of Sufi orders highly superficial and paved the way for shallow teachings by ignorant religious believers whose customs did not extend beyond drum dances and amulets. Thus, the bulk of Europeans regarded these actions as manifestations of black magic and witchcraft.

The mainstream culture in Algeria dominated by Sufism contributed to a type of philosophical monotony that undermined rationality and caused an academic decline, first

and foremost because of the fragility of the intellectual elites who nurtured the proliferation of superstitious thoughts.

On the contrary, certain Zawiyahs had a positive influence in the region. Many scholars emerging from it, switched to higher education institutions with religious curricula similar to 'al Zaytuna' and 'al Azhar' institutes. (Landjal & Bensaid, 2014)

1.10.1.2 The Mosque (Qur'anic School/al Masjid/ al Kuttab/ al Madrasah):

The mosque in the second religious institution after Zawiyah; it is a venerable institution that arose with the advent of Islam and has maintained a respectable status ever since. Al Masjid al Nabawi was the first structure built by the prophet Mohammad, peace be upon him, after his Hijrah from Makkah to Madinah. Mosques have since become a symbol of Islam, serving as places of worship and collective Muslim prayers. Algeria became acquainted with this religious and cultural institution during the Islamic conquests in the second half of the 1st century A.H/ 7th AD, which witnessed a great evolution throughout history.

During the Ottoman era, Algeria became famous for the large number of mosques that served as a meeting places concerned with teaching children basic Arabic and knowledge skills such as reading, writing and memorizing Quran. It was also a place for resolving legal issues, with a council convened to issue fatwas and settle disputes. The size of the mosque was an important factor in determining its function; such mosques are known as grand/ great mosques.

The printed information concerning the history of mosques during Ottoman control was credited to the founder who may have been a businessman, a politician or even a soldier. Among these mosques registered in the Beylik records are: Shaaban Khoja Mosque, Khader Pasha Mosque, Ali Bajin Mosque, Abdi Pasha Mosque, Hassan Pasha Mizmurto Mosque and Ramadhan Pasha Mosque.

Some mosques were named after the neighborhoods in which they were built or after a market nearby. Such as: Houmat al Qayed Moussa Mosque, Mosque al-Salawi Neighborhood, Bab al-Jazirah Mosque, al-Shamameen Mosque, Souq al-Wad Mosque, Souk al-Samen Mosque, al-Batha Mosque, Qaa al-Sour Mosque, al-Sabbaghine, al-Dalia

Mosque, al-Qubbah Mosque, al-Balat Mosque, al-Zaytuna Mosque and Bab Azzun Mosque. While others are attributed to the Sheikh of Zawiyah such as: Mosque of Sidi Abdel-Harman al-Thaalabi, Sidi Ali al-Meliani Mosque, Sidi Joudi Mosque, and Sidi al-Rahbi Mosque.

It is worth noting that mosques built before the era of Ottoman rule belonged to the Maliki School, such as Sidi Ramdhan mosque 1551 AD. With the arrival of the Turks, a new religious institution was established which is, al Hanafi School. The first Hanafi mosque 'al Safir mosque' was constructed by Safar Bin Abdullah in 1535 AD. The following table shows the mosques of the Hanafi and Maliki schools during the Ottoman existence:

Name of Mosque	Date of Establishment	School
The Great Mosque	1108 AD	Maliki
Sidi Ramdan	1551 AD	Maliki
Safir	1534 AD	Hanafi
al Sayida	1564 AD	Hanafi
al Casabah	1571 AD	Maliki
Khayder Pasha	1592 AD	Hanafi
Ketchaoua	1612 AD	Hanafi
Ali Bitchin	1622 AD	Hanafi
al Djedid	1664 AD	Hanafi
Mezzo Morto	1685 AD	Hanafi
Ibn Khodja	1693 AD	Hanafi
Abdi Pasha	1726 AD	Hanafi
Ali Pasha	1758 AD	Hanafi
al Casbah	1818 AD	Hanafi

Table 1.1: Mosques of Maliki and Hanafi Schools (Bouchehdane & Djmili, 2017)

According to data compiled to chronicle the number of mosques during the Ottoman Empire; Algiers had more than a hundred Quran schools, al Casbah had eight, and Constantine had ninety (Lenouar, 2017, p.122-199). These findings suggest that

illiteracy was practically non-existent in Algeria at the start of the French occupation, and that the majority of the Algerian population could read and write. To support this claim, a statement made before the French National Council in 1847 by diplomate 'Alex de Tocqueville' said that Algeria had its own culture before the French presence, and that it was the latter that made the society miserable and barbaric. (Bouchahdane & Djmili, 2017)

1.10.1.3 Higher Education:

It was similar to nowadays universities, however, the professor was appointed by al Pasha. The official language in higher teachings was Arabic to study juristic sciences, Arabic grammar, arts, logic and scheduling to determine prayer time. The main centers of higher education were: al-Qashashiyah and al-Andalusiyin in Algiers; the Madrasah al-Jami' al-A'zam and the Madrasah Wadi Imam in Tlemcen; the Madrasah al-Khanqah in Biskra; and in Constantine there were al- Fakkun, Ibn Afunas and al-Kitaniyah. Students, thus, can either choose to continue their study in their home country, in colleges in nearby nations (such as Morocco and Tunisia), or in one of the Middle Eastern nations (al-Azhar University in Egypt, mainly). (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p.575)

The structure of the educational system in pre-colonial Algeria is illustrated in the table below; it is separated into three levels with the potential positions that a person might have because of each level.

Levels of education	Institutions	Possible professions
First level	*Quranic schools*: urban or rural, learning the Quran and reading and writing the Arabic language	Sailors, corsairs, craftsmen, all types of manual jobs, domestic economy
Second level	*Zawiyahs*: in rural areas Madrassas: in towns/pursuit of learning Quran and Arabic language	First level teacher Secretarial activities

Third level	Courses of law and theology in grand mosques: Zaytuna in Tunisia, Karaouiyne in Morocco, al-Azhar in Egypt	Cadi, Muphti, Professorate of grand mosques

Table 1.2: The Structure of the Educational System in Pre-Colonial Algeria (Kateb, 2004, p.75)

In this respect, General Beidou published an official study revealing that the number of students with a higher education in Constantine in 1837 was between six and seven hundred. Wilhelm Chamber, a German tourist at the time, expressed his astonishment of the learning rate in Algeria as follows: "I have searched for an Algerian citizen who is not capable of reading or writing but I could not find such a person, while I found plenty in the countries of Southern Europe." (Ladjal & Bensaid, 2014, p.575)

Another testimony was made by Dumas, director of Algerian affairs in 1850, who confessed that the primary education in Algeria was more common than French people typically imagined. As evidenced by his interactions with the three provinces and the statistics made to determine education rate; he argued that before the French colonization, each tribe and urban neighborhood had a school teacher and that approximately 40% of children attended school, learnt to read and write, and were able to memorize certain Qur'anic verses and supplications. (Belhassine Rahoui, 2011) However, when the colons established themselves in Algeria they denied the existence of educational institutions; they asserted that:

> Il n'existait en Algérie aucune organisation de l'instruction publique. Quelques zaouïas où se perpétuait un enseignement théologique arriéré, sans valeur morale ou sociale, recevaient des étudiants. On y apprenait la lecture, l'écriture et à un degré supérieur, le Coran et la mystique musulmane, sans souci d'exégèse, de philosophie ou d'histoire du dogme. L'ancien élève, muni d'un parchemin, quittait ensuite la zaouïa, revenait dans son douar où il ouvrait une école moyennant des rétributions modiques, apprenait aux enfants, avec des fragments du Livre sacré, la lecture et l'écriture, quelques légendes maraboutiques. (Kateb, 2004, p.68)

Denial is always the most powerful weapon the West offers when confronted with data that reveal its logic is wrong. However, a huge part of the responsibility falls on the policy of Ottoman rulers towards education, which have contributed to education decline in Algeria. As previously stated, education during the Ottoman era was inherited from those who came before them, and their concern was concentrated on facing the Christian world and avoiding its regional spread in the Maghreb, which adversely halted the growth of a cultural life in Algeria.

It was difficult to find any evidence of the Ottoman ruling elite being involved in the construction or maintenance of schools which prohibited any changes in curriculum and academic discipline. This does not imply that intellectual activity in pre- French Algeria was devoid of educational institutions; it rather implies a lack of educational reform and intellectual originality. Despite the large number of schools, the quality of education was moving backward due to an emphasis on theological studies that were centered on traditions and discounted the value of natural sciences. The curriculum lacked attention to scientific fields such as medicine, mathematics and chemistry and failed to promote any cultural transformation of society. Thus, Sufism growing weary due to lack of reform, along with the rigid political system that contributed in the degradation of the Algerian culture which subsequently oiled the wheels of the colonizer's wagon to crush the rest of it.

1.11 The French Colonization of Algeria (1830-1962):

In general, Algeria had developed political and commercial relations with several European countries before 1830 AD. Algerian motives behind forming these relations were to prevent any European coalition that can endanger its stability on the shores of the Mediterranean. Considering Algeria's sovereignty and control over the Mediterranean, European countries were forced to engage in diplomatic relations with Algeria to preserve their commercial interests from piracy by providing financial offerings, and France was no exception.

France relationship with Algeria gave every indication of being extremely friendly from the beginning of the 12th century (Nait Belkacem, 1985), while the close diplomatic

relations started in the first half of the sixteen century between Europe and the Ottoman Empire. The initiative was taken by the French king 'Francis I' who revoked his vow to defend Christendom and made an alliance with the Turks.

For many decades, Islam has been the biggest competitor and the source of intimidation to western Christendom both religiously and militarily. When European defenses were penetrated in 1453 by the Ottoman Sultan 'Mehmet II' who raided Constantinople, transforming it into the current Istanbul, Europeans broke out in cold sweat from the imminent threat. When the Ottomans conquered Egypt in 1517, Francis I received papal instructions to lead an anti-Turkish league which he eagerly accepted.

Following the battle of Pavia 1525, Francis I was held captive by the Roman emperor 'Charles V', for which he appealed to the Ottoman Sultan 'Sulayman the Magnificent' for military assistance, announcing the beginning of the Franco-Turkish Alliance. This union, though shocking to the Christian audience, was justified as a 'traité de circumstance' and the French king was, thereby, able to maintain his integrity as a Christian monarch.

Initially, the negotiations between the two sides were intended to discuss the protection of the French in the European context, then the Franco Turkish diplomacy shifted to the Mediterranean when Francis I sent his envoy, the French ambassador 'Jean La foret', to Constantinople to suggest formalizing the military alliance with the Turks, while also discussing the possibility of a peaceful and long term commercial treaty. (Jensen, 1985)

At the invitation of the French king, a conference was convened with the envoys of Hayreddine and Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent to officially sign 'the tripartite treaty 1534' or 'le traité de Châtellerault' in the name of the city where the treaty was signed. As a result, France was granted the privilege of establishing a commercial center in El Kala for coral fishing and wheat exportation to Europe. (Nait Belkacem, 1985)

At the onset of the French revolution in 1789 France suffered a severe economic crisis; European countries hostile to the French revolution announced an economic siege on France. Accordingly, Algeria permitted the French government to conduct its financial

operations in Algerian ports, in addition to a loan of one million francs with no interest, to be invested in Algerian grain

Since the commencement of Algerian-French commercial relations, the payment of financial fees for every business transaction has been covered directly to the Algerian government. Later on, France decided to adopt a financial intermediation through the Jewish merchants 'Michel Bakri Cohen' and 'Bushnaq' who are blamed for the Algerian economy's stagnation and political obstructions that led to the siege and the colonization of Algeria.

The two Jews won Dey Hussein's[13] consent to dominate the grain trade. It all started when the Dey instructed Bushnaq to bring him a jewel known as 'al Sarima,' which he did for 300.000 francs. Because the Dey lacked the necessary funds, he compensated for the jewel with 75.000 bushels of wheat instead. It was subsequently sold in France for 3 million 450 thousand francs, despite the fact that the diamond cost him no more than 30 thousand francs in the first place. (Saadallah, 1982)

This incident was the beginning of Jewish interference in Algerian affairs and their influence on the Mediterranean as a whole. The two Jews were shrewd enough to monopolize trade in the area, and lured French officials to import Algerian wheat from their company, resulting in massive debts to the French government.

While France was indebted to the Algerian Jews, they were in return indebted to the Algerian state. So whenever the Dey demanded the Jewish merchants to pay their debts to the Algerian government, they rejected, stating that payments to the Regency is not possible until France pays its debts. Therefore, the Dey was always in constant insistence on France to pay its debts to the merchants.

To address the loan issue, Algeria licensed a committee in 1819 to scrutinize the debt rate owed to the Algerian government. It was first estimated at 24 million francs, but this was progressively reduced to only 7 million francs. When the case was submitted to

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[13] - Last Dey (Ottoman local ruler) of Algiers, 1818-1830. His hitting the French consul with a fly-whisk led to war and French occupation of Algeria

the French parliament, it agreed to pay one million and a half francs and pursue the Jewish company, with the remainder of the debt frozen until the court decision is issued.

Practically, this display was a mere artifice and France collaborated with the Jews to deceive the Algerian government and repudiate its obligations. Despite the Dey's repeated petitions to the French monarch to reverse the parliament's decision to freeze the loans, he received no answer. When the truth about the scheme was revealed, Bakri went to Livorno after receiving his money, while Bushnaq relocated to Paris after obtaining French nationality, leaving Algeria in huge political crisis.

On April 22nd, 1827 the French consul 'deval' paid a visit to Dey Khodja Hussein as a diplomatic protocol to express his greetings on the occasion of Eid al Fitr. It was during this meeting that the Dey put forward the issue of the debts and inquired about receiving no answer from the French government. In an effort to irritate the Dey, Deval boasted arrogantly that the king does not write to those below him. Infuriated by his response; the Dey thrusted his fan towards Deval's face, touching the tip of his cheek, shouting: "you are a wicked, faithless, idol worshipping rascal". (Evans & Phillips, 2007, p.01) and ordered his departure immediately.

France, as is customary, seized the fan incident to gain international sympathy. French press was outraged; the 'Gazette de France' declared that French dignity must be avenged, and the nest of pirates (Algeria) had to be taught a lesson. (Evans & Phillips, 2007) This claimed insult propagated on a global scale; foreign embassies were purposely notified to attain witness on the offense that defamed the French honor. In addition, France threatened to occupy Algeria if it did not receive the Dey's regretful acknowledgement within the next 24 hours. (Ferkous, 2003)

The 16th of June 1827 was a well-planned selection for a date to declare war on Algeria; it coincided with the absence of the Algerian fleet on a mission to Greece to fight on the Ottoman Empire's side against the triple alliance (France, England, and Russia). When war broke out on October 20th, 1827 bringing the four world powers together in the battle of Navarin; France tracked with a sadistic grin, the opportunity to bring down those

holding the sword. Eventually, the Algerian fleet was totally razed to the ground and Algeria was besieged by the French forces.

The reasons behind the invasion were completely ambiguous. One 'short term' pretext given by the French government was that of the fan incident; a 'long term' one was their endeavor to end the act of piracy on the Mediterranean. Perhaps the most logical answer was that of Majumdar (2007) when she asserted that the siege was an act "to provide something of a diversion for a monarchy in trouble" (p.05)

This declaration of war remained in the shape of a maritime blockade of the Algerian coasts over the course of 3 years. France turned to active warfare a month and a half after Dey Hussein refused to appease their demands. On June 12th, 1829 France sent a part of its naval fleet, foregrounded by la provence captained by admiral 'Collet' and carried on board consul 'Deval', to negotiate the conditions of an agreement that might satisfy their vanity.(Nait Belkacem, 1985) It had firmly stipulated the followings:

1. the Dey should personally proceed to the French consulate and submit an official apology to consul Deval
2. to send an official delegation headed by secretary of the navy to the French ship *la Provence* to offer his apology
3. to fly the French flag over the whole city of Algeria and to fire a hundred cannon rounds as a tribute.

To top it all off, Collet stated that the Dey's agreement to these terms will surely lead to further conditions, the most crucial of which is the unequivocal admission of having no debt owed to the Algerian government (Saadallah, 1982, p.24-25). Though it was evident that the Dey would not approve to this shady strategy, France persevered in placing pressure on him in order to maximize the prospect of gaining additional reasons to invade Algeria. As expected, Dey Hussein could not sacrifice his dignity to preserve France's, proving that the precise planning was effective in achieving the desired result.

On May 25th, 1830 a French campaign led by general 'Bourmont' departed the port of Toulon heading to Algeria. With a superb force of 37000 troops and 103 vessels, the French army waded ashore on June 14th, 1830 at Sidi Ferruch, a beach some twenty miles

to the west of Algeria's capital. This location was chosen as a stepping stone to launch an invasion because it was so safe from any potential threat to an extent that members of the French high class rented pleasure boats to be on the lookout of the bombardment of the Algerian coastline. In the absence of a defensive military plan and the unheeded conduct of taking no requisite precautions to ensure the security of the state and prevent the campaign from reaching the shore, the French succeeded in seizing Sidi Ferrouch after defeating the Dey's forces in Staoueli on June 19th, 1830.

Without a second thought, Dey Hussein rushed to offer an olive branch announcing his consent to give all concessions possible to the French trade, to waive all debts and to pay the campaigns expenses as a compensation for the apology. Though these were the seemingly claimed requests, Bourmont's desire for power had not yet been quenched. He refused all offerings but the surrender of the Dey and the capitulation of his city. As a result, he dispatched his messenger with the following instructions:

1- to hand over the Capital castles and fortresses and port on the morning of July 8th.
2- to guarantee complete protection of the Dey's life and personal properties if he chooses to stay in Algeria and confirm his absolute freedom to depart to any desired destination
3- to give a pledge of honor that the inhabitants' rights, freedom, religion and properties will be respected and well protected
4- this document should be signed and delivered on July 5th and the French soldiers receive the Kasbah and other fortresses of the city immediately. (Ferkous, 2003, p.129-130)

After signing the contract against his will, Dey Hussein fled Algeria on June 10th and remained in Alexandria till his death in 1838 AD. The Turks were then forced out of Algeria to Anatolia on July 11th, 1830 AD.

With might and main, the French invading troops rushed to reave the Algerian state treasury after a keen assessment of the financial resources, which was estimated to be worth 55.684.527 Francs in total, divided as 48.684.527 Francs from the stock of gold,

silver, and jewelry; 3.000.000 Francs from wool and other goods; and 4000.000 Francs from cannons sent to France.

Euphorious with the triumph; Comte de Bourmont[14] drank a toast in honor of the victory that he knew would grant him a Marshal baton, and congratulated his crew on a campaign that had lasted only 20 days and culminated in the destruction of the most powerful empire that had been, in his words, a "thorn in the side of Europe for three centuries" (Evans & Phillips, 2007, p.01) for its protective process of piracy around the Mediterranean basin. From this moment forth, Algeria was to become a French state annexed to mainland France.

On re-examination of the French scheme; there was no willful prearrangement for the systematized forthcoming invasion. Due to a vexed policy, French military men and politicians relentlessly debated over the course of action; whether withdrawal, limited control or full occupation. The latter was fulfilled when the fan incident chanced to occur and the cynical pretext succeeded to hoodwink international public opinion. Away from the meretricious prestige that France bestowed on itself, the invasion of Algeria was of high economic significance. It was the first Arab country to be annexed by the West, which renders it the main gateway for Britain and France in their pursuance of the rest of the Arab world over the next hundred years. Thence, Algeria was rather the unexploited 'hidden treasure' and "the gold that had been plundered over the previous three centuries by the pirates operating out of Algeria" (Evans & Phillips, 2007, p.02)

From a religious prospect, the Mediterranean has long been seen as a field of tension and competition between Christianity and Islam. For the French Papacy, the invasion of Algeria revived a sense of nostalgia for the Crusades. Since the Crusades, according to historian Joseph François Michaud, transcended religious devoutness to express France's national grandeur; then striving to restore the honor of France that has allegedly been dragged through the mud by the Algerian government is cut from the same cloth of the crusades. Therefore, the incursion is indisputably a victory of Christianity over Islam.

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[14] - was a French soldier and politician, conqueror of Algiers (1830), for which he received the title of marshal of France

The incident that ascertains the validity of this notion is when King Charles X announced the invasion of Algeria to the French national assembly on March, 2nd, 1830. In so doing, he justified the enterprise one hundred per cent on religious grounds, claiming that the endeavor was a reverence of Christianity. He stated:

> In the midst of the grave events that have preoccupied Europe, I was obliged to suspend the effect of my just resentment against a Barbary power; but I can no longer allow to go unpunished the grave insult of my flag; the resounding redress that I hope to obtain in satisfying the honor of France will with the Almighty's help turn to the profit of Christendom. (Evans & Phillips, 2007, p.02)

In the main, it was the Cultural dimension that energized France to stir the pot all the more; considering itself a great nation with a superior culture, it took the pledge to help those culturally vulnerable countries to experience the universal values of Civilization. In particular, Civilization is a term coined by the French in the 18th Century. Though at the end of the 19th century all European countries proclaimed to carry out the work of Civilization worldwide, France overvalued this claim and made it an official imperial doctrine.

La Mission Civilisatrice started in 1870 when France began to spread its dominance in Africa. It was during this period that French politicians proudly claimed that the French attempt to civilize its colonies is a unique mission unlike that of other European countries. The concept of 'secular mission civilisatrice' centered on some basic beliefs regarding the supremacy of the French culture and supereminence of the French race. Historian Augustin Bernard explained the French aims behind their colonizing mission: "Our final goal, conforming to our ideal of yesterday and today, the ideal of Richelieu Louis XIV as well as of the French Revolution, is the foundation of a France overseas where our language and civilization will be established." (As cited in Assous, 1985, p.91)

Resting on these notions, the colonized subjects were looked upon as too primitive to govern themselves but luckily have the potential of being elevated. Due to the French revolutionary past and their present industrial potentials, they are by nature qualified to undertake this task, (Conklin, 1997) in like manner, Algeria was seen in French eyes as an unstable state. By the beginning of the 19th century the Ottoman Empire was weakened by

the growing tribal quarrels and the insecurity of economy dominated by European trades. The Algerian regency was torn with discord and was no longer shielded from external attacks which motivated France to develop colonial tendencies towards it. Believing that since Algeria was ready to overthrow the Ottoman rule; France must be the perfect alternative. When the French war was waged in 1830, the French discerned that by taking away the land and the culture of the natives, Algeria was to be made French. It was this extremist notion that agonized the Algerian society for 132 years and continued to frame the Algerian culture and identity ever since.

1.12 Conclusion:

Throughout its history, Algeria witnessed series of colonial existence that affected its current entity, but the French colonization always outweighs when compared to the previous ones. The French colonial endeavor was not held only to satisfy a material ambition, but also a tendency to obliterate the Algerian culture and identity. This ideological colonization remains the most menacing, given that it is a tool that will continue to exist after the departure of the colonized. Ensuring the survival of the colonized culture would serve to erode the structure of the independent state and create obstacles for independent governments searching for their sovereignty.

Chapter Two:

Cultural Hybridity and the Frenchification Tendencies in Colonial Algeria

2.1 Introduction:

France's third republic that operated from 1871-1880 witnessed the establishment of the first governmental primary school system. This educational system was characterized by a tendency to control education by setting it apart from religious institutions and by promoting the use of the French language in the metropole and overseas colonies. Through a process of assimilation, the application of this educational system in Algeria sought to convert Algerians into French citizens. In order to build a society that was submissive to France and devoted to its government, France attempted to amputate the culture and language of the indigenous people by adhering to precise Frenchification policies and enacting several educational reforms. The republic attempted to control the cultural identity through its secularizing tendencies and its quest for linguistic uniformity, which resulted in the establishment of a hybrid culture and identity.

2.2 The Algerian War in '*les Pieds Noirs*' Historiography:

When the French entrenched themselves in Algeria at the outset of colonization, they were confronted not only with a treacherous landscape but also a diverse society of 3 million inhabitants. At short notice, French settlers took the ultimate command position and constituted a society later called les pieds noirs. It was not long after, that Algeria was divided into three French departments, the fact that rendered the locals mere 'subjects' of the French state devoid of any political rights, unlike the French residents who were at their extreme convenience in enjoying all their rights both socially and politically. These set of tactics constitute a proof that the French had no inclination to take leave; as historian Marc Ferro puts it:

> Elsewhere, there had been invasions, occupations of countries that have lasted ten, twenty maybe thirty years yet; this level of occupation, with massive land dispossession and settlements is quite singular. Algeria was not only part of France, Algeria was France. (Calvet, 2017, p.04)

The French found it difficult to put the idea of invasion into words. Therefore, a pretext was to be made to convince the general public that it was not part of a grand design. It, thus, objectified the notion of 'colonization' to meet the French narration of 'nation building'. In sharp contrast with the British imperial model of association that did not intervene with the structures of the pre-existing local power; the French colonial government based on the assimilationist model sought to make Algeria French by forcing Algerian subjects to adopt the French language and culture. Historian Leroy Beaulieu said that:

> The way to dominate a people is to assimilate it, to seize the youth in its infancy...The knowledge of the Koran is disappearing in Algeria: it must not be revived; it is a book full of bellicose exhortations against infidels and includes thousands of texts that can be used against us. North Africa (....) will only belong to us definitively if we conciliate Arabs and, to a certain extent, Frenchify them. (As cited in Assous, 1985, p.91)

This scheme was set afoot by the opening move of annexing Algeria to mainland France in 1848; the territory was divided into 3 departments directly ruled by the minister of domestic affairs. It was followed by a declaration that Algerians must be honored with a French education to be made proper and well deserve the title of a French citizen. Until that happens, they have to put up with their status as subjects of the French empire, having no political rights unless they choose to relinquish their status of Muslims. As a matter of fact, the French attempted to raise their standards and created a criterion of a French citizen that is impossible for an Algerian to attain and against which they were compared. However, it was wisely used by Algerians as a tool to challenge French power and base their claims for independence.

National resistance begun in the shape of organized political movements. The first of which was a reformist movement led by a small group of elites in an attempt to prove their eligibility to be both Muslims and proper French citizens. This movement was institutionalized in 1926 by the creation of the *North African Star* by Ahmed Messali Hadj[15] emphasizing on the demand of complete freedom. Though France promised

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[15] - was a revolutionary Algerian nationalist leader

complete autonomy to its colonies as a reward to their enrollment in the French army; after the First World War, the French government adjusted its plan to grant French citizenship to a merely specific category of Algerian Muslims. This was denied by Messali Hadj for this classification, in his words, was: "a new instrument of Colonialism… to split the Algerian people by separating the elite from the masses." (Calvet, 2017, p.06) and he called for a revolution against colonial rule who replied by dissolving his political party in 1929.

This latter was succeeded by the Algerian people's Party in March 1937 founded by Messali Hadj himself but was also suppressed only to reemerge in 1946 as the *Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties* (MLTD). This political party grew rapidly and had a massive influence all over the country but was unfortunately repressed by the police in 1950.

Messali's influence witnessed a gradual decline in the post war era. In 1954 he formed the *Algerian National Movement* (MNA) as a reaction to the formation of the *National Liberation Front* (FLN). The sharp division of opinions between the two political parties created a state of rivalry. However, Messali's organization was not able to compete with the FLN, in addition to the brutal political repression enacted by the French political power that ended by Messali being imprisoned and the prohibition of his nationalist political parties. Luckily, the Algerian National Movement was able to withstand these repressions by the formation of a disciplined national organization embodied in the FLN which came to lead the Algerian struggle for independence.

The outbreak of revolution was articulated by Arnold Fraleigh former Foreign Service officer, department of state- in a very appealing manner. As a reader of his book you have to imagine yourself a farmer in the mountains of Algeria. It is the 1st of November 1954 and you awoke to learn that the French guards have been attacked by a group of compatriots who took the initiative to inform you about the campaign by leaving a handbill on your doorstep reading:

> Algerian people:
>
> Reflect on your humiliating colonized position. Under colonialism, justice, democracy and equality are nothing but a snare and a delusion… side by side with our brothers to the East and the West who are dying

that their fatherland may live; we call on you to reconquer your freedom at the price of your blood. Organize yourselves to give aid, comfort and protection to the Forces of Liberation. To take no interest in the struggle is a crime; to oppose it is treason. … Long live the Army of Liberation! Long live independent Algeria!   (Fraleigh, 1967, p.06)

After this appeal, the masses had gathered with great enthusiasm to contribute in the struggle. They joined the liberation forces functioning as the National Liberation Front (FLN) who embarked their campaign by setting up road barriers and cutting down telephone poles and managed to kill the village administrator appointed by the French state to eliminate any reason that can hinder their move.

The response of the French forces was quick witted. Few weeks after, plains holding a French badge were flying ahead showering the country with alerting leaflets saying:

Agitators, among the strangers, have brought bloody strife to our country and have, in particular, established themselves in the area. They have been followed by the misguided few whose notion is to start a civil war. Moslems: you will not follow them but will assemble immediately and not later than November 21 at 6 p.m. in the security zones with your families and goods. … Those of you who have enlisted without thinking, if you have no crime on your conscience, proceed immediately to the security zones with your arms and no harm will come to you. Soon a terrifying calamity will overtake the rebels, after which French peace will reign again. (Fraleigh, 1967, p.07)

These words of defiance triggered the fire of war. Revolution burst out with the FLN arranging bloody revolts and threatening to subdue the colonial cities hosting the great majority of European settlers. To put an end to rebellion, France sent 500.000 troops to Algeria. Confronted with 100.000 militant on the side of FLN, the French forces dispatched thousands of civilians in Algeria and pro independent citizens in mainland France. Whereas those Algerians who choose to fight for the French army or the so called 'Harkis' were killed in large numbers by the FLN and abandoned by the French after independence.

These campaigns aimed to tear down the FLN. Moreover, to isolate the rebels France sought to grant Morocco and Tunisia independence to keep itself focused on Algeria. Their borders were fortified with electric fencing and barbed wire as a military isolation design to push the rebels back to rural areas which succeeded in limiting the spread of revolution.

Unexpectedly, in May 1958 a crisis shook the European Algerians' composure. The recent campaigns made them fully aware that the rebels were not trying to destroy the colonial system only, but also to eliminate the social structures and European minorities in Algeria. Feeling the threat of exclusion led les pieds noirs to organize massive manifestations to denounce the abandonment of Algeria and demand its complete integration with France. Simultaneously, French citizens called for the return of De Gaulle to power for he, due to the insurrection that had broken out in Algeria, was believed to be the only man capable of avoiding a civil war and restoring national unity.

De Gaulle was appointed as a prime minister by the national assembly and was given the power of forming the constitution of the Fifth Republic. He was elected president on December 21st, 1958 and the main challenge in his first years of presidency was to find a solution to the Algerian war. He was fluctuating between the left wing intellectuals who supported the Algerian independence and pressed him to find a quick solution to the war and the European residents of Algeria and mainland supporters who sought to keep hold of Algeria. However, after the FLN formed the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) on 19th September 1958; it was clear that its leaders are not going to compromise on the full independence of the country. De Gaulle realized that he has no choice but to acknowledge the Algerians right to self-determination.

On June 4th, 1958 De Gaulle delivered a speech in front of a huge crowd offering Algerians the choice between 3 possible solutions: secession, francization (meaning assimilation) or association, hoping that Algerians may opt for the third choice. Yet, the results of the referendum rated 75% votes in favor of full independence. The partisans of French Algeria who welcomed the return of De Gaulle were disillusioned and felt

betrayed by the one supposed person to support them. Their anger gave rise to the Secret Army Organization (OAS), a civil military terrorist movement found by French dissidents to fight against Algerian independence. This organization materialized from 1961 to 1936 and launched series of attacks in France and Algeria but was not able to prevent the signing of Evian accords on the 18th March 1962 that acknowledged the autonomy of Algeria and the overall withdrawal of the French troops from its territories.

Following the wave of decolonization in the 1950's and the 1960's, Colonialism or Imperialism was highly perceived as a European historical heritage. But the colonial experience in Algeria was not among those great events (the two World Wars and the Holocaust) that merited recognition in their cultures of remembrance (Jensen, 1985). Extremely startling was the French reaction towards the Algerian war of independence. Throughout the entire conflict the French objected the recognition of the war because admitting its occurrence is much the same as affirming the dislocation of the French republic. For contemporary critics: "Algeria [was] and must remain[ed] French; no more French Algeria, no more France". (Calvet, 2017, p.09) Thereby, the French government enforced a policy of censorship that restricted the publication of dozens of books and movies that strove to disclose the realities of the war.

Moving towards a 'war with no name' was a diligent plan to retain the possession of Algeria, but since the course of events was not of a particular advantage, after independence the French government held a referendum that was unanticipatedly approved with 75% of votes for independence. The popular vote marked the end of the French presence which implies the loss of the last territory of the empire; however to the French; the dispossession of Algeria was not as losing a mere territory but particularly half of itself.

Algeria's independence was a stake through the French's heart, but their colonial obstinacy continued to exist even after the end of the conflict. The French state's denial of the war was apparent in the embellishment of the term in their official texts; euphemisms such as 'les évènements d'Algérie' or 'the events of Algeria' were used instead.

The misrepresentation of facts had a corrupting influence mainly on the academic field. In France, the minister of education kept a lookout on history textbooks content before setting the program; to eliminate any possibility of disseminating ill-favored information. By doing so, the reality of the war was buried underground for over 30 years and was barely discussed in academia, the media or political debates. It survived only within those who actually witnessed the war: former soldiers of the French army, les pieds noirs, the harkis and the Algerian diaspora.

When the French managed to remember the war; the act of remembering was always hovering around the idea of "collective memory". Though memory is fundamentally an individual phenomenon, according to Halbwacks (1950), we are part of a common symbolic order that provides us with cognitive schemata that defines time and space and provide modes of thinking through which we perceive and recall past events. This policy of framing the public retrospect was adopted by the French government after the 1990's. It was until 1995; approximately 35 years from the beginning of the war, that the deputies of the French national assembly agreed to replace 'the events of Algeria' by 'the war of Algeria' in the legal documents of the French republic. (Calvet, 2017)

In May 2016 a radio debate by historian Benjamin Stora with the French journalist Francois d'orchival was held, in which he explained how sensitive the issue was in contemporary France on the political and the academic level. He acknowledged that as scholars:

> We fail to come to an agreement on the memory of the War of Algeria as it remains vivid in the minds of those who experienced it in a way or another. This opposition within ourselves, the national body of the French community, is a kind of mystery of the end of colonization that we still have not fully processed   (Calvet, 2017, p.01)

Such confusion was created due to the lack of congruence between what is narrated and what has actually happened. The historical narratives were a combination of fact creation and a bundle of silences based on the notion of forgetting in collective memory. Indeed, this strategy is a cardinal principal in The French history. For over centuries, France had a monopoly over collective memory; its political institutions produced

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standard regulations to frame the memorial of events in order to support the narration of French national unity.

As convincing a reason it may seem; this was not the only one behind the French deafening silence. Indeed, the war was a witness on the unlawful measures of collective torture and massacres employed on Algerians. France had sacrificed its principles as a democratic and civilized country, and to add insult to injury; it had lost the war. This was a chapter in their history which the French were not proud of and having a confrontation with the past was all the more uncomfortable and pressing, so they preferred Amnesia over facing their dishonorable memories.

In an attempt to unfold the secret behind the erasure of the Algerian war from the French historiography, in 1992 Benjamin Stora published his seminal book *la gangrene et l'oubli* where he explained that denial was not a matter of choice; it was eating the body of France away like cancer, so France had to forget in order to live. Moreover, the absence of public discussion about the war was another reason that the memory of the war persisted on an individual basis, a process called by Stora 'the privatization of memory'. It was until after the publication of his book that the French public was able to partake in an open discourse on the war that ultimately contributed to the official acknowledgement of the conflict in 1999.

The concealment of the war was a French policy to escape an undesirable past after decolonization, but the unfaithfulness in writing history was just the tip of an iceberg; what was hidden was even greater. Those events that were eradicated from colonial archives and distorted in historical narratives were the continuum of previous hybridizing tendencies that targeted the culture of the nation and the population's factor of identification by creating a disoriented other or , in Fanon's words: "individuals without an anchor, without horizon, colorless, stateless, rootless." (1963, p.218)

2.3 Cultural Hybridity: a Postcolonial Perspective:

Hybridity is one of the most controversial terms in postcolonial theory; typically, refers to the formation of new cross cultural expressions produced by

colonization in the zone of contact between the colonizer and colonized. In his examination of colonizer/ colonized relations; theorist Homi Bhabha suggested (1994) that despite the stark division, there is a strong connection that binds them both together and affects the formation of their realties. He went on to define them as two opposites that intersect in a zone named 'the third space of enunciation,' where all cultural beliefs and systems, as well as their cultural identities, are created.

By 'third space of enunciation' Bhabha refers to a hybrid space where communication is possible. It is a metaphysical zone and a transition space that challenges colonial power standards and values, while also allowing for the existence of hybrid identities and cultural changes without an imposed line of dominance. In *the location of culture* (1994), Bhabha casts doubt on the concept of culture as a single entity and a simple depiction of self and other. He employs the concept of hybridity to highlight the contradictions in the colonizer's assertions of power. To put it another way, acknowledging culture as plural and hybrid is necessary to eliminate the belief of a pure and original culture, which permits the colonized to put into question the colonial claims to possessing a superior and a pure culture. As a result, there can be no cultural singularity or purity because all cultures are hybrid. Hybridity thus:

> Becomes the moment in which the discourse of colonial authority loses its univocal grip on meaning and finds itself open to the trace of the language of the other, enabling the critic to trace complex movements of disarming alterity in the colonial text. (As cited in Bellocchi, 2009, p.72)

In here, young explains that, to Bhabha, meaning is generated out of the exchange between the colonizer's culture and that of the colonized. The latter's interpretation and negotiation of the colonial discourse and the meaning he attributes to it is what makes the hybrid, or what is dubbed a 'third space' that transcends the polarities of us/ them, self/other, colonizer/colonized.

Hybridity according to Bhabha is "a problematic of colonial representation…that reverses the effects of the colonialist disavowal, so that other denied knowledge enters

upon the dominant discourse and estrange the basis of its authority." (As cited inBellocchi, 2017, p.73) Hybridizing the colonial discourse changes the hegemonic mechanisms of the colonial authority. By tracing the voice of the colonized in the colonial discourse, it weakens the claims of colonial power and it reveals itself not as single voiced but rather as a double voiced authority. From another perspective, the influence of colonial power is seen as the production of hybridization and not the authoritative order of colonial power or the elimination of the direct native culture, so: "If the effect of colonial power is seen to be the production of hybridization…it enables a form of subversion" (Bhabha, 2012, p.160) that leads the colonial voice to be heard and questioned differently; thus, this alteration implies its otherness and reveals at the same time its ambivalent and violent nature.

Hybridity in simple words is an act of opposition and resistance to a dominating cultural power. It is created when two cultures confront in the third space to form a new identity that is 'neither the one, nor the other'. This confirms the colonial culture failure and "inability to replicate itself in a monolithic and homogeneous manner" (Muñoz-Larrondo, 2008, p.15) creating an alienated colonized from its true self and identity.

For Bhabha, colonial discourse is not only concerned with the colonizer. Though the colonized is generally looked upon as the stranger other, it is always dragged into the colonized "circulations of identification and disavowal" (Huddart, 2006, p.44) However, the act of discrimination between the self and other, the mother culture and the other's culture is an act of estrangement and disavowal "where the trace of what is disavowed is not repressed but repeated as something different, a mutation, a hybrid" (Bhabha, 2004, p.111)

2.4 The Politics of Frenchness and the Creation of the Hybrid:

This is a political process designed to produce a French individual with a French identity. It began with the concept of the civilizing mission or in French "la mission civilisatrice".

2.4.1 La Mission Civilisatrice:

There is a general consensus among historians that Civilization is a French concept. It was coined by the French in the 18th century and they have, ever since, generated a sense of pride over their own; which was mainly celebrated during the new imperialism of the third republic. This notion was not unique to France; several European countries claimed to be carrying out the mission of civilization in their colonial territories overseas at the end of the nineteenth century, but only France elevated this claim to the level of an official imperial doctrine.

When France sought to build its empire in Africa in the 1870s, French officials made it abundantly clear that France was the only European country capable of civilizing the indigenous peoples; what is dubbed by the French as 'La Mission Civilisatrice'. Yet, the concept of the civilizing mission was predicated on some fundamental convictions, such as the supremacy of the French culture and the superiority of their race. This indicated an attempt to trivialize the colonized people by portraying them as barbaric creatures incapable of self-government. Due to their allegedly superior nature and their groundbreaking past, the French believed they are uniquely qualified to undertake this mission.

As a matter of fact, the notion of France as a superior race was supported by a bunch of scientists such as Joseph Arthur de Gobineau and Paul Broca. In the so called 'scientific racism' theory; anthropologists defined race based on the study of craniometrical features, due to which a hierarchy of races was created and categorized each with specific mental abilities. According to philologist Ernest Renan (1882), nations are in a constant race struggle, and it is a necessity for a superior race to colonize an inferior one to establish itself as dominant. It is no crime for one nation to assert its hegemony on the other since it's the rules of nature that made it possible. Renan claimed that "nature produced a race of laborers: the Chinese...; a race of workers of the earth, the Blacks...; a race of masters and soldiers: the Europeans," (Brooks, 2016, p.10) and colonization is the possible means to end class conflict by setting each race in its proper place.

From a French perspective; the notion of la mission civilisatrice resonated effectively in a society that is currently known for securing the universal principles of 1789, and in the name of the Republic; the rights of men summed in the trilogy of 'liberty, equality, fraternity' were championed as being universally applicable even on the colonies overseas. (Majumdar, 2007, p.08)

There were, however, certain outliers among the French people. The minority that had reservations concerning the superiority of the French mocked the notion that the republic actually bestowed privileges on its colonies. Yet, no one dared to question the foundation of the French superiority or from which the idea of empire was generated, or in lesser extent, to question the ability of the mission to be successfully accomplished. These firmly held beliefs formed the core of what is required to be French and Republican in the 19th century.

An afar glance at the notion of la mission civilisatrice would indicate a resemblance to that of racism. However, the dimensions of the term are so wide to be put in the same mold, ignoring its demand for a colonial ideology and its relationship to policy making. The concept of a civilizing mission had a particular implication in Republican France which limited what the government could or couldn't accomplish in the colonies. Thus, France was able to conceal the act of a forcible creation of an empire in the gown of democracy.

During the course of its history, France's imperial ideology has constantly associated civilization with one value above all others: 'Mastery'; mastery not over peoples themselves, but of nature and social behaviors. Their perception of being civilized is closely linked to the idea of being free from any form of tyranny: "the tyranny of the elements over man, of disease over health, of instinct over reason, of ignorance over knowledge and of despotism over liberty" (Conklin, 2000, p.06). This was a crucial term that helped France to define itself. The French thought they deserved an empire since they were powerful enough to overcome nature (geography, climate, illnesses, etc.) by developing marketplaces and conquering colonies in other countries. They are not to be compared to non-Europeans since their battle against tyranny and superstition resulted

in the establishment of a logical democratic government, which non-Europeans failed to attain. They are barbarians in need of civilization due to their lack of competence or mastery.

The French applied an assimilationist ideology on the indigenous people and when confronted with their low economic conditions; they believed the mission civilisatrice compelled them to raise their subjects living standards; or the so called the 'mise en valeur' of the colonies' human and natural resources through the construction of railroads that could facilitate the movement of people, currency, and goods, as well as improving the colonized people's hygiene to avoid any disease. However, the project took a step ahead to include interference in the people's way of life. They argued that civilization necessitates African people to evolve within their own cultures to generate a new one that comply with the principles of the French government. Thus, the colonies became test grounds of French policies and areas of negotiation and struggle between the colonizer and colonized, where French notions about Africans' potential to progress and France's ability to civilize them were questioned and altered on a regular basis. (Conklin, 2000) The very notion of la mission civilisatrice was summed up by Nicholas Harrison in his book Our Mission to Civilize (2019) when he stated that it is: "a complacent mix of religiosity and ethnocentricity, embroiled in a shameful colonial history where the malignant rhetoric of the white man's burden served as the pretext for violent conquest." (p.02)

2.4.2 Teaching Frenchness: The Formation of a French Identity:

Within the bounds of the French empire emerged a strong conviction that France 'est une variété dans l'unité'; that it is both one and different. Under the Third Republic, the French identity was said to be the consequence of existing local and national affiliations, and that the empire's strength was attributed to the diversity of its provinces. However, the question that has been and continues to be perplexing is whether individuals from various cultural and religious backgrounds, who reside beyond the boundaries of France, although being part of the French empire, can obtain any sense of Frenchness and whether assimilation is feasible.

As previously stated, Algeria unlike other colonies was the only country awarded a departmental status by France. It was certainly incorporated to the French soil because Algeria upgraded the grandeur of a country concerned about its international standing; as a result, French politicians were in a constant trial to persuade the general public that Algeria is France, although in another continent. Those who opposed colonization, on the other hand, found the concept of French Algeria unfathomable; Algeria was not France, and so was not worth the effort. The colonization and the Francization of Algeria was a mere wasted French energy on a land afar from metropolitan France. This begs the issue of why would an African Muslim country such as Algeria be at that point of debate? And how the French envisioned Algeria becoming to eagerly rush to make it French?

France was attempting to extend its borders and had begun the process of establishing 'la plus grande France.' However, the circumstances were not favorable; low birth rates and conflicts with Germany made the task so difficult. Thus, the acquisition of territories and colonial communities would help dissipate the fear of war and competition, and to incorporate millions of indigenous people into the French population (mainly to fill the units of the French army) required disseminating Frenchness or the French sentiment addressed by the civilizing mission. Hence, Algeria and its large population would become French through a process of assimilation; a system that believed in the equality of all men and that according to the universal power of reason, the colonies overseas must be treated as an extension of the metropole.

The French identity transmitted to the colonial world originated from the belief that "Frenchness represented a kind of civic faith, a consciousness or sensibility, a moral unifying force capable of transcending racial, religious, cultural, and socioeconomic differences" (Gosnell, 2002, p.04) for that reason, all colonial people may purportedly be converted into 'like-minded' Frenchmen as a result of France's civilizing initiatives, which will eventually aid to willingly consider the French nation and identity, as well as transcending beyond the natural borders of the metropole. Frenchness is then transportable; it can defy all the impeding factors of race, religion and geographical location as long as it is stuck in people's minds.

Unfortunately, what was said and what was done were diametrically opposed. The assimilationist model applied in the colonial world did not admit the locals into the citizenship of the French government, and the Frenchness that was meant to be inclusive served instead as a tool to obscure issues of race and religion for it was meagerly distributed between the indigenous people and the colonial subjects. Logically speaking, this strategy was highly reasonable given that it was illogical and hardly possible for both sides to be equally made French. Historian Albert Missnemi argued (1957) that assimilation and colonization are two incompatible terms that cannot coexist together; the presence of one will inevitably bring the second to its end. If both were to become equally French; then what would remain of colonial systems of domination? This absolutely contradicts the concept of colonization and renders it dysfunctional or of counterproductive results.

French authorities also considered military service as a criterion for granting Algerians a French citizenship. During the great wars, the defense of Algerians by the French army heightened a common feeling of national identity. For the French, this was presumably a sacrifice and an 'impot du sang' for which Algerians earned a French citizenship. However, citizenship was simply one technique of regulating Frenchness in Algeria, meaning that an Algerian with French citizenship was not necessarily an actual French person; certain people were considered legally French while others were not. Thus, if there are different levels of Frenchness and one individual can be more French than another; how Frenchness is defined? by whom? and how it can be claimed or perceived? These are some of the most perplexing questions left unanswered.

According to the French; if Algeria was to be 'Francisé' then the whole world has to be informed about this Franco Algerian collaboration endeavor by organizing events and expositions to propagate the notion of a greater France. This was the image that France was attempting to solidify in the public's imagination via the paradigm of a 'print capitalism'. This colonial concept was embellished to facilitate the construction of imagined communities that allow 'the tight skin of the nation' to be stretched 'over the gigantic body of the empire'. However, despite the French state best efforts to elongate the skin of its nation; it was not able to contain the whole Algerian population. A limited

number of them were able to attend French schools and access to the French culture; Frenchness or 'les Français de souche' embodies only the natively French individuals and a small number of assimilated Arabs (naturalized Europeans). Thus, the French identity was not assessed fairly; the population was divided into citizens and subjects, and Frenchness among them was a fluctuating sensibility and a changing perception that is not bound by a specific rule. (Gosnell, 2002)

2.5 L'Algérie Française: an Imagined Country and the Frenchification of Algeria:

In his book *L'Algérie Terres Françaises* (1931), Armand Megglé asserted that "l'Algérie est Française" and: "Elle est fière de l'être, comme la France, dont elle est le prolongement à travers la Méditerranée, et heureuse de l'affection que lui portent tous ses enfants." (As cited in Gosnell, 2002, p.13) From this assertion; it is clearly noticeable that Megglé describes the relationship between France and Algeria as one of parenthood. He established a family link between them to show that Algeria was merged with France to create a larger whole. Imagine it this way: Algeria and France is the spouse, Colonization is an act of parenthood and native Algerians and settler population are the symbolic children of this marriage which, therefore, makes them unmistakably French!

A lot of literary works joined the 'getting together' and celebrated the imaginative process of making Algeria French. Works such as *La France Nord Africainne* (1920), *En Algérie avec la* France (1927), *L'Algérie, fille de France* (1935), *France Algérienne* (1938) and *Notre Enfant L'Algérie* (1949) highlighted this exceptional colonial relationship. France, for its colonial residents, was the patrie and, simultaneously, the matrie of its infant daughter 'Algeria' who welcomed its beneficent power and leadership. On the other hand, this colonial paternity and maternity combined to help France take care of its daughter, only to create a clone of France; its colonial child (Gosnell, 2002), but if Algeria could be considered French by birth, its identity must have become more tangled as it got older, leading it to adopt both French and Algerian characteristics.

Algeria was certainly a colony like none other. Due to its administrative division; it was literally France. Yet, the colonial authorities still held the belief that Algeria is North African, or perhaps a hybrid entity combining both. What was certain is that for the process of making Algeria French to be successfully accomplished; a complete denial of its existence had to be generally accepted. The French claimed that: "Le nom même d'Algérie est l'oeuvre des Français: Les Français ont nommé, ont créé l'Algérie, quelques mois même après la reddition d'Alger" (Maunier, 1935, p.168) It was named 'Algeria' instead of 'the regency of Algiers', it was as well shaped and its frontiers were created at their arrival. Algeria, thus, was imagined as a void space to allow colonial desires to be forcibly instituted.

The official and metaphorical status given to Algeria as part of a French whole had to be upgraded by making Algeria literally French. It was, therefore, the growing concern over the Francization of its population. Though the term 'French Algeria' was commonly used in the first half of the 1940's and 1950's, its meaning was still blurred to the great majority. The following section of this chapter aims to deconstruct the concept of French Algeria to reveal its sociocultural structure.

The process of making Algeria French or 'Francisation' was initiated by the seizure of the North African coast. The landing of an armada ships in Sidi Ferruch, West of Algiers on June 1830 was the stepping stone to fostering a French rule in Algeria. In 1848, French officials decided to create the legal boundaries of French Algeria. Thus, it was divided into 3 French departments; consisting of the cities of Algiers, Constantine and Oran. Within these French departments; 'communes de plein exercice' were formed and were governed by a mayor and a city council. Each department had two representatives and one senator in the French parliament in Paris. Yet, with the foundation of settler rule in 1870, the colonial government had been led by a general governor. It was the establishment of this official seat of power, governed by the French ministry of interior that linked colonial Algeria to France, as did the officers governing les communes de plein exercice.

Figure 2.1: The Administrative Division of Algeria (Ruedy, 1992, p.82)

The French began implementing their scheme by occupying the coastal cities of Bone (Annaba), Constantine, Oran, Algiers, Philppeville (Skikda) and Orléansville (Chleff). In such urban centers where the French people concentrated, Algeria was very much like France. Student Charles Robert Ageron commented on number of Europeans saying: "These European communities did not simply cohabit in Algeria; they began to mix very soon... In brief, the amalgamation was itself affected by the school, by the street, by the barracks." (Prochaka, 1990, p.206)

According to the 1936 urban density surveys; almost three quarters of the Algerian cities were populated by people of European origins, naturalized French or native French (Français de souche).

YEAR	EUROPEANS IN C.M.s	EUROPEANS IN C.P.E.s	ALL EUROPEANS (C.M.s and C.P.E.s)	% EUROPEANS IN C.M.s	% EUROPEANS IN C.P.E.s
1181	35.000	365.000	400.000	8.7	91.3
1891	41.800	484.018	525.898	8.0	92.0
1901	59.330	549.364	608.694	9.7	90.3
1906	63.325	607.999	671.324	9.4	90.6
1911	75.183	666.373	741.556	9.8	90.2
1921	66.099	717.325	783.424	8.4	91.6
1926	64.549	764.031	828.380	7.8	92.2
1931	57.238	818.398	875.636	6.5	93.5
1936	52.650	886.993	939.643	5.6	94.4
1948	38.214	871.465	909.679	4.1	95.9
1954	35.412	936.126	971.538	3.6	96.4

Table 2.1: Distribution of Europeans between Communes Mixtes and Communes de Plein Exercice 1881-1954 (Humphrey, 1976, p.432-433)

YEAR	EUROPEANS IN C.M.s	EUROPEANS IN C.P.E.s	ALL EUROPEANS (C.M.s and C.P.E.s)	% EUROPEANS IN C.M.s	% EUROPEANS IN C.P.E.s
1181	1.854.000	569.000	2.423.000	76.5	23.5
1891	2.323.710	771.263	3.094.973	75.5	24.5
1901	2.615.326	901.525	3.516.761	74.4	25.6
1906	2.843.522	983.384	3.826.906	74.3	25.7
1911	2.986.634	1.072.785	4.059.419	73.6	26.4

1921	3.109.157	1.205.761	4.314.918	72.1	27.9
1926	3.285.703	1.330.078	4.615.781	71.2	28.8
1931	3.482.983	1.543.412	5.026.395	69.3	30.7
1936	3.788.806	1.781.209	5.570.015	68.1	31.9
1948	4.214.562	2.662.850	6.877.412	61.0	39.1
1954	4.390.000	3.250.000	7.640.000	57.5	42.5

Table 2.2: Distribution of Moslems Between Communes Mixtes and Communes de plein Exercice 1881-1954 (Humphrey, 1976, p.432-433)

Algiers and Oran in particular served as symbols of French culture; they were patterned the same as metropolitan cities and acted as testing structures of French architecture and city design. The architecture of boulevards and public buildings resembled those of France and street names were given a French designation as a commemoration of great French leaders and simultaneously a reminder of French presence in Algeria. The third department 'Constantine' had a distinctively non-European vibe. It was known as 'la ville juivé' and was inhabited by a considerable number of indigenous people. The rest of the country, on the other hand, was far from the 3 departments (beyond the coastal mountains). It was divided into 'communes mixtes' and 'les territoires de sud' inhabited mainly by indigenous people, with only a small group of Europeanized Arabs and Berbers allowed to live in 'les communes de plein exercices' closer to the coast.

This division was intended to facilitate integration between the French and Algerians, since "the simple coexistence of two different societies in one given area should have led to some interpenetration" (Heggoy, 1973, p.181). However, the image of French Algeria that the French attempted to achieve was wildly disparate from the actual one, and was by no means similar to l'exagon. The planned amalgamation of Algerians and French that was intended to help them become one entity did not serve the intended purpose, French Algeria constituted barely 10% of the nation; the remaining 90% were at odds with all what is French.'

During the colonial era, French Algeria was considered an integral part of la plus grande France. The colonialists felt that greater France was the consequence of French participation in various parts of the globe, and that its existence had to be supported by a variety of variables, including schools, media, travel, and military service, in order to disseminate information about the empire. The reason why the concept of Frenchness was modified to embrace territories far from metropolitan France and to support the holding of colonies in diverse regions as part of the establishment of a unified France, or a French whole. This notion was a way to spread a new sense of Frenchness, termed by Archimbaud as 'l'âme imperial' or 'imperial spirit'.

In terms of commitment to the project of creating a French whole, the next move taken was making strong declarations of Frenchness in Algeria a worldly known fact. In the year 1930, colonial authorities planned extravagant festivities and grandiose celebrations in Algiers to commemorate one hundred years of French presence in Algeria. It was in their speculations that a hundred years of French presence in Algeria was sufficient to result in the spread of the French culture and thought to the farthest corners of the country; or perhaps was a scene that they tried to implant in the general public's imagination. Celebratory activities were, then, held all over the country to glorify the French arrival at Sidi Ferruch on June 1830 and to simultaneously celebrate the Algerians' assimilated Frenchness. According to the organizers of the centennal:

> L'Algérie entend non pas seulement célébrer son propre effort ou sa réussite, mais surtout organiser une manifestation mondiale en l'honneur de la France. Elle entend que ce Centenaire soit la glorification des methods colonisatrices de la Mère-Patrie, de son action tutélaire et juste. [. . .] Faire aimer davantage ce grand pays et surtout le faire mieux connaître. Voilà [...] un des buts principaux du Centenaire. (As cited in Gosnell, 2010, p.20)

The following year, the French celebrated the civilizing mission in a French context; at the universal colonial exposition in Vincennes. The festival centered on the notion of bringing the colony into the metropole and displaying, to the French, the result

of French influence in Algeria. It was, indeed, an opportunity to increase awareness of the colonies and enhance the concept of greater France.

The organizers of the centenary attempted to increase the impact of the French culture in colonial Algeria so as to ostensibly develop an equal Frenchness. According to spokesman Gustave Mercier, these events offer a chance for Algerians to "better know and love France for Algerian generations, so that France may allow them to imbibe her ideas, her traditions, her history, her art." (As cited in Gosnell, 2002, p.21) Yet, despite the fervent tone in the French declarations of a hundred years of Franco-Algerian coexistence or, more accurately, 'French involvement' in Algeria; the festivals were not warmly greeted by many. Articles in the communist journal L'humanité condemned the commemoration of calculated exploitation. The centenary, according to editor victor Spielmann, was only a repetition of previous tyranny and a renewal of colonial dominion. In July 1931, the journal announced a counter exposition entitled la vérité aux colonies as a means of protest and rejection of celebrating what is in fact the conquest of a territory and population. As Ferhat Abbes declared in his book *De La Colonie vers la province: Le jeune algérien* (1981) that: "Les fêtes du Centenaire ne sont qu'un rappel maladroit d'un passé douloureux, une exhibition de la richesse des uns devant le paupérisme des autres" (p.08)

Despite a century of French influence in Algeria that contributed to the country's administrative and cultural change; in 1930 local authorities reported that Algeria was not as French as it was destined to be. The French hoped that Algerians would be civilized through continued contact with Europeans, yet, the efforts made to make this a reality were eventually unsuccessful, and Algerians were not sufficiently westernized to be labeled French. The widespread doubts about the Frenchness of Algeria challenged the French claims of assimilation. France had, therefore, to renew its efforts to civilize Algerians by conducting new reforms mainly in the field of education.

2.6 The Republican Ideology of Education:

Understanding the French educational system in both the metropole and Algeria requires more consideration of the First World War, a significant period in French history. As is the case, France triumphed in 1819, but the price of that victory was paid with the bloodshed of millions of lives and an alarming instability in the economic and political domains. Thus, rebuilding the country and regaining its cohesiveness was the main goal of the post-war era. In doing so, France faced two major obstacles: the dominance of religion over the state and the obstinacy of local cultures and regional localities. France consequently came to the conclusion that in order to construct a unified country, it was necessary to instill a strong republican identity in young people, and that the most effective method to achieve this was via education. Though it wasn't clearly defined from the start of the project; the idea of a 'loyal republican identity' was hardly worked on to meet the desired political and cultural outcomes.

The educational system of the Metropole, which initially largely emphasized religious and biblical topics, steadily degenerated throughout the course of several periods in French history. The first republic's administration aimed to develop more enlightened citizens after the establishment of the constitutional monarchy in 1789, hence the church's power abated throughout this period.

In 1833, Minister of education 'Francois Guizot' established 'the Guizot law' that created the French national primary school. It stipulated the accessibility of a secular primary education to all citizens. This law was anti-clerical, it objected the intervention of the church in schools, and unlike the former system that allowed a clergy or a member of a religious order to be teachers; this law stated that all instructors are regularly inspected by the government and are required to complete a formal training in an école normal.

Despite the approval of a considerable number of society members to the adoption of this new law; French Catholics highly objected the intervention of the state in the school and demanded an independent religious schooling. The latter endeavor helped in the inclusion of religious teachings in school curriculum throughout the second republic.

Based on the Falloux law 1850; this reform allowed the establishment of schools by religious orders who worked hand in hand with the state to maintain a clerical primary schooling. However, these decisions have not gone unchallenged; the French defeat in 1871 in the war of Sedan at the hands of Prussia sparked a considerable criticism of the educational system. The general consensus was that Prussia had prepared young students physically and mentally towards being competent soldiers. The French educational system was, thus, condemned to have inadequately prepared French youth for combat. French officials decided to make reform and advocated the necessity of a new universal state run education. This was a step forward to the establishment of a national, secular school system.

A series of educational reforms were implemented in the early 1880's in an effort to republicanize the populace and take authority of schools away from religious orders. These notions were put into practice with the establishment of a secular, free education by minister of education Jules Ferry in 1881. Yet, Ferry did not miss to pay a heed to the opposition that may result due to rejection of his newly suggested reforms by Catholics and religious groups. He, thus, used the history of the French Revolution to support his reforms and asserted that creating an educational system as such is a step towards the equality that their forefathers ever dreamed of. (Magrath, 2006)

If the truth to be told, these laws were not introduced to implement a social reform, but employed to primarily avoid political unrest by educating the next generation to be devoted republicans. To openly attack the establishment of the church is to split the French populace between citizens of the republic and followers of faith, but to develop a public and secular education is to help unify a society with different levels of religious beliefs. Education became a key factor to progress and a tool to improve mankind.

Further regulations that sought to abolish all congregational schools and implement the strict separation of church and state were enacted in 1905. From a political standpoint, the republic's victory over all the difficulties caused by religious orders in French society was symbolized by the secularization of schools. The French government sought that controlling schools was the ultimate method to ensure the reinforcement of

the state's values of equality and fraternity and to create a sense of allegiance to the republic. As a result, classrooms were transformed into 'churches of the republic', where pupils were taught civic virtue and prepared to be French citizens. French teachers made sure that morality was taught in the form of teachings about right and duty towards the family, community, and the republic in general despite the absence of clerical lessons. These atheist institutions put a strong emphasis on encouraging civic engagement and patriotism in each student in order to reflect the ideals of France as the nation that brought culture and enlightenment.

The second challenge that the French had to overcome was the existence of multiple tongues. It was thought that by unifying linguistic expression, France may become stronger, which is why everyone in France must speak the same language. (Magrath, 2006) After the French Revolution, the government assigned Abbé Grégorie to research the number of languages spoken in France and whether the French language was the one mostly used. Surprisingly, the survey revealed that 6 million out of 25 million person did not speak French at all. The government decided, accordingly, to universalize the use of the French language. A decree set by the national assembly in October 1783 asserted that "dans toutes les patries de la République, l'instruction ne se fait qu'en langue Français" (As cited in Magrath, 2006, p.39) The majority of politicians firmly believed that having a single language would benefit the whole country, which is why Ferry and all the other ministers of education in the third republic gave the issue of the French language instruction top priority in their efforts to reform education. They claimed that "French, the national language must come before the others. It was and is the vehicle for all ideas of liberty and must be spread as much as possible" (As cited in Magrath, 2006, p.40)

The republican ideology applied in France was simultaneously implemented in the African context. When France colonized Algeria; it clearly stated that its aim was to make the invasion profitable for France as well as a means to enhance the lives of the colonized by exposure to the French culture. The second objective was mostly accomplished through education.

2.7 French Colonial Education in Algeria:

Colonial education in Algeria was established following the French occupation. It was initially executed to cater the demands of the newly arrived immigrants (French, Italian and Spanish) who settled in cities ruled by the French troops. French schools in colonial Algeria were inevitably a focal point for local families concerns about the possibility of 'déracinement,' particularly given the fact that their other interactions with French culture and French or European people were quite restricted. (Harrison, 2019)

Coincided with a period of educational development in France; the settlement of European communities required the establishment of primary schools in Algeria. According to the Guizot law of June 1833, every French department or municipality with more than 500 inhabitants must maintain a primary school. This decree culminated in the establishment of mutual education schools in Algiers, Oran and Bone in 1833 and as the French presence expands into new territories; the number of primary institutions rises. In 1862, there was about 200.000 European living in Algeria; 33.065 (53.7% of them girls) received primary education in 470 schools. There were often close to 70 students per school divided in one or two classes. The schools were separated based on gender; except in instances where it wasn't easy to open separate facilities that both boys and girls attended the same school.

The educational system in Algeria have undergone numerous periods of growth. The first phase that began in 1832 witnessed the desertion of native Jewish and Muslim students from French schools. To solve this problem, the government decided to establish 'les écoles indigènes'. The first was 'l'école juive Françaises' in Algiers in 1832, in Oran in 1833, and in Bone in 1837. The second type was 'l'école maure Françaises' in 1836 in Algiers and in Bone and Oran in 1839. These institutions relied on instructions (the teaching of history, geography, mathematics and natural sciences) taught in the French language by a native French teacher who also served as the school's director, and a native instructor who taught Arabic and Hebrew languages. The presence of bilingual education is a defining feature of this phase; in addition to the availability of Quranic instructions, but only with the aim of reducing the political power of religious brotherhoods on indigenous population.

Soon after, legislation was passed from July 14th to August 6th of 1850 declaring that Algeria's primary institutions lacked a formal appearance and a coordinated voice. Thus; the government decided the establishment of six écoles Musulmanes Français for boys in Algiers, Oran, Constantine, Bone and Mostaganem; in addition to four others for girls in Algiers, Oran, Constantine and Bone. This decree also allowed setting up the schoolchildren curricula and organizing their study schedule. Students get to study reading and writing French, reading and writing Arabic, calculation, grammar, geography, the system of weights and measures and needlework for females. The morning was devoted to the teachings in Arabic and French in the afternoon.

Another initiative in the realm of education was the construction of 'les écoles Arabes Françaises'. According to statistics of the 1862 Tableaux des Establishments Français dans l'Algérie (TEF) published by the general government of Algeria between 1836 and 1868, there were exactly 8 schools constructed in Algiers containing 167 pupils; 4 schools in Constantine with 160 pupils (including 130 indigenous Muslims and 3 Jews), and Oran witnessed the construction of schools of this type between 1865-1866. Concerning girls' schools established by law of 1850 in Algiers and Constantine; they were gradually converted into sewing and embroidery workrooms. (Kateb, 2006, p.20-22)

Figure 2.2: A Classroom from L'école Arabe Française d'Alger (Musée national de l'Éducation, 2018, p.11)

Under the Third Republic, the French educational system saw a drastic change. The rhetoric of la mission civilisatrice during the 3rd republic proclaimed that France was eager to promote its colonies socially, politically and economically. Therefore, cultural assimilation was their possible course of action to put the notion into practice. Far beyond the group of people who questioned the adequacy of providing an education to indigenous children, the type of education to offer was the most important. The key concept in education was the application of the notion of 'adaptation' which entailed adjusting curriculum and instructional materials to the particular local conditions and the specific population of students. With the outset of educational projects, the French supposedly intended to eradicate racial difference and decided to convince the Algerian juniors of their Gaulic line of decent. School children in the colonies, as in colonial France, chanted 'Nos ancêtres les Gaulois' ovationning their shared gaulic heritage. This sentence is perhaps the living example of non-adaptation, and as illogical as it may seem to validate a non-truthful reality; the repeating of 'nos pères, les Gaulois' in the classroom enabled children to connect with Europeans and helped foster a sense of acceptance by them. (Ezra, 2000, p.150)

Republican ideology, on the other hand, held that one may become French not based on race or place of birth, but through cultural transformation. Thus, the dissemination of the French culture across la plus grande France was assisted by a centralized educational system that taught similar lessons and utilized similar text books in both Algeria and France, so that education in Algeria would meet metropolitan standards. In doing so, the French identity became accessible to both settler and native population. Students were reading in their history textbooks that they are: "tous de bons petits Français; vous aimez tous votre patrie. [. . .] Vous avez dès aujourd'hui à remplir un devoir envers la France: c'est de la bien connaître pour la bien server". (As cited in Gosnell, 2002, p.41)

The Frenchness of Europeans was strongly promoted in primary schools in Algeria, particularly via the employment of the French language. As part of its assimilationist strategy, France attempted to impose the same educational system utilized in France: a free, secular, and obligatory education. Yet the teachings in Algeria had

always embodied some military and nationalist dimension. Throughout the third republic, countless discussions were held among educators and politicians over the relationship between school education and national unity. After the French army's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War 1871, their inquiries were resolved. In contrast to French schooling, Prussian leaders made it compulsory on their instructors to foster in their young students a sense of patriotism and loyalty to their homeland and created well trained soldiers for battle. The Republican government that succeeded after the war was highly convinced that the war of sedan was won in the classrooms of Prussia. Thus, the educational reforms of Jules Ferry centered on this point of debate. Following the defeat, France decided to create a new state run system of schooling afar from religious teachings and biblical texts. This alteration was a way to reduce religious influence on politics and society and to maintain a unity not of a shared religion but one derived from a sense of civic duty which would eventually lead to the creation a of a new generation of soldiers. Educators created primary school textbooks that emphasized promoting a feeling of citizenry.

> L'objectif essentiel de l'instruction morale et civique placée en tête des programmes de l'école primaire par les élites républicaines apparaît clairement: encourager et affermir au profit de l'État-nation un sentiment de loyauté et d'engagement civiques. (Déloye, 1994, p.25)

The educational reforms or the so called 'Jules Ferry laws' were declared in March 1882 by politicians to establish a primary school education that is free, obligatory and secular in France and in the 3 departments of Algeria. According to historian Caroline Ford, secularization was France's way of creating a cultural unity; a religious society would put the interests of the church ahead of the state, therefore, secularization in primary schooling is crucial to maintain a linguistic uniformity. (Magrath, 2006)

Colonial schools' motto was to 'épousez les pays' (Maamri, 2009, p.78) and as a firm believer of this strategy; Jules Ferry forever used the civilizing mission as an excuse to defend his educational policies. Before the French Chamber of Deputies on March 28th, 1884 he proclaimed:

There is a second point I wish to refer to. It is the humanitarian and civilizing question [...] the superior races have a right in relation to the inferior races. I say they have a right because they have a duty. They have the duty to civilize the inferior races. (Jules Ferry on French Colonial Expansion, n.d., Para.02)

The primary objective of the ferry laws was to create loyal republicans and simultaneously improve mankind. However, with the establishment of '*les écoles Franco indigènes*' for Arabs and Berbers in October 1892; educational racialization was at the heart of the system. These institutions adopted a system of education based on vocational or agricultural teachings, because, for Algerian juniors, as future peasants and laborers, practical knowledge would be of more advantage. These schools were subject to criticism; the instructions provided were thought to be ineffective and derogatory terms like 'écoles Gourbis' (Belhassine Rahoui, 2011) or "instruction au rabais" (Kateb, 2004, p.24) were used to describe it.

Figure 2.3: Une Ecole indigène (Musée national de l'Éducation, 2018, p.11)

The main goal of these schools was to raise Algerian workers' qualifications to better serve the colonial requirements; to create in the shortest time possible an individual with a practical knowledge that can instantly be used is more rewarding than training a future citizen. Primary school textbooks, thus, operated in support of this objective.

School textbooks portrayed Algerian laborers who worked on farms; carried buckets of water, sold fruits and vegetables and clothes on city streets and connected these trades with Arab names: 'Sliman the basketmaker,' 'Ali the jeweler,' 'Ahmed the barber,' and 'Mohammed and Ali the cobblers' only to identify the professions that an Algerian should pursue. In addition to a tendency by instructors to make these trades accepted by encouraging students to adopt them on the grounds that "Il n y a pas de sot métier" (Gosnell, 2002, p.46) and one should always be proud of what he does.

Some critics claimed that textbooks which had any sort of training that fostered goals beyond the field of labor were unsuitable and of a harmful impact on French interests. It is preferable for the locals to learn what they ought to do rather than what they ought to know; they have specific tasks to perform, and a complex education will ruin their nature as originally peasants. From a different prospect, agricultural education was the children's most adequate reason to ease their parents' reservations towards French schooling by bringing forward the new learnt agricultural practices. Yet, this method impeded the children's access to secondary and university education (Magrath, 2006).

Despite all the proudly claimed assertions of the universality of Frenchness; there was, indeed, a tendency to emphasize racial differences by separating the settler community from the indigenous population and instilling in the latter the notion that some are more assimilated than others. The great contradiction between rhetoric and action culminated in an ambivalent colonial regime that could francize only a small fraction of the Algerian populace. The rest of Algerian Muslims lacked any form of education.

The next step in the field of education extended beyond schoolchildren and curricular amendments; the year 1856 witnessed the construction of a new school in Bouzaréah specialized in the training of both European and Algerian teachers. Any person intending in the course of time to become a teacher must complete his training at this institution before starting his teaching career. These teachers' training program aimed to prepare them deal with the African context by introducing the local conditions

and the population with its differing languages and cultures. In addition to pedagogical matters, colonial rulers selected these instructors as substitute fathers with a parental responsibility of fostering a sense of Frenchness in their students. Aimé Dupuy, Former director of the school, said "a Bouzaréah, nous faisons de la France." (As cited in Gosnell, 2002, p.48)

The percentage of kids who attended colonial schools in Algeria is as follows: in 1936, 8.9% of school age Arab and Berber children were enrolled in schools, 10.6% in 1949, and 15.4% in 1954. Certain historians claimed that the French authorities oriented their efforts on educating the Berbers and created the so called 'Kabyle myth' by asserting that the Berbers are a more superior race than Arabs mainly because they are descendants of Europeans. This ideology formally recognized individuals with the capacity to be 'more assimilable' or have a readiness to hold the French culture dear (Benrabah, 2005, p.395).

On the other hand, a significant number of Muslim parents refused to send their children to French schools; feeling concerned about their children being labeled 'Mtournis' or traitors of their religion. They were especially hesitant to send their daughters to French schools unless the tutor is a woman. Yet, French authorities had done its utmost to include females into French schools since they would be future mothers and, by passing on the French culture standards to their kids, they will be able to offset the influence of Islam (Gosnell, 2002). For people whose access to French education was restricted by the French government; it was due to the danger that might result. Skeptics believed that indigenous education can be of a serious peril to colonial equilibrium. Obtaining a similar schooling as a European might make Algerians more desirable in government and business since a non-European worker could be paid a comparatively low wage (Magrath, 2006). From another viewpoint, similar instructions would raise the indigenous people's awareness and urge them to fight colonial control and demand independence. To avoid such resistance, indigenous schools were established in distant areas of the Algerian countryside.

2.8 The French Language and the Creation of a French Individual:

The colonial education system revolved around the teaching of the French language. Some believed that if populations in colonial Algeria could speak French; they would have journeyed half the distance towards French identity or at least achieving a half French status. By mastering the language they would automatically begin to think and feel French; what the French themselves consider a miraculous point in the French language that has a transformative power in helping the locals become gradually assimilated. It was indeed a necessity that all Algerian population speaks and reads French; to be united under one language will help in better connecting with France.

In the educational domain as well, The French language had to be instilled in school children's daily conversations, but it had to be infused gradually. At first, French was taught as a second language, and to do so, they would show an Algerian student an object and say its name to approximate the meaning: "On montre un objet, on en dit le nom, on fait faire une action et on prononce le verbe qui l'exprime" (As cited in Gosnell, 2002, p.51) Colonial educators also made sure that Algerian students are introduced to reading texts with recognizable concepts that reflected familiar scenes in their daily lives to encourage a better comprehension. For instance, in science textbooks, schoolchildren studied about Algerian weather, Flora and Fauna and natural landscapes, while in social textbooks they were introduced to Algerian sites and areas using words in dialectal Arabic such as: 'un souk', 'un couple de fellahs', 'un matin dans le bled' to instill a sense of indigenous familiarity in the teaching of the French language.

In the literature designed for Arab and Berber schoolchildren, lessons on French social customs were notably prevalent. Muslim youngsters were introduced to the French culture via the teaching of what is believed to be an appropriate conduct. Schools provided students with a thorough description of how to act in order to be deemed French. Expressions such as: 'il ne faut pas être gourmand', 'faut avoir les dents proper', 'il faut écouter le maître' are some of the instructions that hints on the behavior expected from indigenous youth in their journey to becoming French citizens. In a book entitled *Bonjour Ali, Boujour Fatma*, they give an example of a mouse that advises a less sophisticated mouse: "Mon cher, nous les gens de la ville, nous ne mangerons pas comme

vous." (As cited in Gosnell, 2002, p.56) It is indeed a story taken from Jean de la Fontaine's Fables: *le Rat de Ville et le Rat des Champs* (1876), yet the meaning transmitted via such childish characters was so profound. The use of simple grammar with sympathetic phrases such as 'Mon Cher' would attract and help grasping the text better. Yet, imparting a significant cultural lesson: to be French and civilized; one must eat like a French person, use suitable utensils. Any failure in adopting such simple manners would thusly mean a failure in becoming authentic French. (Aziz, 2015)

In addition to these simple reading passages, schoolchildren were introduced to more sophisticated works of literature. Famous passages from novelists such as: Victor Hugo, Emile Zola, Honoré de Balzac were taught to construct certain moral codes. The narrative is meant to leave a lasting impact on the youngster by developing his linguistic abilities first, and then improving his moral judgment. This type of instruction was advocated by sociologist Emile Durkheim (1957); he explained how morality was shaped in the classroom and its importance in creating a social order. Durkheim's theory particularly known as 'civic instruction' influenced the republican ideology. Republican school aspired to create a homogenous French society; hence, a mutual understanding of moral behavior would highly contribute in forming a social order. However, Algeria lacked this kind of education; there were no curricula that emphasized morality among pupils; instead, French-language texts were adopted to fill this void.

As a matter of fact, it was the high regard given to the French language that rendered the republican policy even more effective. The secret is the fact that Frenchness needed effort which makes it all the more desirable and deserving of respect. In addition to some well-established conditions such as: the repression of individual passion, moderation and self-control that France succeeded in creating an organized society. These 'essential elements of civic sociability' contributed in the formation of a wider social order within the parts of la plus Grande France. (Gosnell, 2002)

Another educational instruction that formed the basis of colonial education was the teaching of French history. They tended to exhibit the inseparable link between the French and Algerian history. To emphasize the connections between the two; it was

common practice to teach portions of French history alongside Algerian history, sometimes even with pages back to back. One of the major events covered in the children textbooks was the contribution of Algerian soldiers during World War 2 alongside the French army in their struggle against Nazi Germany. This colonial involvement would foster the idea that they are an integral part of French history which would finally result in the society's full acceptance of colonization and francization. (Aziz, 2015)

Between the years 1882-1962 there was a rapid rise in the frequency with which the French language was spoken in social and familial context. By the middle of the 20th century, the majority of Algerian society could speak some form of French, which was often used in households. The French language had begun to take root in the nation despite the disparities in oral fluency and literacy. The French language officially became the lingua franca of French Algeria in the 1950s, all due to colonial educational initiatives and the continued interactions between French settlers and indigenous populations.

From a postcolonial perspective Fanon explains the complex relationship in relinquishing someone's own language in favor of that of the colonized. He stated in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1986) that:

> Every colonized people-in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality finds itself face to face with the language of the civilizing nation; that is, with the culture of the mother country. The colonized is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the Mother country's cultural standards. He becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness. (p.18)

Fanon here is illustrating that the process of colonization is an alienating agent. Every tendency made by the colonizer to set the colonized apart from his own culture through racial isolation, widespread illiteracy, and the introduction of his language and culture develops in the colonized a sense of worthlessness of his own. Learning a new language is a method to facilitate cross-cultural communication, and creating a dialogue between two conflicting groups can change how each one of them perceive the other. As affirmed by Claire Kramsch in her book *context and culture in language teaching* (1993);

communication can provoke: "Fundamental realignments of value and perception among participants" (p. 232) however, dislocating someone's cultural values has the ability to either change or chain his cultural identity. In the case of Algeria, the dominion over cultural life; the dissemination of the French language and culture was intended to destroy the Arab Islamic one. This resulted in the production of a man devoid of culture, easy to manipulate.

The colonizer classification of himself as barrier of science, logic and development and the pride he has towards his culture would encourage the colonizer to imitate him; what is known in Lacanian theory (1950) as 'desire'. It is indeed understandable that the colonized wants to be White/European since these are the criterion that classifies him as a remarkable other. Though Algerian subjects were forced to imitate the ideology and the speech of the French colonizer; they were desired features that Algerians longed to obtain because it was a way of identification and a means to gain recognition from the colonizer.

Though Europe's scheme in the mission civilisatrice was to urge the colonized to mimic the colonizer, instead of unifying them; this mimetic drive served to divide the opposites even more. The identification sought by the colonized can never be fulfilled; because despite all efforts to eliminate discrepancies; the colonized can never renounce his image of being the inferior other, and on the other hand; the colonized would never weigh his worth on the same scale as that of the colonized.

Frantz Fanon asserted that the more the colonized is exposed to western values; the less he accepts his own and when using the colonizer's language he will be separated from his cultural roots which will create a crack in his identity. This conflict in one's image is what Bhabha calls 'third space' or the 'unhomely' where the colonized experiences "an estranging sense of relocation of the home and the world" (Chattopadhyay & Shrivastava, 2012, p.118) It is the third space where Algerians endured a sort of alienation that involved copying and identifying with the French other, thus, losing any autonomous viewpoint on reality. (Maamri, 2009, p.81) The mimetic drive was only a way to escape the stereotype placed upon Algerians as the uncivilized

which culminated in the creation of a generation that suffered forever after from a dispersed self and a quest for a real identity.

2.9 The Arabic Language and Islam in Colonial Algeria:

France was aware from the beginning of colonization of the position of Islam and Arabic in the Algerian context; it wasn't just a religion or a language but rather a unifying force that binds the society together. The ultimate goal of France was, therefore, to weaken these two institutions to finally be able to obliterate the Arab Islamic culture in Algeria.

Despite the French promises not to interfere with the state sanctities; colonial educational reforms required Algerians to be instructed in the ways of colonialism, Arab Islamic teachings had to be replaced. By undertaking such decision the French believed that by simply excluding urban Muslims from their universe, they could permanently eradicate their reality and nature. Such exclusion started with the destruction of many educational institutions that relied mainly on the teaching of Quran to hinder students education in an Islamic way. The report of 1948 commission disclosed the French scheme; with great pride the French acknowledged:

> We laid hands upon those revenues. (Those of religious foundations, the object of which is to meet charity needs or public education). We left schools to fall down, disbanded seminaries. Around us the light was put out... that means we rendered the Muslim society more (....) ignorant and more barbarian than it was before it knew us. (As cited in Djabri, 1981, p.39)

The French went further into classifying Arabic as a foreign language; teaching it was put under control of the French government. Due to the 1904 act; Arabic was confined to teaching Quran only with no explanation to its verses that would encourage the population to seek freedom, while teaching Arabic and Islamic history were completely forbidden in the educational program. The very few institutions where Arabic was allowed, the teachings held some political and cultural purposes that served colonial interests. On the other hand, French was vital; it was forced to be used in the government and utilized to name streets and municipalities. Act N° 848 of the constitution mandated

that all agreements be written in French and permitted its use in legal proceedings. Based on this creed; French became the official language in Algeria (Djabri, 1981, p.44)

The French government aimed to raise Algerian youngsters in a French speaking environment and to create individuals completely oblivious of their native tongue. It was anticipated that this policy would divert Algerians from their culture, yet with massive objection showed by the Algerian society towards the French schooling system; France decided to intensify its procedures. The French government began to place some obstacles such as the separation of colonial schools from Qur'anic schools and the non-inclusion of Arabic in the curriculum; creating financial difficulties such as transport. Due to the remoteness of French schools and the law wages paid to Algerians; schoolchildren's parents were not able to send them to schools.

The French government discerned that the primary driver of Islam expansion among Algerians was the Arabic language. Its efforts were strongly directed to distance the Berbers from the rest of Algerians by forcing them to evolve independently of Islam. As Gordon (1978) stated: "the colonizer had often created plurilingual situations for the simple purpose of setting up boundaries between the ethnic groups constituting one nation" (As cited in Assous, 1985, p.95)

This 'divide and rule' policy ordered the prevention of speaking Arabic in Kabyle schools; only French and Berber dialects were permitted. The Kabyles were the Berber group that had the most exposure to French assimilation policies and educational opportunities. By 1888 the French had constructed 75 schools; 50% of which were in Kabyle districts. These advantages given to the Kabyles were generally opposed by the great majority of Algerians. They asked for a fair and general instruction but the French educational system was not meant for all Algerians; it was intended to create 'cultural intermediaries' who are able to transmit the French culture. This 'elitist policy' was well explained in 1908 by Governor General Charles C. Jonnart when saying:

> We have much interest in creating among them (the Algerians) an intellectual elite capable of spreading our ideas of justice and progress, a conservative bourgeoisie which will be the more attached to us as it will

distinguish all better the road travelled under our domination, and the progress achieved for its benefit   (As cited in Assous, 1985, p.95)

Despite Algerian resistance to the French acculturation policies; the Algerian situation remained unaltered since new schools were not built to replace old ones and, to make things worse, the use of the French language was increasing due to its use in daily conversations. After World War I, there was a change of heart considering French teaching. Algerian returning soldiers altered their attitudes into becoming more involved in all that is French; their resistance changed from being against French education to being in favor of it and demanded equal educational opportunities for their children (Benrabah, 2005, p.398). This shift was due to an elite with a French education that strove to create an atmosphere where local and colonial societies might coexist harmoniously. The demands for no disparity between the populations of both the colonies and mainland France means "there will be only one France" and an "ever closer assimilation to the mother country" (As cited in Majumdar, 2007, p.09)

According to historian Saadallah (1998), the adaptation of western ideas and cultural norms with an aim to convert the Algerian society into a European one pushed Algerians to relinquish their own language and culture. (Djabri, 1981) Owing to this small group of elites, French became a valid form of Franco-Algerian self-expression; they were thoroughly absorbed into the French culture and adopted a French identity which allowed them to secure senior administrative positions. As far as language is concerned, this group of elites started to depreciate the Arabic language while alternatively having high regards for French; the language of prestige that was accepted as a matter of civilization. Yet, from an Algerian nationalistic perspective it was one that actually helped enslaving them. (Harrison, 2019, p.57)

In addition, even those peasants who were not concerned with the French educational policies have had their chance with it during the war of liberation. A key contradiction of the military conflict was the expansion of Francophonia or what is referred to as 'delayed Frenchification process.' By 1960, the French military relocated 2 million villagers that represented 24% of the Algerian populace. This endeavor

introduced the rural inhabitants, who did have a previous encounter with the French culture, to the French language and culture in schools run by the military. After independence, the majority of these people choose to reside in metropolitan areas abandoned by les pieds noirs when returned to l'exagon; cities where inflated with individuals saturated with the French culture who were expected to contribute in fostering French acculturation tendencies after independence. (Benrabah, 2005) (Benrabah, 2005)

2.10 The Algerian Cultural Resistance:

At the beginning of colonization in 1830, France promised not to interfere with internal affairs of the state including customs and religious beliefs. Though the promise was partially implemented by not directly interfering with cultural institutions (Madrasahs, Mosques or Qur'anic schools); colonial authorities indirectly damaged the already existing educational system. In order to expand the colonial public domain, numerous schools were forced to shut down and many hubus lands were sequestered. This interference in Muslim education was a must, if not; the notion of la mission civilisatrice would be put in jeopardy and would gravely undermine the French system's inherent superiority. The establishment of a secular education with the idealization of the French language was part of the plan to terminate the dominance of Islam in Algeria, another endeavor was that of creating specific madrasahs and merabouts that claimed Islamic teachings to ease the people's reservations towards colonial teachings. Yet, these institutions were equipped with teachers who knew little about Islam and Quran and an administration that could not care less about the Arabic language. In response to this endeavor, the reformist movement arose in refusal of becoming cultured Frenchmen and due to their conviction that France's efforts in the educational domain were insufficient; the teaching of 2 hours of Arabic during thirty hours school week was a manifested cultural disrespect that the reformists could not endure. In 1926 Messali Hadj formed *L'étoile Nord Africaine* (ENA), a political party with an ideology that combined elements of Marxism with an Arabic perspective with the purpose of fighting against French reforms (Heggoy & zing, 1976). This party was the first to claim 'Algeria for Algerians'

it was mainly formed to preserve the right of North African workers. Though it didn't affect the cultural side in a positive way; the party had a political stance that was believed is going to help the social and economic situation in Algeria. (Djabri, 1981)

The second political force was established in 1934 named as The Federation of Elected Natives. Its leaders were a group of middle class liberal elitists who had benefited from France's presence in Algeria and wanted to share their gains with other Muslims. Dr. Bendjelloul and Ferhat Abbes were the mostly known leaders of the group; they were known as 'les évoluée' who supported French education. Their cause was not to ask for independence but rather to demand granting a French citizenship to all Muslims. (Heggoy, 1973) They launched their newspaper *L'Entente Franco-Musulmane*; it first went into print in 1935 and, as its name suggests, embraced a philosophy that represented the hopes and worries of évolués, integrated Muslims. Its editorial board and writers aimed to create a more comprehensive concept of Frenchness in colonial society, one that eliminated the divide between citizens and subjects.

Another association that had the most contribution in cultural resistance was that of the *Ulama* Association. It was formed by Sheikh Adbelhamid Ibn Badis[16] in 1931, with the focus on denouncing the French acculturation efforts and the process of naturalization among the Algerian elite. As an educated theologian; he focused on teaching his people the true essence of Islam through reading the Quran and learning Arabic. The Ulama created 130 schools by 1936; about 10.000 students were enrolled in these schools and approximately 50.000 during the First World War. These were Quranic schools that instructed under the slogan of 'Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is my homeland' (Heggoy & zing, 1976, p.575) with the objective of establishing a well versed generation in Islamic and Arab culture. The Ulama instructors took a big pride in their ignorance of the French Language and acted accordingly by not allowing its teaching in their schools. Despite the regulation in colonial schools that mandated 15 hours per week for teaching in French and a law that stated no sessions in Quranic schools three kilometers away from public schools to be held at the same time as colonial

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[16] - the leader of the Islamic reformist movement in Algeria and founder of the Association des Uléma Musulmanes Algériens (AUMA)

schools; the legislations fell on deaf ears by the Ulama schools because they were private and able to enforce their own laws. These schools were prone to several threats of closure; yet were, from another angle, of huge benefits to the French government. Their construction put a less social pressure from Algerians who insisted on l'enseignement Arabe libre within Islamic lines and also less financial pressure since colonial schools enrolled only 30.000 student out of 2 million and the Ulama schools were able to offer around 50.000 seats per year.

In 1944 France announced a new set of reforms that decided to offer a colonial teaching to 1 million Muslim by 1964. It was until 1958 that the French administration decided to offer full primary education with reconsideration to the status of the Arabic language. Due to acts of insurgency by the rebels and Islamic brotherhoods; Arabic was elevated to the status of an official language. The French thought by promoting Arabic as an official language and by ordering its teaching on a national scale, they would pacify the Algerian's spirits regarding their culture and identity and would somehow prevent them from perusing their true objectives. Yet, the Ulama proved them wrong by becoming more nationalistic and supportive of revolution. The French government sensed the threat and accordingly ordered the closure of the schools and the arrest of several teachers. (Heggoy & zing, 1976)

Cultural resistance in Algeria was a way to defy French attempts to control Algeria by assimilating Algerians into Frenchmen via culture and education. Perhaps the most destructive feature of the colonial policy was that of rejecting the Algerian culture by undermining pre-colonial education and putting restrictions on language, curriculum and teaching techniques in an attempt to deprive Algerians of their Islamic heritage. These colonial trials to depersonalize and denationalize the Algerian society fall under the heading of la mission civilisatrice. Resistance, however, had the possibility of rendering this mission a bit difficult for France especially that it was initiated after Algerians begun to accept the French culture and the enrollment of their children in colonial schools and because it was a counterattack to remind Algerians of their true origins. Yet, it wasn't of a great peril to the French schooling system. Historians came to an agreement that though la mission civilisatrice did not accomplish the desired outcome of transforming Algerians

into fully Frenchmen, after independence, Algerian intellectuals contended that the French schooling system produced a more degraded generation of youth than previously. It generated individuals 'déclassés' and 'dépersonalisés' who could not find a place in post-colonial society. It was successful in generating an elite of Algerians culturally and linguistically distinct from the rest of the population, due to which the Algerian government would face huge issues in the cultural domain in the post war era. The most complicated of which is the existence of two distinct educational systems: a traditional one that needed improvement and a developed one but alien to the Algerian society. In order to deal with these cultural difficulties, Algeria had to reduce linguistic disparities by supporting factors that would foster the growth of cultural homogeneity and the solidifying of a national identity.

2.11 Conclusion:

The French school system established in Algeria aimed to impress the local populations and instill a sense of duty and loyalty among the youth. It was a two track system where the Algerian population and the French colonizer were separated by a highly recognizable racial difference. However, it was those who received a French education that led nationalist and anti-colonial movements during the war. They were the most aware of colonial inequalities and suspected the ultimate goal of the colonial project. Teaching them about assimilation as the goal of imperial expansion was all the more a doubt impulse and the plan of creating a 'sixty million Frenchmen' within a vortex of contradictions was void. Simply because colonial subjects were not Frenchmen, and those who attempted to become so irritated even the most liberal republicans. Thus, the Frenchification tendencies were not successful in creating French citizens out of Algerians, but were indeed able to generate a distorted self that embodies both French and Algerian traits. This was one of the major concerns of post independent Algeria; to release itself from the shackles of colonialism by restoring a unifying identity which was mainly implemented by making reforms in education.

Chapter Three:

Towards Reform and Arabization in Post-Colonial Algeria

3.1 Introduction:

Following a seven-year struggle for independence that was put to an end in 1962, Algeria was confronted with a number of grave and pressing issues. Among these was the selection of Arabic as the official language of the new independent country by Algeria's new authorities. Algerian nationalists who took the initiative towards Arabization knew that such decision would have significant consequences on the country and its people. Algeria was administratively connected to France for 132 years and was subject to a firm acculturation program to aid in the process of transforming it into an authentic French province. To break those ties and form a whole new nation separated culturally and linguistically from France; considerable thought, reflection and intense commitment to the project that would result in a radical change in the government, the educational system and subsequently all aspects of life, was required. Algerians' quest for identity demanded the restoration of their national language which, due to colonization, had experienced significant setbacks particularly with regard to its usage as a written language. Despite being able to speak colloquial language with no difficulty; the great majority of Algerians were unable to speak, read or write in classical Arabic. On the other hand, a large portion of the educated elite were bilingual and encouraged the promotion of the French language. Moving towards a single language reform amidst the difficult circumstances of not having the required resources for even a basic educational project was a bold step that constituted a huge problem for the newly independent Algeria. This chapter sheds light on the efforts made by the Algerian government to create a monolingual society and to analyze the trials faced and the consequences resulted from the adaptation of this decision.

3.2 Importance of Education in Postcolonial Algeria:

One of the main concerns of the colonial project was centered on the 'educability' of the natives. Education was highly focused on due to its crucial and transformative role in the economic and social domains. Although colonial administrations utilized specific prototypes such as ' adapted', ' vocational', 'mass' or 'fundamental' education in order to

control or reinforce its colonial rule. In like manner, education was a significant element for newly independent nations in the context of large scale political and socio-economic modernization initiatives (Matasci, Jerónimo, & Dores, 2020).

Education in post independent Algeria is a subject of much debate that rose since independence. A country that thought to rise from the ravages of colonization and build its nation induced that education was the main instrument of developing a solidified society. This is what Nelson Mandela confirmed when saying: "The power of education extends beyond the development of skills we need for economic success. It can contribute to nation-building and reconciliation" (Strauss, 2013)

In a celebratory endeavor of the 13th anniversary of the armed revolution (1954), President Houari Boumediene emphasized the importance of education in developing the country. He stated: "Our country's reconstruction and economic development depends essentially on industrial and agricultural projects that we will undertake. To realize these projects, we will have to rely on our educational system and manpower training." (As cited in Kohli, 1987) The assertion implies that there was a major concern about the education of the post-independence society, and that in order to ensure the education of society, the divisions established by the colonial presence due to the dissemination of French culture and language had to be bridged. Algerian officials agreed that in order to keep the country together and achieve full independence, the remnants of colonialism must be eradicated. Algeria had to purge itself of the legacy of colonization, including its language and culture, and reinstate the Arabic language as the core of its identity.

Indeed, the Arabic language is the principal, if not the single, uniting force in the Arab world. Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria's first post-independence president, declared, "We are Arabs, Arabs, Arabs!" (Nakla, 2021, p.149), and the major reference of the word 'Arab' is the language. The very notion of unifying the language among Arabic speaking societies was the main concept of the Pan Arabic Nationalism project (Al-Abed Al-Haq, 2018). Pan Arabic nationalism also known as the cultural and literary renaissance or ' Al Nahda,' was a movement that began primarily as a result of an increase in literacy rates in

Arab colonized nations; it aimed at a cultural and political unification of Arab countries after decolonization (Britannica, 2023).

3.3 Arabization/ Arabicization Planning:

Arabization or Arabicization are two terms used interchangeably to refer to 'al ta'rib' (Balla & Ahmed, 2017). In etymology, 'al ta'rib' or 'Arraba' means to turn into an Arab or to speak Arabic (Khalid, 2018). In terminology, Arabization stands for "the transfer of the foreign word and its meaning into Arabic according to rules and bases guaranteeing its clarity and eloquence" (Al-Shbiel, 2017). It has also been defined by Sayadi as "a lexical expansion which includes the coinage of new terms, either from existing words, or through translation of foreign terms," and by Grandguillaume as "the extensive use of Arabic in all domains of life: political, social, and cultural i.e. it refers to the promotion of Arabic as a medium of interaction in public and private sectors." (As cited in Dekhir, 2013, p.25)

Morphologically, Arabization is derived from the word 'Arab,' thus it is used to talk about Arabs and convey the superiority of the people's culture and identity; whereas Arabicization is derived from the word 'Arabic,' therefore it is more focused on the study of Arabic language planning. (Dekhir, 2013; Bella et al., 2017)

Language planning is a term of great controversy among scholars. To best name the strategy used to characterize language planning; some researchers suggested 'language engineering', while others incline towards the term 'language management', which refers to the process of 'language standardization', or in more adequate terms; 'language reform'. In a multilingual context; language planning serves as a strategy or a collection of methods that handle various issues concerning language; i.e. to examine language challenges and consider the possible solutions for language difficulties with the aim of making a change or control the linguistic norm of a given language. In other words; it is the "conscious intervention to change the future of language and its use in a community" (Benrabah, 2005, p.409)

Language planning can either be:

a - a Political/ Administrative activity or 'status planning' where the language is assigned to serve some communal or societal sectors such as: education, mass media…

b - a Linguistic activity or 'corpus planning' in which the language is used to compose grammar, change spelling, develop new orthographies, and so on. Arabization is a status planning process, whereas Arabicization is a corpus planning process. The distinction between the two is not acknowledged in this chapter, and they are used interchangeably.

c - Acquisition planning: to make sure the intended language is being spread and fostered by being taught and learnt in educational schools

d - Prestige planning: to provide an appropriate psychological setting to help the success of language learning. (Benrabah, 2005, p.410)

Algeria had a strong yearning to reclaim its Arab and Muslim identity after independence. Extensive Arabization activities were launched with the goal of eradicating the colonizer's language. Arabization, according to Benrabah (2007), is "the language policy implemented to displace French altogether" (p.194) and replace it with classical Arabic; the language of the Quran and the essence of Arab Islamic identity, which entails choosing monolingualism over Arabic-French bilingualism. (Bossut, 2016, p.20)

Nationalist elites were interested in preserving classical Arabic because they were convinced that without it, Algeria's cultural history and identity would be lost. Language is, undoubtedly, a tool of power and president Boumediene argued that without recovering the national language, our efforts as an independent nation "will be in vain, our personality incomplete, and our entity a body without a soul." (As cited in Le Roux, 2017, p. 119; Mostari, 2004, p. 26)

Algerian sociologist Khaoula Taleb Ibrahimi went further in explaining that for Algeria:

> Arabization became a synonym for revitalization (ressourcement), a return to authenticity, a recuperation of the Arab identity that could not

be realized without the restoration of the Arabic language… [It became] the fundamental condition for reconciling [Algeria] with itself. (As cited in Bossut, 2016, p.22)

This ensures that Arabization was fiercely promoted by a number of Algerian nationalists and political figures who fervently sought to eliminate the European spirit that has swept across the nation and its people to establish the Arabo-Islamic components of the Algerian identity. A number of laws and directives were enacted with the goal of instituting classical Arabic in all public spheres. Projects to Arabize the public domain: environment, government and education were initiated.

3.3.1 Environmental/ Administrative Arabization:

As indicated in the preceding chapter, France's Frenchification effort began by creating a French environment and imbuing the streets and public spaces with a European spirit. Following independence, the Algerian government issued a circular in July 1576 that aimed to Arabize the Algerian environment. In article 3 of the circular; the government ordered to: "Arabiser totalement toutes les enseignes extérieures des administrations et sociétés publiques et interdire absolument toute inscription en langue étrangère." (As cited in Mostari, 2004, p.27; Aziz, 2015, p.36) while article 4 added: "Utiliser seulement l'écriture en arabe pour les divers services, bureaux et guichets internes et pour les diverses inscriptions, panneaux d'indication ou d'orientation" (As cited in Mostari, 2004, p.27) This tendency generated the use of classical Arabic in public statements and the wider public domain. The clearest example is the city of Algiers, when all of the panels inscribed in French were changed with those written in Classical Arabic in one night.

Likewise, streets and avenues were subjected to the Arabization process. Although not widespread on a national scale, certain communities and streets got their names Arabized. In sidi Belabbes; Descartes village was transformed into Mustapha Ben Brahim, Detrie village into Sidi Lahcen and Baudelaire Street (previously named after a French poet) into Shā-ra' Sakiet Sidi Yousef. In Algiers, some places took the name of Algerian martyrs, among these are Place Bugeaud, rue D'Isly, and rue Michelet which

became Sahet Chouhada', rue Larbi Ben Mhidi and rue Didouche Mourad. (Bekkai, 2015) These improvements were part of a meticulous effort to create an Arab ambiance that would eventually serve to support the country's Arabization process.

More severe Arabization legislations were implemented, requiring the use of Arabic in all meetings, debates, conferences both public and private. In 1968 decree, President Houari Boumediene declared: "Dans un délai de trois ans, les fonctionnaires doivent apprendre suffisamment d'arabe pour travailler dans cette langue." (As cited in Mostrai, 2004, p.27), using other languages will be considered void and violaters of the law will be penalized with hefty fines of at least 1,000 Algerian dinars. (Aziz, 2015, p.37)

In the same vein, a technical committee on Arabization was established in 1977 that aimed to supply the public with the necessary material to implement Arabization in the administration. This initiative was followed by legislation on the 'generalization of the use of the Arabic language' that was approved by the Algerian Transitional National Council (CNT). It stated that:

> Les administrations publiques, les institutions, les entreprises et les associations quelle que soit leur nature sont tenues d'utiliser la seule langue arabe dans l'ensemble de leurs activités telles que la communication, la gestion administrative, financière, technique et artistique". (As cited in Mostari, 2004, p.28)

The Arabization of the environment and government was a stepping stone towards a wave of new changes in postwar Algeria. Despite being considered largely successful, environmental Arabization was only nominally implemented and not substantively. Algerians, out of habit, continued to use the traditional labels used during the interwar era, whereas for the administrative initiative; instructions were impossible to implement after 132 years of French authority. That resulted in a francized administrative cadre in control of the state apparatus.

3.3.2 Steps towards Arabizing Education:

The Algerian experience in the Arabization of Education was a profound and particularly prolonged one. Because education was France's preferred acculturation

weapon, and it implemented extensive educational initiatives to aid in Frenchifying the Algerian society; the issues that independent Algeria faced during the Arabization process were tremendous. The overall cultural situation after independence was: 80% of illiterate people (Djabri, 1981) and a remaining educated group made up of French speaking Algerians who viewed French as a prestigious language that would aid in keeping up with the western civilized world, and an Arabic speaking elite concerned about its cultural and national identity that strived to maintain an Arabo-Islamic personality.

A traumatized and extremely sensitive populace after independence, combined with a dearth of skilled personnel to undertake the Arabization program in education, was undoubtedly the most challenging task that preoccupied the newly elected government. To address this issue, the government convened a meeting in 1963 of Arabic scholars to deliberate on the final measures to assure the effective completion of Arabization. The negotiations resulted in the government offering employment to any Algerian who speaks Arabic fluently and is qualified to teach in primary and elementary schools. However, confronted with a severe scarcity of qualified personnel, the government increased French instruction, only to exacerbate the issue. (Abdulrazak, 1982, p.28)

This decision indigenized most Algerians, especially those in remote areas who placed great hope on the promises of Arabization. The Arabic language is a representative of their cultural heritage and a vehicle of Islamism. According to Ferhat Abbes:

> Arabic is to Islam what the Church is to the Catholic religion; one could not live without the other.... The reading of the Qur'an is everything. It stands at the cement of our faith. Is it then necessary to declare our commitment to the teaching of the Arabic language, the basis of our belief (As cited in Aziz, 2015, p.32)

Their rejection was also motivated by the belief that the colonial battle would be prolonged in the presence of two languages, one of them is established by force and in the presence of which the mother tongue is seen as inferior. According to Memi (1957)

languages mirror the clash between two cultural worlds where the mother tongue is pushed to the margin:

> Possessing two languages is not simply a question of possessing two sets of tools, it means belonging to two distinct psychic and cultural domains. And in this case, the two realms symbolized and articulated through the two languages are in conflict: they are those of the colonizer and of the colonized (As cited in Majumdar, 2007, p.148)

From this perspective, Algerian politicians and military leaders –who were mainly members of the FLN– decided to turn a deaf ear on all impeding circumstances to declare Arabic as an official language and achieve linguistic nationalism which is "the belief that nationality is characterized by a single language that unifies a nation." (Briggs, 2010, p.01)

The process of establishing a linguistic nationalism in Algeria was the same as that of France. Algerian elites followed the example of the French in forcing a monolinguistic tongue via an Arabization campaign in the educational domain, for the sake of forging a country unified by a single language. (Briggs, 2010)

The role of Arabic as a force of unity was clearly perceptible long before independence. FLN commandant Si Mohammed Harbi explains that the language in the Algerian war of independence is men's force of reconciliation, and despite the variety of regional tongues; the country should only have one national language to guarantee a state of cohesiveness and order. In 1961, He asserted that as Algerians "Our national language is Arabic. It is the language of our religion, culture and history." (As cited in Bouherar & Ghafsi, 2021, p.59) The position of Arabic in independent Algeria was considered before independence as a means of political unity and after as a component of national identity. Language also serves as a tool of hegemony via which the state forces its ideology on the society to affirm the sincere intentions of fostering Algerian nationalism. Official documents revealed their scheme to enhance Arabic and Islam by relegating the status of the French language and culture in Algeria. The official texts are presented chronologically as follows:

a) The November 1st, Declaration of Independence:

It is the first official document issued by members of the National liberation Front in 1954 that collaborated mainly to achieve independence and to restore elements of Algerian identity. As written in the declaration itself; the rebels agreed on "the establishment of a socially democratic, independent Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles". It also announced its intention in abolishing the French heritage and performing a "political purging by turning the national movement to its true path and the eradication of remnants of corruption and the spirit of reform, which played a significant role in our current state of backwardness" (National Liberation Front, 1954)

b) Soumam Conference Petition of 1956:

This document was particularly written to encourage the Algerian people to establish a national unity. To achieve the latter; it focused on the promotion of the Arabic language and the national language and Islam as the religion of the state. It declared that Arabic language; the national language and the language of the vast majority of the population has been suppressed by colonialism and the sacredness of Islam has been compromised; only to motivate the people to hold on their Arabism and Islamic heritage.

c) The Tripoli Congress June 1962:

Before Algeria gained its independence, the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (C.N.R.A.) held a conference in Tripoli in June 1962 to discuss how to achieve a popular democratic revolution. By recognizing the Arabic language preeminence as the representative of Algerian cultural values and as the embodiment of civilization, it highlighted the rebirth of Algerian culture, emphasizing a national, revolutionary, and scientific one that will result in a rich and diverse national heritage. (Tripoli congress, 1962, p.25)

d) The Algerian Charter of April 1964:

It is a set of official texts that embodies the decisions resulted from the first meeting of the national liberation front. Its emphasis was on the cultural facet of the Algerian

society, as shown in the first chapter of the charter:

> Le peuple algérien est un peuple arabo-musulman. En effet, à partir du VIIIᵉ siècle, l'islamisation et l'arabisation ont donné à notre pays le visage qu'il a sauvegardé jusqu'à présent… Le caractère arabo-musulman demeure ainsi, le fondement de la personnalité algérienne

e) National Charter of July 5th, 1976:

This charter was clear in its emphasis on the Arab identity of Algerians and encouraged the Adaptation of Arabic in terms of restoring the cultural identity of the populace. It clarified that Arabic and the Algerian persona are an indivisible dichotomy; thus, generalizing and mastering the Arabic language is a necessity.

Because it is the national language: any hesitation in applying it or comparison with a foreign language is unacceptable. Arabization, from now on is to be discussed in terms of how to be taught not whether or not to be taught.

f) The Official Newspaper Decree of 1976:

This decree includes a list of laws and decisions to regulate the educational policy in Algeria. The articles that acknowledged the inevitability of Arabization are as follows:

a- Article (02): the educational system's mission in the light of Arab Islamic principles.
b- Article (08): at all levels of education and training and in all subjects, instructions must be delivered in Arabic.
c- Article (25): studying Arabic so to become fluent in both speech and writing.

g) The Algerian Constitution:

- **1963 Constitution:**

The preamble of the constitution states that "Islam and the Arabic language are each an effective force that resisted with persistence the colonial attempts to deprive Algerians

of their identity." Algeria, thus, must affirm that "Arabic is the national and official language and Islam is the source of its fundamental spirituality" (1963 constitution, p. 09)

Article 4 of 1963 constitution continued to affirm that Islam is the religion of the state and that Algerian republic ensures the religious freedom, opinions and practices of every individual are highly respected, while Article 5 of the same constitution stated clearly that Arabic language is the national and official language of the state. (p. 10)

- **The 1976/ 1989/ 1996 Constitutions:**

Article 3 of the 1976/1989/1996 constitutions states also that Arabic language is the national and official language of the state (1976 constitution, p. 21; 1989 constitution, p. 50; 1996 constitution, p. 74)

- **2016 Constitution:**

Article 3 of this constitution states that:
- Arabic language is the national and official language of the state
- Arabic remains the official language of the state
- A supreme council for the Arabic language shall be created by the president of the republic
- The supreme council of the Arabic language is specifically tasked with promoting the Arabic language, generalizing its use the scientific and technological domains and encouraging translation into it for this reason. (Jeradi, 2017, p. 12-13)

3.3.3 Arabization of Education:

Arabization went through five stages according to the number of presidential terms

3.3.3.1. Arabization from 1962-1965:

This stage was the period of rule of President Ahmed ben Bella[17]. Since the nation was in a state of chaos; the governmental cadre focused mainly on rebuilding the nation. At the time, their main focus was drafting a constitution that would create the nation's

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[17] - First elected president of Algeria

political institutions and governing authority. Education was regarded as a fundamental part of the process of nation-building; thus, it was one of the main concerns of Ben Bella's government, as well as one of the most difficult tasks to complete after the deconstruction policies that affected educational facilities and domain in general.

Following an in-depth examination of Algeria's educational situation, it was determined that: only 300.000 out of 1.800.000 schoolchildren were enrolled in schools in 1961, the departure of 90% of European teachers created a significant gap in the teaching sector, necessitating the search for substitutes (Ruedy, 1992), in addition to the lack of institutions and the constant increase of the Algerian population.

Ben Bella's administration focused its efforts on identifying feasible solutions to educational challenges, primarily because the discussion over the nation's cultural identity was always conducted through education. In his inaugural address, he underlined the significance of education as the embodiment of the nation's future. Knowledge should be among the Algerian people's aspirations due to its significance in rescuing the country from the stagnation and intellectual reliance brought about by French colonization.

According to Ruedy (1992), to achieve an understanding of the Algerian culture after independence is the same as achieving the political and economic development. Nation building is generally based on a transitional movement from 'segmentation' to 'integration'. The latter can be geographic, economic, sociological and political, but the individual's involvement in any of these systems operating in a single nation is explained by one's perception of his cultural identity. (p.224) following the credo of the reformists that Islam is our religion, Arabic is our language, Algeria is our fatherland; it can be perceived that to affirm cultural identity is to affirm the national language.

When the constitution was ratified in 1963 and Algeria was declared a socialist state; what to do in the field of education became clearer. Based on the 1963 constitution; Arabic became the official language and Islam the official religion of the state.

Ben Bella announced the Arabization of education in Algeria and that Arabic must be taught in primary schools alongside the French language; (Hala, 2018) explaining that

Arabization would allow: "Algerians to reconciliate their country which has been depersonalized with its history and its past, that is to say, with itself" (Kashani Sabet, 1996, p.269)

The first school entry was characterized by a bilingual policy of instruction with 7 hours a week dedicated to the teaching of Arabic. This procedure shows the government strict adherence and commitment to the revolution charter that promised to eradicate the remnants of the French colonialism and give the Arabic language its national character by introducing it as the national and official language of the state. However, this decision infuriated Algerians who were French educated or Berberphones who sought that Algeria is rather Berber than Arab. Despite this opposition; the socio-political situation of the state tended to favor Arabization. Arabic instructions continued to be an obligation in all curricula and at all levels in primary schooling.

The first and second grade of primary schooling were totally Arabized while the third and fourth received teachings in both Arabic and French (p.228). Bilingualism was a must because there was still a confusion over how to erase the French language and culture. Following the 1964 constitution; French was allowed to be used until the goals of Arabization are met. Article n° 73 of the 1964 constitution states the following:

> The provision of this constitution notwithstanding, the actual achievement of Arabization on the territory of the Republic must take place in the shortest possible time; however, the French language may be used provisionally with the Arabic language.   (Bouherar & Ghafsi, 2021, p.59)

However, despite his eagerness to pursue the Arabization plan, President Ben Bella himself had massive doubts concerning the success of Arabization. In his speech to Algerian teachers on July 3 rd. 1963 he admitted that he could not deny the importance of the French language, as it is "a factor of enrichment to us" (As cited in Kashani Sabet, 1996, p.269; Bouherar & Ghafsi, 2021, p.60) and this explains the government's tolerance of using the French language while gradually implementing Arabic.

Concerning the educational personnel shortfall, the government quickly trained 3.452 Algerian instructors who can read and write in both Arabic and French to offer lessons. But, due to the increasing number of students enrolled in schools, this amount was insufficient. Two months after independence, Algeria asked the support of international organizations and other countries to help fill empty posts and prepare for the first school season. With the UNESCO consent to provide the required funding for the Algerian educational initiative, Egypt sent 3.000 graduates from al Azhar and Syria sent roughly 150.00 instructors.

Perhaps the most serious error made by the Algerian government shortly after independence was its partnership with France to improve the educational system. Due to the Evian agreements:

> France shall … place at the disposal of Algeria the necessary means for helping it to develop education, vocational training and scientific research in Algeria, together with the teaching personnel, technicians, specialists and research workers which it may need. (As cited in Assous, 1985, p.105)

These accords re-established Algeria's cultural links with France. The number of French instructors returned to Algeria in 1962 is estimated to be 12.000, who resumed their teaching duties in December 1962 and were allocated as follows: 2000 in higher education and secondary schools, and 10,000 in primary schools. (Assous, 1985, p.106)

In 1963-1964 there was a tendency to train personnel and provide more teachers in primary schools. To that end; the standards of diplomas were decreased and based on which the personnel were divided into 3 categories:

1. Teachers: those individuals who obtained a Baccalaureate degree. In 1963 twenty per cent of teachers had a Baccalaureate.
2. Instructors: those individuals who obtained the Brevet d'Enseignement Moyen diploma. After completing 9 years of education and going through examination; 40% of the teaching staff had a brevet diploma in 1963

3. Monitors: those individuals holding un Certificat d'Etudes Primaires achieved after six years of education and examination. In 1963, 40% of the teaching personnel held the C. E. P,

Secondary school teachers have to follow certain protocols as well. Teachers, primarily from France and the Middle East, were required to get a French license after three years of study at a university. Algerians made up just 100 of the 1.216 instructors who held a French license after independence, together with a group of 305 'aides' who only had one or two certifications or 'propédeutique' approved as a license. (Benabdi, 1980, p.130)

In addition to international teachers; Algeria also imported books from different Arab countries and called for the return of all students studying abroad to take their positions as teachers. To solve the problems of educational institutions the government utilized abandoned colon buildings and military barracks as classrooms to provide enough seats for the growing Algerian population. To meet the rapidly growing number of school children; lessons were held in shifts, reducing the number of hours weekly from the usual thirty (twenty-three taught in French, seven in Arabic), to twenty (fifteen hours in French, five in Arabic). (Benabdi, 1980, p.130)

An event worth emphasizing is the establishment of the 'office universitaire et culturel Francais' by the returning French instructors who had been previously repatriated to France. These instructors were eager to re-establish the French educational system; they thought that their children should have the privilege of encountering their forever honored French culture. Thus, the office operated by establishing 28 French cultural institutions (centres culturels Francais), 40 primary schools, and 9 lycées, all of which operated in accordance with the previous educational system, providing the same instructions and pursuing the same goals. These institutions were not meant for every Algerian student to join. Only 13.500 who were mainly from upper and middle classes were permitted; the rest of Algerian children attended the country's public schools. This initiative brought the deeply rooted historical problems of racism and divisiveness back to the surface, repeating the same scenario of an 'aristocratic' class whose belief of its

seemingly superior culture led to the exclusion of the inferior 'agrarian' peasants from participating in national life sectors due to the general use of the French language in all official transaction, leading again to the marginalization of the Arabic language. (Assous, 1985, p.107-108)

To summarize, the first phase of education after independence (1963-1964) was not a huge success; there were still plenty of problems that needed to be addressed, such as the bilingual situation in classrooms and the difficulties faced by students in adapting to an instruction policy in two different languages. Nonetheless, it was successful in enrolling every kid aged six in school.

The second phase of education (1964-1965) focused on making Arabic more inclusive. Between 1964 and 1965, a decision was made that required all subjects to be taught in Arabic (Hala, 2018) as part of the triple plan of: 1- Arabization of education, 2- democratization of education, 3- Prioritizing science and technology in order to produce more productive and prosperous citizens. Nonetheless, the statistics made by the end of the 1965 academic year proved dissatisfying results. The recruiting approach, which targeted both Algerians and foreign teachers, resulted in a major drop in professional standards, affecting the quality of instruction, and the outcomes of Arabic courses dashed the state's hopes of Arabization. Some critics assumed that Algeria might have rushed into Arabization without forethought.

The daily newspaper *al Moudjahid* disseminated the government's wishes to slow down the process of Arabization:

> The worst enemy of Arabization is Arabization at all costs, which does not take into consideration our capabilities or our means . . . we will do well to realize progressively and in time the Arabization necessary for our education, without neglecting the importance of French, a cultural and technical vehicle of the first order. (As cited in Benabdi, 1980, p.132)

Ben Bella was a political enthusiast who worked hard to develop his nation. He was keen to make a substantial transformation in education after 132 years of French

dominance, particularly via the process of Arabization to reduce colonial influence and cultural reliance. Significant efforts were made in the sphere of education by the end of 1965; nevertheless, the government goals had not been thoroughly articulated, and it lacked the required cadres and resources to carry them out. Because of economic, political, and societal concerns, it was difficult to achieve the desired goals. Ben Bella was confronted with a military coup on June 19th, 1965 by former Minister of Defense Houari Boumediene which marked the beginning of a new government under his presidency.

3.3.3.2. Arabization from 1965-1979:

This stage witnessed huge reforms and activities in the field of education and Arabization. What defines this stage is the change in governments from Ben Bella to Houari Boumediene[18] who formed an administrative crew that cared deeply about the enhancement of the educational sector. The first year of his government 1956-1966 was devoted to promote the Arabization process started by the previous regime; to monitor the outcomes and to complete the necessary pedagogical plans. All of this was done in conjunction with ongoing efforts to train teachers in Arabic and improve their performance via the regular participation in educational seminars and forums under the supervision of skilled advisors and inspectors. (Hala, 2018)

Ahmed Talib al Ibrahimi (the son of the Ulema member, al Bachir al Ibrahimi) was appointed as minister of education. He revealed the governmental intentions towards a complete Arabization of the Algerian society via education. He asserted that: "The Algerian must seize the richness of his past and he cannot do it without the knowledge of Arabic (...) Our culture, which means before everything, our education, must be Algerian, founded on the Arabic language" (As cited in Assous, 1985, p.110). He continued his announcements by emphasizing the difficulty of the Arabization process, and assured that the task should be implemented gradually and with careful tactic to avoid damaging the quality of the enterprise that will accordingly damage the linguistic unity of the people.

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[18] - Also known as: Mohammad Ben Brahim Boukharouba, was an army officer who became president of Algeria in July 1965 following a coup d'etat.

President Houari Boumediene showed his massive support to the ideas of al Ibrahimi and claimed that the Arabic language is the native language of an Algerian. It is therefore, a necessity for the Algerian to speak his own language. But, he must remain open to foreign languages to cope with modern sciences and technology.

On the 4th of August 1966, minister of education al Ibrahimi stood before the Ministers' council to display the results of the first year of Arabization. They were the following:

1. The first grade was totally Arabized and the remaining grades were taught 10 hours a week of Arabic.
2. Arabic became mandatory in all classes of secondary schools
3. The creation of 5 Arabized high schools that followed the educational techniques of Ibn Badis Madrasah. Students also received instructions in French and English as second languages.
4. The college of philosophy and liberal arts witnessed the beginning of the gradual Arabization operations. (Assous, 1985, p.111)

This year of Arabization is notable for its inclusive nature, which accommodated all Algerians. For the first time since 1830, Algeria has experienced an equitable and non-discriminatory system in which education was essential for both genders and all social groups. Based on this accomplishment, the Ministry of Education worked to implement more educational reforms. There was a general agreement among educators that Arabization is necessary and that it will take significant effort to make it inclusive. Their major worry, however, was determining the best way to administer it. Thus, Ahmed Taleb al Ibrahim suggested the following Arabization plans to the council of ministers:

1. Vertical Arabization: means entire Arabization of each year of school (100 percent rather than 50%) beginning with the first year of primary school and continuing vertically to cover elementary and secondary education and concluding with university.

2. Horizontal Arabization: Arabization subject by subject in all levels beginning with literary subjects such as literature, history, philosophy and moving to scientific subjects such as mathematics, science, and physics.

3. Geographic Arabization: should concentrate on spreading Arabization in certain areas, particularly those that have had little contact with French culture, such as the southern states and the countryside.

4. Progressive Arabization: the entire Arabization of the educational system, beginning with a small region and progressing from one school to another until it encompasses all educational institutions in the country. (Benabdi, 1980, p.132-133; Assous, 1985, p.112; Hala, 2018, p.320-321)

Following a thorough assessment of the four designs, the administration heavily criticized the first two. Vertical Arabization was almost impossible due to a lack of supplies and teaching staff, as well as the government's inability to fund the necessary expenses. The sole option would be to continue as before, with certain sections being taught in Arabic and some in French, and to slow down the process of Arabization until the entire sector is Arabized. This plan, however, would create a larger issue: pupils in the elementary level would be required to complete their studies in French while waiting for Arabized kids from primary schools to transfer to the elementary level. This implies an unfair level of teaching Arabic and a greater delay in its instruction.

Horizontal Arabization, on the other hand, was criticized for its capacity to limit the use of Arabic to the humanities, perhaps widening the gap between them and the sciences. Algeria was eager to strengthen the scientific sector and was in dire need of skilled scientists and technology; pursuing a language strategy incapable of dealing with scientific concerns was strongly opposed.

The government did not object to the third suggestion, but instead selected the fourth as the most logical and practical. The practical implementation of the plan was determined in the fall of 1971. Though the government chose the fourth plan; in reality, all four plans were unsystematically executed. (Assous, 1985; Benabdi, 1980) There was not an organized scheme on which educational institutions depended to implement the

process of Arabization; therefore, each school selected the plan that best suited its needs. Some schools decided to Arabize year by year seeking the vertical mechanism, others who believed that Arabization would be easier in smaller and poorer communities went for the geographical plan, in some regions where Arabization was highly considered, the focus was on teaching literary matters and in others where Arabization was opposed, like in Algiers, the procedure was not seriously considered. (Assous, 1985)

Primary school education was concluded by the granting of the CEP (Certificat d'étude primaire) that is both Arabic and bilingual, as was the case after the completion of twelve years of schooling; bilingual students were awarded the Baccalaureate certificate while those who seeked Arabic studies were granted the Ahliyah Certificate.

These imposed educational practices were condemned in educational institutions for their divisiveness and inconsistency. Criticism fell specifically on the issue of Arabization. The process was assaulted by the elite in urban areas for lowering the educational standards and the non-conformity in the language of instruction that generated pessimistic parents towards the likelihood of Arabization success. It was unreasonable for a first year school child to study a subject in Arabic only to discover it is being taught in French the following year; which is why most parents urged their children to skip first year of education and go straight to the second. (Benabdi, 1980)

However, there was a significant progress in the second year of Arabization, 1967-1968, partly as a result of the importation of 1,000 Syrian teachers and primarily as a result of the ministry's initiative that created standardized Arabic textbooks for both first and second grades, implying that the second year of primary education was also completely Arabized. For parents who previously opposed Arabization, this procedure opened their eyes to the fact that Arabization has become a serious issue and that it will be an essential part of their children's educational careers; avoiding it would only delay their children's exposure to an inevitable process that may become more challenging in the future. (Benabdi, 1980) As a result, many parents favored transferring their children to French private schools instead of Arabized public ones. This indicates that parents' reservations towards Arabization stemmed not from their fear of its failure, but rather of

its success, and that although being carried out perfectly; elite hostility prevented it from attaining its objectives.

Despite opposition, the years 1968-1969 saw the continuation of Arabization. In addition to the total Arabization of the first and second primary levels, two-thirds of the third grade was Arabized with French being used in science and mathematics, half of the fourth and fifth grades were Arabized with 15 hours of French and 15 hours of Arabic, but the sixth grade was only one-third Arabized. (Assous, 1985) This year also saw the opening of three lycées in Algiers: Aysha for girls and Ibn Khaldun and Ibn Badis for boys. These three institutions followed the gradual Arabization plan, with completely Arabized and multilingual portions. All disciplines, literary or scientific, were taught in Arabic, with French as a required second language for both sections. Graduation from these schools began in 1968 and the first Arabic baccalaureate degrees in math, science and literature were granted the same year. (Benabdi, 1980; Hala, 2018)

Starting from 1968-1969, all departments of the faculty of letters, law and economic sciences added the Arabic language in their curriculum to supply enough seats for graduates with an Arabic baccalaureate. Concerning the scientific fields; they were offered 'experimental' Arabic courses that required passing an Arabic exam to get a university diploma. This initiative proves that Arabization became a serious business to the point that even Algerians who study abroad or have a French education at any university were required to pass the same exams.

Further steps to enhance Arabization in the year 1969-1970 were by increasing the amount of time Arabic is taught for bilingual sections in primary schools. Third grade students received a weekly fourteen out of thirty hours of Arabic, ten out of thirty in the fourth, twelve out of thirty in the fifth, and fourteen out of thirty in the sixth. The same year saw the establishment of technological institutes with the purpose of training Arabized elementary school instructors to welcome freshly graduating juniors from primary schools. (Benabdi, 1980) for the succeeding educational levels; they went through a dualistic educational process. The development of Arabized parts parallel to the French ones was mandated by law. In secondary school, Arabized liberal arts sections

were formed alongside French ones, and by 1970, parallel courses in geography, history, sociology, and philosophy were given at the university level. (Assous, 1985)

It is worth noting that, until this point, education in Algeria was still following the French model in both format and subject matter, and by scrutinizing the results of educational reforms, primarily Arabization, one can easily discern that the issue meant to be resolved, namely dualism, still exists. Because it was deeply rooted in the society; French was still consuming a significant amount of time and effort, either via teaching it or through the immense work done to replace it with Arabic.

The year 1971 was intended to be a transitional year, or 'the year of Arabization,' as President Boumediene dubbed it. The procedure began in 1968, when Boumediene personally ordered civil servants to learn Arabic while proclaiming his aspirations for total Arabization. The National Committee for Educational Reform, directed by Abdelhamid Mehri, was founded in December 1969 with the primary purpose of re-evaluating Algerian policy relative to the status of foreign languages. Despite the committee's recommendations emphasizing the need of studying other foreign languages, it was agreed that Arabic would be the only language taught at all educational levels, with French being emphasized as the first foreign language to be taught in Algerian schools.

The four year plan (1970-1974) that materialized in 1971 stated the following:

- The third and fourth years of primary education would receive Arabic instruction in all subject of the program, and French would be taught as a foreign language
- One-third of the first year of middle school (the seventh year) would be totally Arabized
- In secondary school; one third of scientific subjects (Physics, Mathematics, Chemistry and Science) would be entirely Arabized. In addition to French as a foreign language and the introduction of another foreign language. (Benabdi, 1980, p.139; Hala, 2018, p.322)

The government initiated more changes at the university level. In 1971, it was decided to abandon the French style of education at the university level as well. Unlike the one-year French university system, which required students to take just one exam at the end of the academic year; Algeria chose a semester-based system that required students to take an examination at the end of each semester. This helped in giving more chances to students to upgrade and improve their levels which accordingly helped increasing their desire to pursue their higher education culminating in the training of highly qualified Algerian personnel.

One of the requirements of the 1971 plan was to study 300 hours of Arabic over six semesters, followed by an examination that would determine whether or not the student continues his university studies based on his grade in Arabic. For the first time, scientific modules were taught in Arabic for students who desired to pursue their studies in Arabic. However, this option hampered the students' opportunities for better employment other than the teaching domain because the scientific sector was more reliant on teachings in French; a problem that still exists nowadays and exhibits the contradiction between rhetoric and action. (Assous, 1985; Benabdi, 1980)

Another issue concerning the Arabization of the scientific stream was the paucity of books and instructors. To address this issue, the government organized committees tasked with authoring books and approached Eastern nations for teachers. The adoption of this strategy fostered a competition between the Arabic and French languages. Because French remained the medium of teaching for at least two-thirds of many academic years, rivalry between the two languages was essential, as was comparison between scientific texts with Arabic manuscripts and those with French manuscripts

The ministry of primary and secondary education also tasked a group of persons with translating textbooks into Arabic while ensuring that they cover the same subjects as their French counterparts. Though the government ambitions to elevate Arabic and place it ahead of the French language were not realized at this time, it was able to keep Arabic from falling behind.

Nevertheless, due to the bilingualism of the educational system, this era was marked by a large divide between students who received teaching in Arabic and those who received instruction in French. Officials justified resorting to this plan by citing a severe staff shortage and the inability of Arab cooperation to meet Algeria's needs, assuring that this procedure is only temporary because their original plan stated explicitly the gradual mechanism of Arabization in education until finally realizing a single language system.

A large number of Algerian individuals hoped that this process of education won't continue the same for a long time. Yet, those in charge couldn't care less. Bilingualism for them is a win-win situation, since the elite parents prefer their children to study in French and others, mainly poor class parents, favor Arabic instructions; then the authorities shouldn't disappoint either of them and keep the same process as long it satisfies both sides. This, however, does not indicate that the government was at ease with these practices. Following Algeria's selection as the site for the second Pan Arab Congress for Arabization in December 1973, major procedures were followed. This congress sponsored by A.L.E.C.S.O. (the Arab League's Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization) gathered all Arabic speaking countries to develop standardized scientific and technological terms that could be used by all Arabic-speaking countries. This idea of a unified terminology stimulated the F.L.N to hold its fourth congress on January 1973 that ordered the creation of the national commission for Arabization.

This commission brought together a group of intellectuals from various scientific and technical disciplines, as well as representatives from various ministries and national institutions, with the goal of studying the ongoing process of Arabization from the past to the present, focusing on the successes and deficiencies in the educational system. Following various research, the commission conclusions revealed that Arabization faced significant hurdles. As a result, the Algerian government held the First National Conference for Arabization in May 1975, with the goal of accelerating the Arabization process in those regions that were still hostile to it, preventing internal strife, and ensuring that Arabization was applied equitably to all facets of Algerian society.

As he opened the conference, president Boumediene asserted that Arabization is part of the country's history and the revolutionary struggle, and that those responsible for its development must be devoted to the revolution. Any disregard towards the revolution guiding principles is intolerable, and as a nation that upholds its values: "We will never accept that it (Arabization) be a simple slogan behind which hide some reactionary elements, enemies of the revolution, who work for interests incompatible with it, using the slogan of Arabization to sabotage the revolution" (As cited in Assous, 1985, p.123)

To ensure the most successful Arabization process, the conference provided a strategy with three major developmental phases:

I.   The Immediate Phase (1976-1978) :

This phase was intended to concentrate on aspects of daily life, or "the Arabization of the milieu." It entailed Arabizing:

- Street signs, store names, labels, etc. (Medicine and tourism labels were not included)
- Publicly available documents: those issued by the police, customs, TV shows, and foreign films must be translated or subtitled into Arabic.
- To encourage Algerians to utilize Arabic in the home through media and education.
- In terms of education, this stage saw the entire Arabization of kindergarten and it was agreed that calculus and math at elementary school would be completely Arabized by the end of this stage. Arabization at this stage also encompassed educational and professional aspects of life that functioned bilingually and did not need in-depth understanding of Arabic or sophisticated scientific terminology.

II.   Intermediate phase (1976-1980) :

This phase was meant to address those areas of work and education that required a more sophisticated knowledge of Arabic in the technical and scientific domains.

Accordingly, students in scientific, technical and vocational fields (technicians, engineers, doctors…etc.) were expected to take Arabic courses to be ready for the third phase that was meant to conduct all technological trainings in Arabic. As a continuum of the first phase; the intermediate phase worked on the completion of educational programs for future middle school teachers.

III. Long Term Phase (1976- 1982) :

This phase was meant to address those functions and educational fields that required the most technical and scientific knowledge of the Arabic language. For instance; those totally bilingual scientific fields were supposed to receive 50% of French instructions and 50% Arabic.

Further reforms were made at the university level that stipulated the complete Arabization of economics and the introduction of Arabic in medicine and pharmacology.

The three-phase plan was supposed to begin in 1976, but Arabization began immediately following the National Liberation Front fourth session in January 1975. Education laws addressing the generalization of the use of Arabic stated that education must adhere to the principles and guidelines of the National Charter, as well as work on the affirmation of Algerian national identity by reconsidering the national language and making it a tool for achieving Arabization within the framework of the country's comprehensive development plan. Based on this, the Arabization Commission offered a thorough explanation of a set of techniques deemed to be the most feasible and practicable in achieving Arabization by the end of 1975. (Hala, 2018, p. 323-326)

Another educational endeavor was the 1976 reform, or the implementation of l'enseignement fondamentale. Prior to 1976, Algeria followed the French model that divided education into 3 phases. Primary education that required 6 years of education to receive un *certificat d'étude primaire*, an elementary education consisting of 4 years of middle school (first cycle of or lower secondary education) that ends with having un *certificat de brevet moyen* after passing a public examination, and a 3 years secondary education at un lycée (lycée d'enseignement general/ second cycle or upper secondary

cycle) to receive the Baccalaureate certificate. In 1976, the Algerian government decided to break the mold. The previously followed educational system was a colonial residue that was somewhat adjusted to meet the needs of the country. Algeria must experience significant educational adjustments to achieve complete independence from France's cultural influence.

In June 1976, a commission of educational reform was formed to determine the structure and goals of the new educational system. The 6-4-3 structure was modified to a 9-3 structure; 6 years of primary school will be merged with a 4 reduced into 3 years of middle school to produce a 9 fundamental years of education. The sixième exam is therefore removed, and the student earns a Diplôme d'Etudes Fondamentales (DEF) after completing 9 years of study. Following that, a student might either work or pursue an upper secondary education. (Kohli, 1987)

At this point, it is difficult to dispute that education and Arabization strategy were not accurate. However, the problem with educational reforms and decisions taken back then, and which continues to this day, is their tendency of being hasty and highly improvised. Furthermore, decision makers were frequently entrapped in the idealized vision of their goal, paying little attention to the undesirable consequences. Thus, the 1975 'ideal blueprint' was not put into practice, the government ignored the possibility of resistance once more, rendering the process a failure in all stages save for modest improvements that happened in the immediate period. The educated French elite showed no devotion to carrying out the plan and completely ignored its recommendations. Aside from the absence of Arabized personnel, the idea proved to be extremely utopian and unrealistic. Perhaps the Arabization Commission should have considered enforcing consequences if the plan was not carried out; doing so would have averted laxity in the educational sector. (Assous, 1985, p.123- 126)

The year 1976 was notable in terms of Arabizing the government and the environment. All street names, stores names, highway signs were Arabized on March 1st, cities and villages also restored their Arabic or Berber designations (for instance, Fort Nationale in Kabylia became Larba n'AtIrathen and Michelet became Ain al-Hammam). In 1977 the media was also affected by Arabization; the formerly French speaking journal 'la république' was converted to 'al Djoumhouriya'.

This same phase marked the governmental attempts to eliminate classism and racism in the school. In 1976, all private schools were nationalized so as to compel the elite parents to enroll their children in public schools. This precedent forced the majority of public schools to shut its doors, only few ones remained in service. The government also attacked the Office Universitaire and Culturel Français and set strict limitations on its activities for its overwhelming control over the educational system in Algeria. Yet, according to 1981 statistics, 7.236 Algerian students were still exposed to the French educational system via the enrollment in the few private schools left open. Simply because the elite parents had strong relations; they were acquainted with prominent figures in the state that used their power to represent their needs and helped keep the French educational system in effect. In addition, the elite intended to keep the boundaries set between themselves (who received a French education) and the Arabized masses, and any tendency that aimed to remove disparities was faced with great resistance.

However, the failure of Arabization was not solely attributed to the resistance of the elite, the educational sector experienced failure primarily as a result of the pursuit of inclusive change without in-depth study of the situation and a thorough understanding of the dynamics needed to conduct such a change. The government daydreamed of creating a radical change while still following the French educational model in both shape and content. In addition to the unrealistic presumptions of a speedy transformation such as the notion that by establishing commissions and issuing decrees, the general populace would respond and adapt hastily to these reforms. For the French elite, it is more accurate to say that they were more influential than responsible. They were effective in preying on the psychological vulnerability of the state because it was easy to sway policy in a state that had been severely harmed by a protracted French cultural occupation.

From a political standpoint, President Boumediene made two mistakes in the educational field: the first was the appointment of Abdelkarim ben Mahmoud as minister of education in 1970, who was an advocate of Arabization at first before he disclosed new measures aimed at restoring the French language (Bouherar & Ghafsi, 2022, p. 65). The second was in 1977 when he appointed Mustapha Lacheraf as minister of primary and secondary education. The choice of a minister who is a member of the elite and

fervently believes in the superiority of the French culture is proof that the state did not have a deep faith in the efficacy of its projects. According to Roberts (1983):

> Arabization policy has not been taken very seriously by the regime… The appointment of Mustapha Lacheraf as Minister of Primary and Secondary Education in 1977 undoubtedly reflected Boumediene's recognition of the need for delicacy and caution in this area and was a clear defeat for the advocates of rapid Arabization. (p. 232)

Lacheraf is an Algerian intellectual who was a member of Ali Yahia's Berberist movement in 1948-1949. Despite not being 'Kabyle,' he was widely recognized for his reservations towards Arabization. This demonstrates that not only kabyles were opposed to Arabization, a considerable number of Arabic-speaking Algerians who believe French is more advantageous were also opposed. (Roberts, 1983, p. 232)

Lachref started his tenure by introducing new policies that halted Arabization. He ordered:

- The removal of all members of the commission for Arabization from their positions in the ministry of education
- The closure of the E.N.S (école normale supérieure of Bouzaréah) which was in charge of training 300 Arabized high school teachers since 1974
- The restoration of bilingualism in primary and secondary education in scientific subjects and at high school in liberal arts
- The abolition of l'enseignement fondementale which adopts the teaching of Arabic in the very first 4 years of a child's education
- The beginning of teacher training sessions in French after their abolition in 1976 and replacing all Arabized personnel in the ministry of primary and secondary education with French ones. (Assous, 1985, p. 130-131)

To allay societal criticism, Lacheraf explained his approach as a temporary measure aimed at improving the educational system by slowing down the rate at which the Arabization process is carried out. Abdullatif Rahal, serving as Minister of higher

education alongside Lacheraf, concurred with his premise and alluded to the educational gap caused by the society's rapid Arabization. Although their words may implicitly indicate their support of Arabization and that the measures taken were in its favor; they were in fact the ones who obstructed Arabization until the death of Boumediene in 1978.

The successor to the ministry was Mohammed Cherif Kharroubi, a graduate of Ibn Badis Institute and Baghdad University, was also a former Arabic language instructor and a well-known Kabylian politician. Despite being of Kabyle origins, he was a strong supporter of Arabization, as seen by his unwillingness to use his native dialect, and for which he was 'detested by his fellow Kabylians'. As a result, when he was named Minister of Education in 1979, he was roundly condemned in Berberist circles. (Roberts, 1983, p. 232)

With Kharroubi's installation in office; his predecessor's activities were no longer applicable. All his policies were reversed, except for the ENS that remained closed. He encouraged the recommencement of total Arabization and the inclusion of Religious teachings at schools. He also took two significant steps to promote student employment integration: the first was to require all educational institutions to print diplomas in Arabic in response to employers who made the French language a recruiting criterion, and the second was to reintroduce l'enseignement fondamentale. This strategy gave Algeria's educational system its well-organized framework; Arabic was utilized as a medium of instruction in all subjects including science. French was a mere foreign language beginning in the fourth grade and students were able to complete nine years of schooling without going through an examination by the end of the sixth year (exam de sixième). (Benrabah, 2007)

This program attempted to help students transition from school to the workplace, but the fact that French was still of great demand in the job market stirred up a huge strike by Arabized university students from November 29th, 1979 through January 29th, 1980. The main reason of the students' protests was the huge contradiction between their language of education and the job requirements. Access to employment was particularly

dependent on the proficiency of French which was mostly used in scientific fields, and barely accepted around 16.9% of the 53.6% of Arabized university students.

These students raised slogans demanding better employment opportunities and graduate courses in Arabic, as they were still taught in French, and tied their demands to the 1954 revolution in order to elicit larger responses from the state. This action culminated in the development of a graduate studies program and compelled the FLN to conduct its second session in December 1979, which resulted in the immediate implementation of Arabization in all administrations, national corporations, and social and economic institutions. (Assous, 1985)

These declarations of reform were mainly theoretical, the same as many Arabization endeavors throughout the Boumediene regime. Despite the president's efforts to successfully implement a full Arabization program; the procedure was adversely affected by the administrative personnel's manipulative and mismanaging tendencies in the educational sector. An administrative system dominated by the French language was displaying a positive reaction towards Arabization while secretly striving to thwart any serious attempt of change. To be fair, introducing the Arabic language to a society that was almost entirely ignorant of it is an achievement, but all claims of it being the national language were merely words on paper and fanciful assertions that had no bearing on reality.

3.3.3.3. Arabization from 1979-1992:

President Chadli Bendjedid[19] ruled at this period of time, after assuming his position as successor to the late President Houari Boumediene. Algeria's cultural scene at the epoch was unstable and influenced by two separate currents: an Islamic trend that called for the return to Islamic origins and the implementation of the Arabization project, and a Francophonic one contradicting with the first in its advocation of modernism, secular democracy, and adherence to the French legacy. (Saidouni, 2021, p. 231)

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[19] - was an Algerian nationalist politician who served as the third President of Algeria.

During this president's tenure, the cultural situation was heavily influenced by the economic and political condition of the Algerian state. During the first phase of his leadership (1979-1988), Algeria experienced a significant increase in oil prices, estimated to be three times higher than the preceding period. This rise influenced the president's strategy, prompting him to pursue a large consumption policy, as a result of which a wealthy, corrupt class emerged, leveraging its influence, bribery, and nepotism to amass wealth, while the majority of the people were content once their basic needs were met.

This economic affluence enabled a surge in cultural activities as well as a massive growth in educational programs. Following the former president's agenda, primary and secondary education were Arabized, while Arabic accelerated and dominated the sector of journalism and media. French, on the other hand, was mostly used for administrative purposes and exterior relations. The position of Arabic enraged the Francophonic Berbers, especially following President Bendjedid's forthright recognition of Algeria's Arabness. In response to criticism, he declared that "Algerians are Berbers Arabized by Islam," and reiterated his views in a press interview when he added that "we Algerians... chose to speak Arabic, by virtue of our faith in Islam." (As cited in Saidouni, 2021, p. 232)

According to Bouherar et al., (2002), the Berberist opposing activities were instigated by a covert French hand (p.66), however Mesthrie et al. (2000) state that: ''strategies of resistance [are] a typical reaction to overt political and linguistic oppression'' (As cited in Benrabah, 2007, p. 233). The resistance was first restricted to a small number of Kabylians who created the Socialist Forces Front party (FFS) in 1963-1964 and stated their complete enmity to the central government, as well as their rejection of the country's linguistic policy (Arabization). However, the government continuous repression resulted in widespread demonstrations in 1980, known as the Berber spring.

Prior to this occurrence, the government took coercive measures against the Berber culture and language, it abolished the Circle of Berber Studies at Algiers University in 1971 and the chair of Berber studies at Algiers University in 1973, as well

as making possession of Berber dictionaries and alphabets a criminal offense. So, since Arabization target was the French language; the Berbers resorted to it as a form of resistance to Arabization control.

What caused the violence in Kabylia was, in general, Minister Kherroubi's quick Arabization policy, and, in particular, the cancellation of Mouloud Mammeri's lecture. Mouloud Mammeri is a Kabylian Berberist writer and militant who was allowed to re-establish the Chair of Berber Studies at Algiers University by Minister Taleb Ibrahimi after being prohibited by Ben Bella's administration in 1962 (Benrabah, 2007). He was supposed to give a lecture on Kabyli Folk Literature at the University of Tizi Ouzou, but the state authorities cancelled it on March 10th, 1980, sparking rioting and rallies known as 'the Berber Spring.' (Mufajir Alrabie al Amazighi, 2019)

These demonstrations gained more traction during the second phase of Bendjedid's rule (1988-1992). Following the collapse in oil prices and economic instability, the state was unable to meet the populace demands. Concerned about their future, Algerians staged massive uprisings in October 1988, beginning in Algiers and spreading to cover 70% of the national territory. Although the primary goal was to improve social and economic conditions, the protests also included political waves opposed to the dictatorship and resentful of the one-party system, making political change another demand of the demonstrations.

These events compelled the President to react to the people's demands by committing to undertake political changes, including the limitation of the FLN's hegemony and the recognition of party pluralism. These vows were explicitly established in the 1989 constitution, which allowed the establishment of more than sixty political parties in accordance with article n° 40 of the constitution that acknowledged the freedom to form political organizations. (p.53)

On December 26th, 1991, legislative elections were held, and the results were announced by Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali, who announced that the Islamic Salvation Front had won 188 seats, followed by the Socialist Forces Front with 25 seats and the National Liberation Front with 16 seats. However, before one day had passed, the

authorities declared the election results void. This signaled the beginning of a violent civil war known as the Black Decade 1992.

According to al-Jazeera, Arabization in Algeria has advanced considerably since the 23rd of February 1989 Constitution, which proclaimed in its preamble that Algeria is an Islamic republic, an Arab territory, and a Mediterranean and African country that is an essential component of the vast Maghreb, (p.49) and in the setting of political openness, Algeria began a new stage of Arabization. The Algerian parliament enacted a 'law to generalize the use of Arabic' on December 27th, 1990 that was signed by Bendjedid on January 16th, 1991. (Hadhaqa, 2021), It consists of 41 articles published in the Algerian state official newspaper to offer broad guidelines for the use of Arabic in many facets of national life. The following is a summary of the most important legal provisions pertaining to Arabization.

- **Article 2:** The Arabic language is one of the cornerstones of the well-established national personality, and one of the nation's constants. Its use embodies a manifestation of sovereignty and public order.

- **Article 4:** All public administrations, bodies, organizations, and associations of all types are required to employ the Arabic language exclusively in all aspects of communication, administration, finance, technology, and management.

- **Article 5:** All official papers and reports issued by government agencies, bodies, institutions, and associations must be written in Arabic.
  It is prohibited to use any foreign language in official gatherings for debates and discussions.

- **Article 8:** Contests and examinations for joining all jobs in the administration and institutions must be conducted in Arabic.

- **Article 10:** Official seals, stamps, and distinguishing signs of public authorities, administrations, agencies, and institutions, whatever their nature, shall be in the Arabic language alone.

- **Article 15:** All teachings, education, and training in all sectors, at all levels and specializations shall be in Arabic, taking into consideration foreign language teaching techniques.

- **Article 28:** The state allocates prizes for the best scientific research done in the Arabic language.

- **Article 29:** Official papers published in a language other than Arabic are deemed void.

- **Article 36:** Teaching is carried out in the Arabic language alone in all institutions of higher education and higher institutes, starting from the first academic year 1991/92, with the goal of completing thorough and definitive Arabization by July 5th, 1997 .

Despite the president's commitment to the election results as a valid procedure and reflection of the people's vote, the Arabization process came to a standstill as a result of the growth of currents opposing the election's outcome. On January 11th, 1992, Bendjedid declared to the Algerian people his choice, made after much thought, to retire from his post in order to safeguard the country's stability and security. (Ouchen, 2019)

The end of Bendjedid's rule marked the shift from the dominance of Islamists and Arabization supporters to the dominance of the Francophone secular current, whose position in the administrative body and social services served in halting the process of Arabization, so that French remained present in education and 98% prevalent at the highest administrative levels. (Saidouni, 2021)

3.3.3.4 Arabization from 1992- 1999:

In this relatively short period, 3 different presidents assumed the presidency: Mohamed Boudiaf[20] (January 16, 1992- June 29, 1992), Ali Kafi[21] (1992-1994), and Liamine Zéroual[22] (1994-1999). Mohamed Boudiaf took control following the coup against President Bendjedid. The putschists were successful in creating a political vacuum that allowed them to seize control . On January 14th, 1992, Prime Minister Sid

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[20] - also called Si Tayeb el Watani, was an Algerian political leader who was one of the founders of the revolutionary National Liberation Front (FLN) that led the Algerian war of independence

[21] - was an Algerian politician who was Chairman of the High Council of State and acting President from 1992 to 1994

[22] - was an Algerian soldier and statesman. He led Algeria as president of the High Committee of State then as president of the Democratic and Popular Algerian Republic between 1994 and 1999.

Ahmed Ghozali, minister of defense Khaled Nezzar, and minister of foreign affairs Lakhdar Brahimi met at the government palace and agreed on a collective presidency through the establishment of the High Council of State, which originally consisted of five members: Mohamed Boudiaf, Ali Kafi, Khaled Nezzar, Ali Haroun, and Tedjini Haddam. Since the Council of State possesses by the constitution all the powers granted to the President of the Republic, Mohamed Boudiaf was chosen to chair the Council after being transported from Nador, Morocco.

This period witnessed the domination of the secular Francophone viewpoint in the state apparatus, which sought to prevent the Arabization process once it became a danger to its interests in the state. In reality, President Boudiaf highly supported this tendency; since he was antagonistic to the Arabic language. According to Dr. Othman Saadi; Boudiaf was the president the most hostile to the Arabic language, he never regarded it the language of Algerians but that of the Ulema Organization. And, in response to Algerians' eagerness for Arabization, he cynically commented in one of his meetings using a colloquial language that 'Jam'iyat l'Ulama ntaakom mish hiya li jabet l'istiklal' (your Ulema association is not the one that brought independence) and thus, it does not have to be overly glorified.

From another perspective, Boudiaf was not aware of the state's internal realities for he was isolated from the national scene for quite a long time, and accordingly followed the route outlined for him by those who brought him to power. The Francophone trend succeeded in brainwashing the president, resulting in the passage of legislation to freeze the law for generalizing the use of the Arabic language issued on July 4th, 1992, but Boudiaf was assassinated on July 29th, 1992 before he could sign the law, to be signed later on by his successor, President Ali Kafi.

Dr. Abdel Aziz Jarad, former Secretary General of the Presidency of the Republic during President Ali Kafi's rule, contended that while Ali Kafi supported the Arabic language, the priority at the time was to protect the nation and ensure its unity and stability. He chose to issue a presidential decree that temporarily halted Arabization (not

an ultimate elimination), rather than standing against the High Council of the State and put the whole nation's safety in jeopardy. (Abdelkader, 2013)

Ali Kafi turned up authority to former Defense Minister Liamine Zeroual when his duties as head of the High Council of State ended. After a long period of bloodshed and instability, life began to progress towards security and stability during Zeroual's reign. After three years of governance, it was decided to hold presidential elections on November 16th, 1995, which Liamine Zeroual won with 61 percent of the vote.

Throughout his presidency, Zeroual aimed to create a space for dialogue to put forward the idea of reconciliation in an attempt to end the security problem. As for identity, Zeroual adhered to the Arab-Islamic element of the Algerian state. Thus, on December 21st, 1996 he issued a presidential decree that ordered lifting the ban on the law of generalizing the use of Arabic language. On December 22nd, 1996, the official newspaper of the Algerian state published the new decree which stated that "Order No. 96/30 of December 21st, 1996 completes and amends Law N° 91-05 of January 16th, 1991, which includes generalizing the use of the Arabic language." Among the revisions the law proposed were that the generalization of the use of the Arabic language be accomplished by July 5th, 1998, and that thorough and final Arabic instruction be provided in all institutions of higher education and higher institutes by July 5th, 2000.

These procedures were followed by the establishment of the Supreme Council of the Arabic language which strived to promote Arabic language in general, and to ensure the application of the legislation on the generalization of the Arabic language through the production of yearly reports to assess the progress of the Arabization process.

As usual, the procedure infuriated the francophone groups who saw it as contrary to the regime's interests and a betrayal of the objectives established in the 1992 coup against President Bendjedid. The revival of the Arabic language was considered as a new attempt to accomplish political reform and pursue political reconciliation with the Islamic Salvation Front, following in the footsteps of President Bendjedid. As a result, Liamine Zeroual was forced to resign when the Francophonic lobby decided to disqualify him,

since even mentioning the French language's supremacy over the state was regarded a red line that could not be transpassed. (Saidouni, 2022; Saadi, 2019)

3.3.3.5 Arabization from 1999-2019:

The year 1999 saw the ascent to power of Abdelaziz Bouteflika[23]. Bouteflika, was no stranger to the political arena, having served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1962 and running for President in 1994 before declining the offer. .

From a political sense, what set Bouteflika apart, was his ruling ideology which sought to appease all opposing parties. When he was elected in 1999, he promised to put an end to the dark decade and to launch a 'peace and reconciliation' campaign. Although national reconciliation was primarily the idea of former President Zeroual, the conditions were favorable to Bouteflika; they were already set up to take the step of reconciliation since Algerian people were fatigued from a decade of war. He also vowed to carry out a plan that would exonerate all army soldiers from acts of violence committed during the black decade, and he was successful in persuading Islamic groups to reconcile by implementing a presidential amnesty law known as the 'Law on Civil Harmony' for all armed groups involved in violent activities (Benrabah, 2005).

President Bouteflika implemented development plans and programs under the so-called 'President's Program,' which included a project to reform the educational system (Saidouni, 2022), but no major educational reforms were implemented between 1999 and 2004 due to his lack of legitimacy and internal opposition, particularly from Islamic Fundamentalists, who prevented any reforms that might tilt the foundations of the country's official language policy, which had been in place since the country's independence.

Surprisingly, after his election in 1999, he publicly stated that Arabization was a failure, at least in the scientific and technological domains, and that the time spent on the process would not have been wasted if instructions were given in a foreign language instead (avoided saying French!): "It is unthinkable... to spend ten years studying pure

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[23] - was an Algerian politician and diplomat who served as the seventh president of Algeria from 1999 to his resignation in 2019

sciences in Arabic when it would only take one year in English." (Benrabah, 2013, p. 75) Though not stated directly, this remark exposed his future plans and intents to change the educational system through the return to the French language, which Bouteflika, if truth be told, never saw as menacing because he never considered the language issue in Algeria to be a real concern. *El Watan* newspaper (1999) published his assertion saying "there has never been a language problem in Algeria, but simply rivalry and fights for French-trained executives' positions" (Benrabah, 2005, p. 382)

To top it all off, he made all of his declarations, claims, and mainly public statements in French, while occasionally exhibiting his proficiency in Arabic, painting a picture of a multilingual Algerian. However, this behavior was in breach of the 1991 legislation that outlawed the public use of any language other than Arabic. To clarify this, Bouteflika stated, "When I speak French, some people write in the press that I am in breach of the Constitution", (Benrabah, 2005. p.382) but our culture as Algerians is plural and we cannot deny that French is a significant element of Algeria's cultural heritage.

Perhaps the strongest evidence that Bouteflika was a supporter of the French language was the speech he made completely in French during his first official visit to France immediately following his tenure. Dr. Othman Saadi expressed his outrage at this move and how much it went from what an Arab state's leader should do. Worse, it was an act that the French themselves had not expected to see. He describes how French parliamentarians expected to hear an address in Arabic and brought their headphones to shield their ears as soon as Bouteflika came up to give his speech, but were astonished when he spoke French and removed their headphones while smiling.

Another incident was the Francophone summit held in Beirut in October 18th, 2002. Bouteflika opened the event themed '*Dialogue between Civilizations*' by expressing his optimism towards overcoming the evils of the past and his wish for the language of colonialism to be transformed into a "language of brotherhood and dialogue." (Francophone Summit, 2009, para. 3) However, while Bouteflika was tolerant of the French culture, Algerian authorities refused to accept this 'institutionalized Francophonia' that embodies neo-colonialist tendencies. As a response; president

Bouteflika assured that: "Algeria does not belong to Francophonia but there is no reason for us to have a frozen attitude towards the French language which taught us so many things and which, at any rate, opened [for us] the window of French culture." (Benrabah, 2005, p.382)

The elite that supported the primacy of the Arabic language found these statements hard to swallow; they categorically rejected the French language ongoing supremacy and tried to persuade the president to reconsider his thoughts. The first attempt was on the part of the President of the Committee for Foreign Affairs at the People's National Assembly; who sent a secret letter to the president expressing his disagreement to the frequent use of French. His message, unfortunately, went public and he was pushed to resign.

The Supreme Council of the Arabic Language made the second effort, warning the president, in a letter, of the francophone lobby's influence on government and the threat of its language controlling the country. In response, Bouteflika appeared on a television program, declaring that for the sake of Algeria, he was willing to speak any language and that it was not the duty of the Higher Council for the Arabic Language to decide the president's 'entourage'. Furthermore, he declared on live television that:

> Algeria is part of the world and must adapt to it and that Arabic is the national and official language. This being said, let it be known that an uninhibited opening up to other international languages… does not constitute perjury… To move forward, one must break taboos. This is the price we have to pay to modernize our identity. (Benrabah, 2005, p.383)

Some scholars claimed that opening up to foreign languages is not always the worst option. What Bouteflika achieved was a departure from the course taken by his predecessors in dealing with the language problem, who attempted to politicize the language and impose a specific ideology. As a result of this pressure, the linguistic problem has worsened. However, when President Bouteflika addressed the country in French, he made the language issue less 'emotionally charged' and less burdensome to deal with. Algerian sociologists have named this phenomenon the 'Bouteflika effect.'

(Benrabah, 2013) This effect was highly visible in the words of a well-known Algerian lawyer after his pleading in court. As he mentioned:

> I have just made the best address to the Court of my career ... You cannot imagine how pleased I was to see that I did not have to look for words, idiomatic expressions: I have been obliged to plead in [Classical/Standard] Arabic for thirty years. It has been a permanent clash with magistrates. As soon as I uttered three words in French: 'Maitre, use the national language!' Last week, a witness spoke with an impeccable French accent. The president wanted him to speak Arabic. I told him since the Head of State had broken this taboo, we would imitate him. He accepted my argument. (Benrabah, 2005, p.383)

From another perspective, his discourse can also be interpreted as a sign of Arabization decline and the change in language policy, especially that the President constantly described the educational system as a 'doomed educational system' whose 'standards have reached an intolerable level'. (Benrabah, 2013, p. 77) In point of fact, not only the government, but also a substantial number of Algerians, recognized the need for educational changes. Many parents criticized the Algerian public education system for producing generations that mastered neither Arabic nor French.

According to a survey conducted by the central government in 1999, 75% of Algerians favored instructions in French especially in scientific subjects. In addition to the widespread criticism leveled at the educational system for encouraging religious 'fanaticism,' which is viewed as a force that fuels terrorism across the world. Following the events of 9/11, Algeria and the rest of Arab-Muslim countries were put under intense pressure to reform their educational systems. As a response, the government of Bouteflika pledged to carry out comprehensive educational reforms by reviewing the curriculum and textbooks, legalizing public schools that provided bilingual education and providing new teacher training programs to combat Islamist extremism fed by schools. (Benrabah, 2007)

In May 13th, 2000 Bouteflika ordered the establishment of 'the National Commission for the Reform of the Educational System' (CNRSE), better known as the 'Benzaghou commission' that started its mission by drawing a systemized plan of the

coming reforms. A year after, the commission submitted a report providing an evaluation of the previous educational curriculum outcomes and reform recommendations to the head of state, that was then transmitted to the National Council of Programs (CNP), the supreme body responsible for converting the suggested reforms into new curriculum, teaching materials and textbooks. According to Ordinance N° 03-08, the reforms practical implementation was to begin on August 13th, 2003. (Gherzouli, 2019; Ferhani, 2006)

The report of the committee acknowledged the prevalence of serious irregularities in the previous educational system, as it was discovered that a considerable number of students failed to advance to the next level, many students dropped out of school, and others did not pass their examinations. Similarly, teachers were accused of lacking competency that undermined the quality of education. Thus, the educational reforms focused on 3 focal points :

1. Reorganizing the educational structures: it involved

    • Introducing pre-school level for 5 year old students

    • Reducing primary level duration from 6 to 5, and augmenting middle school level from 3 to 4

    • Initiating two streams in secondary schools (lycée) : general, technical/vocational

2. Reforming teacher training : it involved :

    • Increasing instructors' and inspectors' knowledge and abilities.

    • Evaluating teacher training

3. Pedagogical reforms : it involved :

    • the implementation of new curriculum throughout all educational levels

    • incorporation of innovative teaching techniques (i,e : the adoption of ICT's in schools) (Baghzou, 2017; Gherzouli, 2019)

The Commission also proposed two additional reforms concerning foreign language teaching. It suggested that French be taught in the primary level, grade two (6-7 year olds) rather than grade four (8-9 year olds), and for scientific fields in secondary schools to be taught in French instead of Arabic. (Benrabah, 2007)

These reforms are often motivated by two major causes. An internal issue originating inside the educational system, when administrators perceived that the system is failing to accomplish the desired outcomes, as evidenced by inefficiency and low production. The second element is an external factor that is mostly connected to globalization and the transition from socialism to a free market economy, as well as other political, economic, and social problems. One, thus, can draw a deduction that the reforms are an attempt by policymakers to keep pace with the times and prepare society's structures to deal with them. It is also no secret that Algeria went through a horrific time (the Black decade), which necessitated a reconsideration of educational philosophy and curricula. Several aims were outlined in the reform plan, the most significant of which were to strengthen and maintain the Arabic language, promote Tamazight, and open up to international languages. (Arif, 2017) But, was it actually the case? was the Arabic language given its rightful place in education? The answer to these queries will be revealed following an examination of the reforms implemented in the educational sector.

In light of these reforms, the Ministry of Education was taken over by three different ministers. The first was Abou Bekr Benbouzid, who submitted his National education directive law 2008, which is a series of adjustments that supplemented and consolidated the National Reform Committee's proposal. (Sbartai, 2007) The second was Abdullatif Baba Ahmed whose tenure in the ministry was extremely short (2012-2014), but in which a report was prepared to evaluate the educational reforms launched by Benzaghou and sponsored by the previous minister Benbouzid. The report revealed major realities that contributed to the degradation of the educational system, namely the lack of appropriate standards for teacher selection and poor training, the superiority of school texts compared to the level of students, and educational curricula that are inconsistent with Algerian society's history and identity. (Boudia, 2013) In the same vein, members of the Committee for the Reform of the Educational System revealed that the educational textbooks contained numerous historical, linguistic, and moral errors that contributed greatly to the destruction of education.

Concerning Arabization, all of the committee's promises to promote the Arabic language were a lip service and remained dead letters on paper. Or perhaps it was much

more truthful in a section of its report that stated, "Language is merely a tool that we employ in teaching people and transferring information, and so there is nothing incorrect with opting for any language other than Arabic, even if it has no relevance to the origins of the society."(Arif, 2017, p.82)   and instead the French language is the potential substitute for Arabic in teaching scientific subjects and training future generations, given that it is the most communicated language by the Algerian people and the language of scientific activity that provides all books and references to conduct Academic researches.

The report explicitly admits the Arabic language inability to contain information and keep up with scientific growth. It states that "teaching Arabic devoid of adequate pedagogical and educational techniques, as well as weak control over languages, notably French, … does not prepare our children to tackle globalization's difficulties." (Arif, 2017, p. 83) As a reaction, the Reform Committee agreed to boost the status of the French language by adopting the subsequent measures:

- Inclusion of the French language teaching in the early years of primary education. After it was intended to be taught in the second year; it was moved to the third.
- In the primary level, all scientific terms and symbols are taught in French.
- Secondary-level scientific courses will no longer be taught in Arabic, but will instead be taught in French.
- Mandating post-graduate students to devote themselves to learning French in order to conduct their scientific research and write their future dissertations. (Arif, 2017, p. 83)

 In general, these educational reforms were heavily criticized, beginning with Ben Zaghou's reforms and on to Ben Bouzid's and Abdel Latif Baba Ahmed's. However, the criticism intensified during the tenure of the following minister, Nouria Benghabrit, when she introduced the 'Second Generation' reform initiative.

Shortly after her arrival to the ministry, Benghabrit organized a national symposium to examine the reform of the Algerian school, following which it was agreed to appoint a specialized committee to 'reform the reform' or the so-called 'second generation reforms'. Hamza Belhaj Salih, former sub-director of cooperation and

international relations at the Ministry of Education, revealed the background of the reforms undertaken by Benghabrit, emphasizing that she made use of French specialists who do not even qualify as experts and are completely ignorant of the fundamentals of undertaking a school reform, to help decide what needs to be done about educational reforms. Soon after, it was decided in complete secrecy and under a total media blackout to generate the travesty of the second generation reforms. Belhadj remarked that the supposed reforms are nothing but a 'reproduction of the crisis', since the execution of the project led to discard the previous generations' books, and to pour huge budgets into the printing of new ones. Worse yet, the content of the books had little to do with the Algerian heritage and instead went beyond targeting the elements of national identity.

In her defense, Benghabrit stressed that the new educational programs are not intended to undermine the foundations of national identity, but rather seek to instill social, cultural and spiritual values aimed at promoting national unity. It is not a war on identity as enemies of the sector claim, but rather an initiative to spread 'aesthetic and cultural' values that are 'open to the world'. (Sedjal, 2021) Perhaps the promotion of the language of Molière in the Algerian school by reducing the number of hours spent teaching Arabic and increasing the hours of French instruction is what the minister meant by 'aesthetic and cultural'. Or perhaps the openness to the world is what made her authorize the use of the al Darija (Algerian dialect) instead of Standard Arabic in teaching students.

It was transparent to everyone that Benghabrit did not master Arabic and, as assured by syndicalist Messaoud Amraoui, all her official meetings and ministerial reports were conducted in a purely French language (Sedjal, 2017). The very few occasions she attempted to converse in Classical Arabic; the endeavor ended up a controversy and a source of much derision and ridicule. Several doubts arise in this respect concerning the purpose of Benghabrit's ascent to the ministry, if it was not a genuine attempt to Frenchify the young generation and disrupt its identity. Analyzing the reforms content, particularly the linguistic issue, affirmed to many analysts that their reservations are reasonable. The equal hours of teaching Arabic and French while promoting the latter as the language of science and knowledge, demonstrates that French

is promoted as a culture and civilization rather than a mere language of communication, which is the aspect of language that jeopardizes one's identity.

In terms of societal norms and standards, the minister never failed to create new controversies in the educational sector. One of these was the discovery of a mistake on page 65 of geography book of the first year middle school, which had a map with the name Palestine substituted with Israel. Anybody who knows the Algerian people recognizes them as the most hostile to Israel, and what the minister considered a mistake that could easily be fixed is indeed a distortion of an entire nation's image and a total rejection of an Arab entity and civilization. This time, Benghabrit accused the publisher, and affirmed that the ministry's copy did not contain the error. But, the Islamists did not trust her argument and deemed this conduct of being an intentional scheme under her mission to obliterate the Algerian society's identity. (Ghamrasa, 2016)

What further heightened the suspicions was the ban of prayer in schools, while offering the pretext that all these rituals should rather take place at the mosque and at home instead of schools (Bahlouli, 2019), in addition to the minister's gesture to remove al Basmalah (بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَٰنِ الرَّحِيمِ) from the opening of educational textbooks, prompting many critics and scholars to question the objective behind its removal. The press also had several inquiries about the matter, but Benghabrit has always remained silent. When she did react; she asked the opponents to 'laisse l'école tranquile' because it's not the right place for ideological and political conflicts.

Fortunately, the answer was provided years before the question was posed. In her article entitled *école et religion* published in 2001, Benghabrit made clear her viewpoint about the status of religious scripts in the educational program. She initiated by confessing that : "L'école est en effet toujours apparue comme un vecteur de pouvoir sur les esprits. Le conditionnement de la jeunesse, sa formation intellectuelle et morale sont l'instrument privilégié d'une diffusion et du maintien du pouvoir des idéologies." (Para. 45) This notion is not uncommon, since using the school to indoctrinate students with the colonizer's ideology is exactly what colonialism managed to accomplish. Yet, Benghabrit did not concentrate on this side of the subject, and instead applauded the colonial

regime's efforts to instill fundamental values at the school level. She confirms that: 'le mérite' est "à l'école coloniale d'avoir intégré dans le système éducatif des cours de morale où étaient enseignées des valeurs telles que l'honnêteté, le goût de l'effort personnel, le respect de la personne …" (Para. 49) but lamentably, all these contributions were wasted after the Algerian state made some poor choices in terms of governing people's minds, notably by clinging to the past and adhering to old fanatical approaches.

> La société algérienne a troqué la pédagogie contre l'idéologie, l'avenir contre le passé, la liberté d'expression et la richesse linguistique contre la langue de bois, le civisme contre le fanatisme, la réflexion contre l'apprentissage... L'échec de l'école est celui de la société, du pays tout entier, de la politique qui refuse de se projeter dans l'avenir et qui regarde le passé comme seul repère possible.   (Para. 18)

Benghabrit kept voicing her disagreement with Islamic education, which had stayed the same for many decades and had to be 'nettoyer' following the 90's events of violence and terrorism.

> Pendant près de vingt-trois ans (de 1976 à 1999), les programmes d'éducation islamique sont restés sans changement sérieux sauf à déplacer, avancer ou reculer dans le temps l'apprentissage de sourates considérées comme plus ou moins difficiles. En 1999… une opération de 'nettoyage' des contenus fut initiée par le ministère de l'Éducation nationale, touchant tout ce qui apparaissait comme appel à la violence, au djihad et à l'intolérance. (Para. 09)

The minister's arguments, thereafter, moved towards convincing the reader of the notion of modernization and the 'secularization of mentalities'; quoting political philosopher Sami Nair, her task was "de savoir comment va s'opérer le passage de cette laïcisation/sécularisation de la réalité dans le domaine des mentalités" (Para. 47) in a society saturated with Islamic ideals and teachings. Therefore, the minister concentrated mainly on the concept of 'modernity'; since she considers "la demande d'islamisation comme contradictoire et irréconciliable avec la demande de modernisation" (Para. 48) she best believes that:

> La mise en œuvre de la séparation des prérogatives de l'éducation nationale et des affaires religieuses constituent les véritables réponses à la problématique du changement, perçu comme un travail permanent et laborieux de l'ancien par le nouveau, de l'existant par l'avenir, du 'traditionnel' par le 'moderne'. (Para. 51)

With these assertions, which the minister explicitly recognized in her article, she has substantiated all allegations leveled against her and validated all the reservations about her endeavor to Frenchify Algerian schools and secularize the minds of the next generation.

After reviewing all of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's education ministers, it can be argued that the worst phase for the Arabic language was during his presidency. As per Dr. Othman Saadi, all activities against the Arabic language suggest that Arabization has been paralyzed, yet without a clear legal edict. Although the presence of entities whose purpose was to safeguard the Arabic language and broaden its usage, they were empty shells that provided no crucial service. The Supreme Council for the Arabic Language, for instance, was active in all domains save those entrusted to it, and the Arabic Language Academy, has become a hollow structure, with no activity and no members except for its head.

Algerians have long wondered about the status of the Arabic language in society, and whether its decrease is due to external factors and pressures from French agents. Although the question persists till today and doubts have not been confirmed by tangible evidence, Dr. Othman Saadi disclosed some French reactions that somehow confirmed these doubts. He emphasized that the National People's Assembly law to generalize the use of Arabic, passed on December 27th, 1990 was met with strong opposition from the French elite. Alain Decaux, a member of the French Academy, was the first to criticize the law, followed by the French press. As for the biggest attack, it was after President Liamine Zeroual lifted the freeze on the law of generalizing the use of the Arabic language. The European Parliament reacted by issuing a statement that devalued the Arabic language, considering it an artificial language that was imposed by force on Algerians and, thus, harmed their thought and belief. Ironically, the French individuals

who constantly fight the Arabic language, have agreed to a law issued in 1994 that protects the French language in Algeria, and they are themselves who call for multilingualism in the Maghreb that highly reject regional languages in their homeland for its threatening effect on national unity.

It happened on February 23rd, 2005 that the French parliament adopted a law that glorifies French colonialism in Algeria. Article n° 4 of this law mandated the establishment of school programs (as is always the case, the emphasis always falls on schools) that recognize the positive role of the French colonizer (Hmamid, 2012). Although Algerian politicians condemned the law, they failed to recognize that the danger of French colonialism lays in the supremacy of its language over the state, and preserving this dominance is, after all, an official acknowledgement by the Algerian government of the positivity of colonialism. (Saadi, 2019)

Today, after over 60 years since Algeria gained its independence, the country hasn't yet totally healed from the impact of its confrontation with France. The horrifying reality of the French colonialism rests mainly on the way its language and culture internalized in the Algerian society. Algerians were educated within a colonialist blueprint, dealt with French as their first language which its long and steady spread resulted in the production of individuals who master the colonial culture even more thoroughly than their native one. The dominance of the French language shaped the identity of Algerians and made it impossible to be altered at least for the old generations, and despite the governmental endeavors to enhance Arabization, especially via education; the French language branched out into the core of the community.

3.4 Conclusion:

This phase was the one that witnessed the fiercest attacks of the most extremist Francophones in Algeria. Raising the slogans of 'Ida Arrabuha Kharrabuha' (if it is Arabized, it is destroyed), all attempts to Arabize the school in Algeria were met with opposition. Of course, it is impossible to be confident that the state's plans were all correct and that opposition was the sole cause of Arabization failure, but it can be stated

that the government was fully prepared to take the Arabization step and made great efforts to render it successful, but the hidden Francophone hands always worked to sabotage what could have achieved independence for Algeria and freed it from the shackles of colonial slavery.

Chapter Four:

National Identity Reconstruction via Citizenship Education

4.1 Introduction:

Algeria, as a former French colony, recognized that rebuilding its national identity entails removing any ties towards France. The initial separation came via independence, but throughout the post-colonial period, the overall focus was on removing the most egregious effects of colonization, namely French and Western culture. Algeria embraced the Arabization technique as a solution and traditional Islamic education as an aid factor to cultural resistance, but things did not go as planned by the Algerian state. The significant split of the Algerian society spawned opposing perspectives and ideas, all of which led to the approach failure. Following that, Algerian popular opinion grew to demand change, ushering in a new political age that reaffirmed the concept of change as both essential and inevitable. In this sense, fresh answers to the challenge of rebuilding national identity were required.

4.2 What is National Identity?

It is generally acknowledged within all disciplines dealing with identity, that the term is 'complex, variable, elastic and subject to manipulation'. Whether collective or personal, identity has always existed as a multidimensional factor, making it difficult to determine its meaning, but despite the term's inability to take on a specific meaning, Suleiman (2003) believes that this reality shouldn't dissuade us from exploring the collective components that comprise the gist of the concept.

Some of the variables on which the concept of identity stands are 'locality, religion, nationality or state citizenship.' As a social definition, National identity might be synonymous to collective identities shared by a group of people, however to discuss the term collectively does not overshadow the fact that identities are first and foremost experienced at a personal level, and each individual bestows a meaning to it based on his/her social and cultural context. (p.05)

A more explicit definition of the term was offered by Anthony D. Smith in his seminal work National Identity (1991). He claims that national identity is what a group of

individuals in a specific nation have in common, summed up in 4 fundamental features that are : "an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members". (p.14) and continues to ensure that national identity is intrinsically multidimensional, as it theoretically cannot be minimized to a single concept nor can it simply be generated to a given society.

In their explanation of 'national identity,' some researchers relied on deconstructing the phrase to simplify its explanation and find the optimal concept to describe it. Originally, the term 'identity' derives from the Latin word 'idem,' which means 'the same or identical.' This concept of 'identification' was first proposed and introduced to the field of psychology by Sigmund Freud, and was later expanded by the German-American psychologist Erik Erikson, who explains that 'identification' provides a response to the question 'Who am I?' and, when combined with the term 'national,' identity is thus concerned not only with the individual but with all social groups of the community. So, instead of answering the question "Who am I?" national identity answers the question 'Who are we?' which is the ability to develop a psychological and behavioral attachment and commitment to the national community. (Zhang & Ji, 2005)

According to Rizkiyani (2018), the expression embodies the word 'nation'; hence, national identity is a person's inner sense of belonging to a certain nation. In other words, a genuine and strong national identity is generated by an individual's capacity to identify with a nation and its distinctive characteristics.

Significantly, national identity is divided into two parts: the cultural aspect which represents the individual's affiliation to a territory with cultural traditions, common beliefs, and deep cultural standing, and the political aspect which necessitates strong ties with the state authority and identification with a national political system. (p. 292)

In *Imagined Communities* (2006), Anderson brought up a new proposal concerning the political aspect of national identity. He suggested that constructing a national identity requires the creation of "an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." (p.06) in this definition, Anderson

gave prominence to three crucial features. He regards societies as 'imagined' since it is difficult for citizens of the same nation to meet each other, and nothing tangible binds them together ; hence, the 'invention' of a common fellowship, or rather a common citizenship, must be fostered. Communities are meant to be 'limited' because nations all over the world are not meant to be a common place and even the largest countries have their own boundaries that distinguish and separate them from the rest. They must also be 'sovereign' because nations yearn for freedom and in the light of pluralism and the legitimacy of worldwide circulation of ideas; the establishment of a sovereign state is a prerequisite for forging the desired freedom. (p.07)

Likewise, philosopher Emmanuel Levinas presents the notion of 'Alterity' in the process of forming an identity. In *Altérité et Transcendance* (1995), Levinas defines Alterity as the act of 'othering' that sets up distinguishing barriers between 'self', 'non self', and 'other' and has a significant impact on the cultural part of national identity; such as the language of a certain nation, in a genuine effort to create a distinct and exclusive national identity. (Aziz, 2015, p.10)

In another endeavor to clarify the meaning of National identity, Bhikhu Parekh (1995) made an effort to present the image that everyone has while considering the significance of national identity. He claims that to almost each individual of us, national identity is the identity of a 'territorially organized community or a polity', but 'polity' in his opinion is more suitable than 'national' since the latter is marred by great ambiguity and controversy. As for identity; he offers the most common definitions:

1. identity as synonymous to difference, that each polity must have distinguishing characteristics to create a unique identity
2. identity as synonymous to self-understanding/ perception, that each polity must comprehend itself to be able to establish its identity
3. Identities are equal to profoundly held values, goals and commitments, and in order to understand a society's identity, one must understand what it stands for, what its core principles are and what initiatives best capture its unwavering dedication and commitment.

However, despite his belief that national identity accepts 'difference from others' as one of its definitions and having specific values and goals as its main characteristics ; he challenged the idea that it is historically fixed and that cross cultural borrowing can diminish its stability. Since our identity is "who we are, how we are constituted, what makes us the kind of persons we are. It includes the central organizing principles of our being, our deepest tendencies … characteristic ways of thought, deeply held values, ideals, attachments, commitments " (p.257) ; then our identity is a collection of ideals and inclinations that cannot be fixed or changed at whim, but must constantly be revised and reassessed in accordance with our inherited traits, current requirements and future goals.

Much like Rizkiyani, Parekh also maintains that a society's common identity is expressed both politically and culturally; the structure of the society's political life determines its political identity and its common way of life determines its cultural identity. When these two conditions overlap; a society can guarantee the maintenance of a shared identity. Yet, if one of them is secured, the other is most likely to be jeopardized in most cultures, especially those who went through a time of colonial dominance.

Scholars generally agree that creating a national identity is a challenging task to complete, especially since most societies contend that their identity has been 'corrupted,' 'lost,' or at the very least, 'confused,' and they are constantly negotiating ways to 'retain,' 'preserve,' or 'strengthen' it. (Parekh, 1995) 'Negotiations' is perhaps the most adequate term to describe the situation in post-colonial Algeria, after the extensive devastation tendencies; much debate was raised on how to create a citizen capable of handling contentious situations, reunite the Algerian community and reclaim the peoples' identity. As is customary, it was assigned to the school to carry out this responsibility since it is the best setting for remaking society and fostering the development of decent citizens, and also because identity and education go in tandem; the ultimate objective of education is indeed to identify the right sort of individuals to 'cultivate' or to 'educate'. To put it another way, it enables people to take on moral principles into their current identities and transfer them into actions. (Zhang & Ji, 2023)

Following debates among educators and education specialists, it was determined to introduce 'citizenship education' into the educational system's curricula, primarily because it was argued that citizenship education was the fundamental way of reaching the aim of national identity.

4.3 Citizenship Education: Definition and Importance:

Citizenship education, also known as 'civic,' 'democratic,' 'national' education, is broadly defined as an educational theory and practice that fosters a desirable type of citizenship in a particular culture (Hämäläinen & Nivala, 2023). It is mainly concerned with creating or educating a 'citizen' which is an individual who possesses the nationality of a country and has rights and duties under that country's Constitution and laws (zhang & Ji, 2023). According to Aristotelian logic, 'the citizens of a state should always be educated to suit the constitution of a state' (Heater, 2004, preface) by developing citizens' character and skill sets to be loyal to their nation and to deliberately practice their rights and duties to ensure the stability and well-being of that particular state.

Citizenship, on the other hand, may be described as an individual's membership in a certain political community. Moreover, while there is broad agreement on the definition of citizenship, there is no clear agreement on its basic components. Membership in a political community has several aspects, which may be classified as: status, participation, and identity. Each component poses substantial obstacles to citizenship education, resulting in different views of what it actually entails.

The first component, status, is about the official status of the individual that distinguishes members from nonmembers and establishes members' rights and duties to the community. In this case, citizenship education will be directed to instruct citizens about the necessary skills and knowledge they must acquire to figure out their status and, accordingly, enjoy their rights and perform responsibilities. The second component, participation, is specifically concerned with the inculcation of civic qualities that convert the citizen into a productive member of society. Citizenship education in this context aims to indoctrinate desirable behaviors and attitudes in order to build a good citizen,

who will be capable and eager to engage constructively in civil society. The third component, identity, is about the sentiments of connectedness and belonging among community members. This type of Citizenship education, also referred to as 'national education' attempts to encourage these sentiments, as well as strengthening the feelings of solidarity and loyalty to the nation. (Hämäläinen & Nivala, 2023; Essabane et al., 2022)

From another perspective, Citizenship is the link between the individual and the state and his first source of identification. Citizenship education may, thus, help the citizens to enhance their sense of identity and belonging, it may help individuals identify with the system as a whole, with the national core principles, and increase a sense of responsibility to their country. (Zhang & Ji 2023)

The need to prepare citizens to become contributing members in their state drove many Arab nations, including Algeria, to adopt Citizenship education in their school curriculum. In this respect, Citizenship education refers to a subject taught in schools that focuses mainly on three aspects: knowledge of civic concepts, systems, and processes of civic life; civic engagement abilities; and learners' general mindset, including a sense of belonging to the community state, as well as common ideals and ethics. (Faour, 2013) However, Citizenship education may extend beyond the classroom; and hence, three types of civic education can be distinguished: Formal, non-Formal and Informal.

Formal education, in its most basic form, refers to schools, where citizenship education is largely administered in line with the curriculum. Non-Formal education refers to structured educational activities that take place outside of the traditional classroom environment such as liberal education and voluntary activities to help learners enhance their abilities and skills, whereas Informal education refers to unstructured education that learners acquire from society: interaction with family, friends and society members. (Hämäläinen & Nivala, 2023)

There is, indeed, a widespread belief that education is more than a social or cultural component. It is also a moral dimension that aspires to produce a decent citizen for his community and nation, and even for his planet and mankind. According to Plato's

book *The Republic* (375 BCE), one of the goals of education is to develop correct citizenship in individuals, by providing young people with accurate knowledge about the nature of government and the nature of absolute right, so that they can practice the main actions in civil and social life.

Raising a good citizen is a process linked to the idea of socialization, and it is a process carried out by the various institutions of society, starting with the family. Despite the importance of the family's contributions in this matter, with different families and the different ways of raising their children, the state decided to adopt the school as a broader entity that possesses various strategies and means that are systematically organized with a precise educational system to achieve the idea of citizenship.

4.4 Citizenship Education in the Algerian School:

Citizenship is perhaps the most controversial issue in postcolonial Algeria. Despite the fact that the term has been theorized for centuries to imply "a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community," or else "an obligation and a calling to participate and actively engage in one's community," (Harris, 2017, p.03) the path to establishing this individual who belongs to a state and has rights and freedoms that allow him to be an effective member of that state; was not yet paved. In 1962, Algeria was a state that had recently emerged from a 132-year period of colonialism accompanied by a horrific seven-year war. Despite the fact that the struggle was rewarded with freedom, the people who lived during this time of political, social, and cultural oppression were not yet ready to adopt the concept of civic education. Indeed, the country's overall situation did not even allow for an interest in this type of education. Thus, less thought was given to the people's social, and civil requirements, and more emphasis was placed on establishing what Boumediene referred to as l'état de l'union.

When Algeria began to prepare for an educational project in the post-colonial phase, the primary concern and purpose was to rid the Algerian people of ignorance and illiteracy. Algeria has relied on the Arab and Islamic dimensions in performing the task of education, and the situation remained the same until the early 1990s, when Algeria

witnessed a major political shift from a one-party approach to partisan pluralism which was followed by an armed conflict (the black decade). This incident had far-reaching consequences in many realms of social, cultural, economic, and educational life. The Algerian school was accused of being a direct cause of this violent struggle, because the Islamic Curriculum in education, in their claims, helped generate a class of radicals and fanatics. Opponents advocated for the removal of these curricula and their replacement with civic education. This suggestion was deemed a suitable option for all sides since it could accomplish the concept of equality while also forming a cohesive national spirit among Algerian citizens.

As previously mentioned in this chapter, Citizenship or membership to a given community can either be status, participation and identity; and for that community's members to maintain a national identity, both political and cultural conditions should be secured. If we consider the first two components of citizenship; status and participation, to be the political aspects of national identity, and the third one; identity, to be the cultural, then, in the following, we will examine citizenship education in the Algerian curriculum as an element towards achieving the first two aims, status and participation, before moving on to the third and most crucial one, identity.

4.5 Citizenship Education and the Political Aspect of National Identity:

Formally, 'Citizenship education' is a school topic meant for pupils in primary and middle school aged 6 to 15 years old. The module comprises lectures on civics, currently known as Attarbiya al-Madaniya (civic education) in Algeria. This designation, however, was not always the same; it went through many changes as well as variances in curriculum material based on Algeria's various historical stations. Algerian civic education went through four phases:

4.5.1 From 1962-1976:

This stage includes the time between Algeria's independence and the establishment of l'école fondamentale. Given that the educational system was not yet determined and

organized on a regular basis at the time, educational efforts in Algeria revolved around the restoration of national sovereignty by referring to its national and historical principles, as it gave attention to the Arabic language, religious education, and historical studies. While civic education was technically included in the educational curriculum, it was supplemented by a number of other courses that were not academically organized.

Through her article titled 'Historical development of civic education' the educational system in Algeria as a model,' researcher Lalouche Saliha confirms that the civic education subject was decided "based on Republican Decree N° 5957 of January 6th, 1959 axis by Resolution N° 67162 of June 14th, 1962. Also, based on the ministerial decision dated June 14th, 1962 and the ministerial decision dated June 2nd, 1964 whereby the Minister of National Guidance decided that the moral, civic, and social education program will be implemented in secondary schools and primary schools from the beginning of the academic year 1964-1965 as specified in Appendix 2 to this decision."

But despite the issuance of a ministerial decision; the accreditation of civic education was academically incomplete because the Ministry of Education had neither prepared a book for the subject, nor lessons with clear objectives or teaching aids. Instead, the professor used the Holy Qur'an, the hadiths of the Prophet, and religious education books as a source of instruction. Moreover, civic education was not instructed as a separate subject, but integrated into others, such as religious and moral education, with the main purpose of teaching the learner to love his nation, adapt to his community, and contribute in its growth. Tayeb Nait Suleiman claimed in the 2007 *International Symposium on Civic Education in the Educational System* that the subject was covered and taught for half an hour in elementary school and an hour and a half in middle school, and the goal was to form a "citizen who is aware of his responsibilities, clinging to his homeland, imbued with his moral and spiritual values, and ready to sacrifice for the unity and integrity of his soil." (Lalouche, 2022, p.775)

4.5.2 From 1976-1998:

This stage lasted from the implementation of basic education through the implementation of educational reforms in 1998. This period began with the April 16th, 1976 issuing of Decree No. 7635 which is regarded the first legal text aimed at controlling educational policy and training process in Algeria.

These decisions were made following a period of time considered a turning point in Algerian history, and with the change of political, social, and economic conditions and circumstances, a comprehensive change in the educational system was required to keep pace with the aforementioned changes. The fundamental goals of national education were to instill in students love of the homeland, defense of the revolution's gains, and an ongoing desire to participate in the tasks of social construction.

Beginning from the academic year 1980-1981, the implementation of this order began to be broadened, and it established the contents and objectives of the civic education subject, as well as embraced the standard-based approach to instruction. It is crucial to mention that throughout this time, the module of civic education changed its nomenclature from 'civic education' to 'social education,' then to 'social and political education,' and finally to 'social education' only. This designation specifically pertains to the period between 1989 and 1998, while revisions in the subject's title were unavoidable as a result of political upheavals and the events of October 8th, 1988. Following the approval of partisan plurality, civic education lectures were arranged to eliminate the concept of the one party and accept partisan pluralism.

In general, civic education programs were similar to the previous social and political education programs. Rather, they included courses with themes pertaining to the characteristics of pre 1990 political and social systems.

4.5.3 From 1998-1999:

This year saw the most significant transformation in civic education since the commencement of the scholastic reforms. Specifically, at the start of the 1998-1999 school year, the Ministry of Education decided to establish new civic education curriculum in place of the previously used social education curricula. As a result of this

decision, civic education was taught separately from the other courses from the first year of primary school until the ninth year of basic education. This significant shift happened in reaction to the political, social, and economic dynamics shown in: political pluralism, orientation towards a free economy and the global market and to the practice of democracy. These changes led to a remarkable development of civic education, resulting in new concepts which the Algerian individual is subjected to on a daily basis.

4.5.4 From 2003 to the Present:

This stage is characterized by the occurrence of deep and radical changes on the political and social levels which also required a change in the cultural level and, consequently, new reforms in the educational system. The new reform stipulated the adoption of a new teaching approach which is the competency based approach. This reform also paid close attention to civic education, considering it a basic educational subject that embodies many of the Algerian society's ideals, and which the school must be committed to preserving, whether through educational performance or through daily life practices.

Beginning with academic year 2003-2004, the Ministry of Education undertook the development of a highly accurate curriculum with specific goals and modern educational methods. This was accompanied by the preparation of new books in line with the new transformations, the aim of which was to provide new concepts and information that the student would use in his interactions with his community, forming a decent individual who understands his rights and obligations, loves and is proud of his nation, and seeks to improve and preserve it. (Lalouche, 2022, p.773-776) But, was Algerian citizenship education a success? And did the goals set correspond to the goals achieved?

Muhammad Faour comments in his book *a review of citizenship education in Arab nations* (2013) that civic education in most Arab countries, including Algeria, reveals a huge gap between the goals set and their actual implementation. Studies conducted by the Carnegie Middle East Center, Arab governments have given 'lip service' to the aims of school reform and education and have taken relatively few measures to obtain citizenship. Particularly, in Algerian public schools, instruction of all topics, including

civics, remains didactic and guided by the instructor, with little chances for students to engage in free discussion or voice their viewpoints without fear of being intimidated by teachers. Active learning is uncommon, and pupils are discouraged from thinking analytically or critically. Students absorb facts and information from textbooks and regurgitate it in tests without immediately applying or integrating that learning into relevant and meaningful experiences. Furthermore, in contrast with other courses, civics instruction for grades one through twelve is rather brief. Civics is a low-value topic for both students and teachers because of the little instructional time allotted to it and the small value it is assigned in total test scores.

It is of paramount importance to note that the political system in Algeria is mainly authoritarian. According to faour, Authoritarian political regimes breed authoritarian educational institutions devoid of accountability and transparency, and they foster a school atmosphere of mindless allegiance to authoritative people, whether they are teachers, administrators, or political leaders. Authoritarian administrators do not encourage free expression, respect for differences of opinion, creativity, or innovation in their schools. They also do not allow students to engage in school and community decision-making, or to create extracurricular activities or student clubs without the permission of the administration and, in certain cases, the state security agency.

In general, civic education remains merely school theories that do not go beyond the walls of the classroom, while the practical aspect is completely absent, whether in or outside of school. Despite the state's efforts to design books concerned with the civil life of individuals, they remain merely ink on paper that does not translate into real actions. Students, thus, do not actually participate in civil life and do not develop the citizenship skills that state policy aims to pass on.

It is, therefore, difficult to assert that civic education in Algeria has contributed in the building of an Algerian national identity. Yet, according to a 2008–2009 study entitled Education, *Diversité et Cohésion Sociale en Méditerranée Occidentale*, published by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, middle- and secondary-school students in Algeria have strong feelings of national

identity. Regardless, anyone who interacts with an Algerian will notice that he is the person most proud of being Algerian and while there is no tangible and clear reason for this, it can be suggested that the reason is due, in particular, to the Algerian revolution which fueled this pride.

Algerian curriculum emphasizes national identity as primarily civic identity that can be transformed to students via the teaching of civic principles such as equality before the law, tolerance, social cohesiveness, collaboration, and respect for and solidarity with others, in addition to the promotion of Islamic values, Arab Nationalism and Berber Culture. The 2008-2009 survey showed that an Algerian identifies himself first as a Muslim then an Algerian and finally as either Arab or Amazighi. This last point has been the major debate in the issue of identity which indicates that the civic education curriculum did not instill in students the importance of social cohesiveness or citizen equality before the law. (Faour, 2013)

4.6 Citizenship Education and the Cultural Aspect of National Identity:

According to Abdellatif Mami (2020), to comprehend citizenship education in Algeria, it is necessary to discuss a number of factors. To begin, the notion of citizenship has several implications and is very context dependent. It can have a broad and diverse extent depending on either the territorial context or the national context (the Algerian area defined by national borders), and identity components that are: Algerianity, Arabization, Tamazight (Berber), and Islam, and if we define Algerian citizenship as a sense of belonging to Algeria and take into account the country's historical, economic, sociological, and political context, we may identify three degrees of identification in Algerian society:

1. The territorial level: Algeria is designated as belonging to a state in its territorial and legal meaning.
2. The official linguistic and cultural levels, as evidenced by the widespread usage of Arabic and the introduction of Tamazight as a second official language in 2016

3. The religious level: belonging to the same religion, Islam, in which Islamic law governs the relationship between the believers and the country (the Ummah).

In her research, Abdellatif Mami outlined the aspects forming Algerian identity which she grouped into four themes: Algerianity, Islam, Arabization and Tamazight. In this sense, we may say that the first criterion has been met with the official independence of the Algerian state. We shall, then, continue with the two following components since our research focuses specifically on the aspect of Islam and Arabism, and due to the presence of a link between the research course and Mami's concept of national identity.

Citizenship education in Algeria focused on Islam and Arabization as the two cultural components of national identity, and to give this process greater legitimacy, the *International Social Survey Program* (ISSP) on National Identity and Citizenship that was founded in the mid 1980's was conducted to identify the different components of national identity. The question asked was: 'what is important for being a true national?' and the survey came out with the idea that among the characteristics considered crucial to national identity are "mastery of the national language" and "to be a member of a dominant religion." (Haller, 2021, p.39) In this regard, we may conclude that the problem was not in the selection of Islam and Arabization as two components for reclaiming national identity; the difficulty indeed resides in the lack of proper implementation as well as how they were looked upon within society. Because our study focuses mostly on language, in the section below; we will attempt to examine, in depth, the challenges associated with language implementation and how to address them.

4.7 National Language Implementation: Challenges and Solutions:

When we look deeper into the concept of language, we discover that it is more than just a term used to communicate. Language is a driving force that encompasses larger concepts such as history, politics, and, most importantly, education. Nobody can deny that the colonizer used education via language as a criterion for governing persons and nations. The colonial powers that used language as an instrument for judging a country's civilization are mostly responsible for the crisis in identity. By propagating the

notion of a superior culture; the colonizer generates a sense of self depreciation and accordingly, an identity dilemma.

Based on Foucauldian discourse (1986) that is concerned mainly with power dynamics manifested via language and actions; discourse is not about language only but rather about the meaning placed on that language to produce a power factor. The meaning that the colonizer addresses is mainly diffused due to their ability to control what is distributed by the government either via education or mass media to construct a 'dominant discourse' that mirrors their own worldview which will eventually be passed on as truthful. This procedure causes an imbalance of power, when "the subordinate classes understand the limits placed on them as truth, the system of symbolic violence is perpetuated" (Dascomb, 2018, p.07)

This symbolic violence, also termed 'epistemic violence' by Spivak (1988) is formed through the interplay between the colonizer and colonized. In terms of language, the colonizer decided to strengthen his language while giving it more priority in formal schooling in order to protect his colonial interests. What is intriguing about the colonial policy applied in Algeria is that the language was limited to the 'privileged few' in order to imbue it with an aura of originality, exclusivity, and individuality that the original language falls short of. In postcolonial studies, this strategy is one of the most important steps in the formation of the colonial 'other', the 'inferior', less valued and culturally impotent. Spivak asserts that the colonizer not only attempts to legitimize his cultural policy by inventing the 'inferior other'; he also strives to naturalize this construct via the change of "the subaltern's perception of self and reality" (Andreotti, 2011, p. 39) to be able to eventually catch up with the superior other.

This imperialistic, linguistic situation is the product of colonization. Unfortunately, even after decolonization, the effect of this 'transmutation' remains irrevocable in many nations today. Cultures altered permanently as a result of the transformation that occurred during colonization, and nations, following independence, inherited a western educational style that relies heavily on the language of the oppressor. These same nations were the most perplexed when presented with the issue of whether to

shift the language of instruction in schools to their mother language or to uphold to that of the colonizer. The decolonized states' decision ranged between: maintaining the national language, shifting to the second language, or moving back and forth. The latter decision was that of Algeria; as explained in the third Chapter, the choice was not strict and definite, and reliance was placed on the national language 'Arabic' and the French language concurrently, alternately, or preferentially depending on the different historical stages and presidential periods. If this implies anything, it indicates that colonialism was successful in generating a cultural confusion, and servitude embodied in the continuation of colonial reliance.

Fanon asserts that a person who owns a language; possesses the world expressed in that language. Setting the colonized apart from his world by introducing a new language; was the goal of the colonizer. Fanon continues to affirm that "The hegemonic hierarchy of colonization is kept in motion through the use, and the avoidance, of language. This new language brings forth a new way of thinking, whether one thinks himself above the language, or whether one is suppressed by the language." (Dascomb, 2018, p.14-15) thus, the colonized falls into the trap of being controlled by a Eurocentric logic, interpreting the world through a Eurocentric lens.

Among the philosophers that had the courage to challenge this Eurocentric logic is Jacque Derrida (1976). Through his theory of Deconstruction; Derrida addresses binary opposites within a text such as: Us/Other, Colonizer/ Colonized, Western/ Eastern, Black/ White, to demonstrate to the reader that these two opposing terms are in fact connected, yet; one is central while the other is marginalized. In an attempt to dismantle this controversial relationship; Derrida unlike Foucault asserts that meaning is unstable, no matter how much effort the colonizer puts into it to help invoke a static message; the work can have multiple interpretations:

> The very meaning and mission of deconstruction is to show that things-texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs, and practices of whatever size and sort you need- do not have definable meanings and determinable missions, that they are always more than any mission would impose, that they exceed the boundaries they currently occupy. (Willette, 2014, para. 02)

In In terms of language, Derrida argues that there isn't a superior or inferior language, and to fight the idea that says otherwise; mother language instruction is necessary. Speaking the language of the colonizer at the expense of the mother tongue would only amplify the problem and further marginalize the latter, because "the language one speaks comes with baggage, that even our mother tongue is the Other" (Dascomb, 2018, p.17)

The domination of one language over another is known as 'linguistic imperialism.' This term is coined by Robert Phillipson (1992) to refer to the unequal distribution of power among languages and its users. Through his research, he attempted to determine the reasons behind the dominance of some languages internationally, and whether the languages imposed by the colons are in the interests of the colonies in particular, or have an imperial dimension aimed at achieving western interests. Phillipson clarifies that Linguistic imperialism:

- Is about exploitation, injustice, inequality, and hierarchy that privilege those able to use the dominant language.
- Is structural: More material resources and infrastructure are accorded to the dominant language than to others.
- It is ideological: Beliefs, attitudes, and imagery glorify the dominant language, stigmatize others, and rationalize the linguistic hierarchy.
- The dominance is hegemonic: It is internalized and naturalized as being "normal."
- Language use is often subtractive, proficiency in the imperial language and in learning it in education involving its consolidation at the expense of other languages. (Phillipson, 2013, p.01)

By projecting these ideas onto the language problem in Algeria, we realize that all these aspects are available in the French language. This prevalent conviction in the supremacy of the French language sparked debate among experts and prompted numerous concerns about what made French a universal language. According to a winning article in a competition organized by the Berlin Academy in 1782 to discuss the matter; languages that do not use French syntax are irrational and insufficient. Further

details show that the answer resides largely in the French state's strategy of appreciating and strengthening its language. The policy focuses on: the maintenance of a linguistic hierarchy via the discrimination and the 'stigmatization' of the dominated languages by considering them mere 'dialects' or 'vernaculars', glorification of the dominant language, and the reflection on the relationship between the languages by giving more credit to the dominant one as the gate to superiority and progress. (Philipson, 2013, p.02)

Linguistic imperialism occurred during colonialism and persisted after decolonization because the language of instruction in formal education was not a simple choice made by the government; many cultural, historical, political, and economic factors played a decisive role in the implementation of the language of instruction, resulting in the continuation of the hegemony of the colonial regime's language. Yet, the difference lies in the fact that during colonization, language was a symbol representing either riches and favored race/ethnicity or one linked to poverty and less desirable race/ethnicity. However, after decolonization the language of instruction was meant to be either one that will maintain a national dignity or one that allows for a continuum of colonial hegemony.

In Algeria, the language policy after decolonization resorted to the use of bilingualism (both Arabic and French) as a language of instruction with a policy of gradual Arabization. Yet, the result wasn't in favor of the latter. This policy created what is known as 'diaglossia' in which one language, that of the colons, was considered a 'high variety' while the other, the mother tongue, a 'low variety'. What was meant to be a transitional phase in which education was prepared to gradually receive Arabization in the future, became a stage in which the school provided the colonists an opportunity to continue their cultural hegemony. The incorporation of the colonizer's language into the newly established formal education led to the devaluation of the mother language on the one hand, and provided the colonizer with yet another chance to naturalize the linguistic discrimination that had previously occurred. (Dascomb, 2018)

French schools taught Algerians to know how, but in forms which ensure 'subjection to the ruling ideology', its installation helped the continuum of that subjection. French was reserved to the educated elite whose mastery aided their access to

government and power; this implies that the colonizer dominated the political and economic domains based on the hegemonic cultural policy. Perhaps this last reason was the one that contributed to language dominance. The fact that the spoken language governs the state's politics and economics has made the French language increasingly important and desired by the oppressed; and the fact that this language is a success factor in life and conversely for the mother tongue is exactly what has caused the latter's prestige to deteriorate. This colonial approach has made it difficult for the locals to accept a mother language that was hindering their progress and has posed the question of whether it's an integral component of an identity they can embrace.

Many of those familiar with the issue of French colonial education and language in Algeria may see that the idea of educating a minority or forming a small French elite is a factor of weakness, given that the majority of Algerians did not have a French upbringing and that the assimilation process was unable to absorb the vast majority of Algerian society. However, what these people fail to recognize is that the assimilated elite is the one in control of the state that maintained peaceful relations with the previous colonial regime upon independence. Added to that, most of them did not consider the language to be a problem in the first place, as happened during the era of former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, when the state apparatus was restructured to accept the French language and its significant reintegration into daily life and formal education. This action threw all earlier Arabization efforts into disarray. As Dascomb (2018) puts it:

> Unfortunately, when local leadership considers a change in language policy post-independence, but decides against it due to economic or political reasons, the results are the same as if a policy is never considered in the first place. The detriment to learning remains constant and unfortunately propels the power hierarchies that were set into place during colonization. (p.57)

However, for the colonizer's language to remain stable in the state apparatus after 61 years of independence is a deal that encompasses political or economic matters. Rather, it has something to do with the society's commitment to this language and its psychological influence on its members. In Algeria, the halo that France set over its language has remained intact to this day. Despite all calls for Arabization, the French

language remains a symbol of culture and development in Algeria. It is utilized in all sectors and is dealt with effortlessly and naturally in people's daily talks. On the other hand, the standard Arabic is considered a stranger and has no voice in Algerian society. Even if someone decides to articulate in traditional Arabic, the speaker will be met with a bout of laughter and ridicule.

Surrounded on all sides by an environment that depreciates one's native language, the language of one's everyday existence, can have a significant influence on an individual's sense of self and community. As a result, we witness a significant segment of society entirely disconnected from Arab culture, and in exchange, we see them glorifying the other's (western) language, culture, and way of life. The individual disavows his roots and loses his identity as a result of this action, as Fanon (1968) stated: "If he is overwhelmed to such a degree by the wish to be white, it is because he lives in a society that makes his inferiority complex possible, in a society that derives its stability from the perpetuation of this complex, in a society that proclaims the superiority of one race." (Dascomb, 2018, p. 100) Thus, it can be argued that the colonists' language still reflects and sustains the hierarchical order that was established during colonialism. The governing elite, who continue to have a distinct culture and language than the local inhabitants, maintain a sociopolitical schism that stymies the decolonization process. This societal schism which prevents the colonial process from ending persists to this day, albeit under new labels and terms. It goes on under the guise of globalization or neocolonialism.

4.7.1 Globalization/ Neocolonialism: Postcolonial Perspective:

Globalization is generally known as a condition in which accessible products and services or social and cultural influences, progressively become identical around the globe. In fact, it is the process through which the globe is becoming a single entity. This term reflects radical changes in social relations worldwide, especially a change in the status of the 'nation', whose borders have become almost illusory due to the access of individuals and societies to globally disseminated knowledge and culture and their exposure to newly economic realities that transcend the borders of the state.

Of course, as with every new aspect introduced into the globe, experts were divided in their attempts to categorize it into opponents and proponents. Proponents think that increased access to information and services will contribute to the development of a social structure that promotes collaboration, freedom, and peace in the future. On the other hand, opponents argue that "While non-Western communities were busy working on one project (decolonization), the carpet has been pulled from under their feet by another project (globalization)." (Canagarajah, 2005, p.196) It is a form of first-world dominance over third-world countries, in which societal and cultural differences are erased and replaced by a homogeneous global culture through the development of a global system that integrates the local economies of all countries. The opposition is founded on the fact that globalization, whether cultural or economic, was not an automatic phenomenon, but rather an inevitable matter that emanated from the centers of capitalist power. Plus, its impact is not the same, nor is it at the same extent, or of the same benefit to all societies.

One of the most important topics examined in postcolonial studies is globalization. Its relevance stems from the presentation of global power relations which are seen as the legacy of western imperialism in the twenty-first century. The process in which local cultures deal with globalization forces resemble those in which historically colonial nations shared and owned imperial dominance powers. Globalization is transcultural in the same way that imperialism was. It did not emerge randomly over the world, but rather has a history entwined with the history of imperialism. The global culture is "a continuation of an imperial dynamic of influence, control, dissemination and hegemony that operates according to an already initiated structure of power that emerged in the sixteenth century in the great confluence of imperialism, capitalism and modernity" (Ashcroft et al., 2013, p.103) the reason why globalization forces remain centered in the west despite their worldwide spread.

The question that arises in this case is how globalization is so centered in the west if it is just a cross-cultural process and not a top-down hegemony? If we consider globalization as merely a transcultural process, local communities and marginalized cultures can also, in one way or another, have an impact on global cultures and systems.

It is natural that the task is difficult, and strict conditions may be required to achieve that goal, but for a person to believe in the possibility of changing his society and his way of life is in itself a strong motive, as the appropriation of global culture will have a positive effect in liberating oneself from local domination, or at least providing a way to form a different kind of identity. However, because small communities are only the recipients of a strong element (culture, economics); this is precisely what is lacking.

Neocolonialism on the other hand, is a term that stands for 'new colonialism,' a phrase invented by Ghana's first president Kwame Nkrumah In his book *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* (1965). This term refers to the belief that colonial countries continue to wield authority and control over the cultures and economy of its former colonies even after their formal political independence. Through global economic institutions and cultural and educational non-governmental organizations; the hegemony of imperialism in third-world nations is maintained, but in a more hazardous manner. Indeed, Nkrumah maintained that neocolonialism is more subtle and harder to identify and oppose than the direct control of traditional colonialism.

This word is noteworthy since it basically captures the scenario in Algeria following independence, and it refers to all forms of control over former colonies after their political independence. It specifically refers to the human groups left behind by colonialism that fought to strengthen its colonial policies in newly independent nations. It describes how: "the new elites brought to power by independence, and often educated and trained by the colonialist powers, were unrepresentative of the people and acted as unwitting or even willing agents (compradors) for the former colonial rulers" (Ashcroft et al., 2013, p.146) which made it difficult for these countries to establish an autonomous identity, whether politically, economically, or culturally due to the pressures of Globalization. In other words, the challenges of colonization were reintroduced and made complicated by the ideological and economic changes brought by globalization, to constitute a new form of colonization that is known as neocolonialism. Altbach and Kelly (1978) clarify that: "Neocolonialism constitutes the deliberate policies of the industrialized nations to maintain their domination. It may function through foreign-aid programs, technical advisers, publishing firms, or other means." (As cited in Thomas &

Postlethwaite, 1984, p.13) As global languages dominate the political and economic arenas, this new type of colonization continues to affect postcolonial states' language education policy while also drawing developed nations deeper into the conflict for mother tongue teaching.

Linguistic or Cultural globalization was welcomed and warmly praised under President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's tenure, when he personally stated that Algeria is ready to open up to all languages of the world, including the French language. The fundamental issue, of course, is not the usage of the language itself, but rather the use of this language as a replacement rather than as a complement for the original language. In our local countries in which cultural globalization has become the most prevalent type of globalization and the country has become a fertile ground for multilingualism and diversity of cultures; precautions must be taken to avoid the spread of discriminatory attitudes and behaviors towards national language. Whether individuals are consciously or unconsciously aware of the depreciation of their language and culture, the school system and education policy might continue to repeat this subservient and degrading stance in subsequent generations.

Perhaps the most recent example of linguistic hegemony is the development of the concept of the global language which is English. Although the language has been in use in Algerian elementary schools for quite a long time, the President of the Republic Abdelmadjid Tebboune has ordered its adoption at the primary stage beginning with the academic year 2022-2023, in addition to using it at the university level. Many postcolonial studies analysts and experts argue that language adoption nowadays has shifted from a drive for colonial language education to enhance human capital to a push for world language education to increase global economic labor force participation. In Algeria, this entails teaching English alongside the post-colonial language, (Dascomb, 2018) and since all nations strive for productivity; world languages are pushed to the forefront as the language of instruction, pushing aside the first language to make room for productivity and economic security. Yet, globalization purpose extends beyond trade agreements and free markets to encompass a shift in people's culture, language, and identity.

It is worth mentioning here that globalization or new colonialism follow in the footsteps of old colonialism, the reason why developing countries must be aware that they can ward off the return of old domination, and that commercial dealings and free markets between countries may not necessarily lead to cultural imperialism when strict and preventive measures to protect customs, local traditions, and languages are implemented.

While acknowledging that opening up to a new language, whatever it is, and developing a coexistence principle that facilitates the process of understanding, communication, and economic opportunities can be very positive; the harm happens when the language acquired in the past through colonial domination or recently through globalization, begins to replace local languages and consider the former as more renowned and significant. The substitution of local languages also means a change in cultures and identities. This is the dread of globalization that neocolonialism engenders.

The most essential notion of all is to prevent a dictatorship of one language on behalf of another, whether locally or globally, in order to avert linguistic extinction. According to a UNESCO estimate (2006), over half of the 6,000 languages spoken today are on the verge of extinction (Dascomb, 2018). In terms of logic, the extinction of language implies the extinction of culture, and the extinction of culture implies, in one way or another, the loss of an entity or an identity.

Since avoiding world languages in this globalized world is impossible; the idea we are debating here does not necessarily imply how to abolish the universal language, whether French or English, from society, but rather how to coexist with it while conserving the dignity of the mother tongue. Individuals can easily adapt to other languages and cultures, but maintaining their individuality is part of the creation of their own identity. We can consider resorting to Arabization in post-colonial Algeria as an attempt to achieve individuality by referring to a language that seeks to regain identity, but if we probe more thoroughly into the problem of language in post-colonial Algeria, we find that the return to the Arabic language was purely of political purposes rather than of cultural and identity dimensions.

Arabic language was one of the key priorities of Algeria's presidents, but their opinions differed on its application. Some of them ordered partial Arabization, and some ordered total Arabization, while others were found to fluctuate between this and that, in addition to many other opposing voices. These puzzled opinions and orientations resulted in conflicting measures taken in its regard, by issuing political decisions in its favor or against in every new presidential term. Huge efforts and resources were spent to accomplish the mission successfully; yet, were not with an attempt to serve the Arabic language or to win a linguistic battle, it rather aimed to clamp down on the French language, and so confining a French elite that held key positions in the state. The entire problem sprang from political obstinacy to eliminate the colonial language instead of devoting efforts to the development of the mother tongue. To put it another way, the Arabic language in Algeria had no cultural or social character, but rather a political dimension that was imposed by one governmental decision and repealed by another. This led decision-makers to take hasty reactions and adopted ill-considered judgments and sterile methods, leaving feeble, diseased language unable to establish itself in society, and has, to this day, not known much development in reality.

Algerian society's reality mostly reflects the Arabic language demise. The media, for example, seldom shows programs in which the speaker is fluent in Arabic. Either he speaks in a language that lacks rigor in terms of morphology and grammar, or he ignores it entirely in order to use colloquial language (al Darija) which he finds more comfortable. In the worst-case scenario, he employs the foreign language which is the dominant French in society, to flaunt his cultural and knowledge superiority. The Arabic language is seldom employed in its output and content to reassure the listener of his or her mother tongue.

In everyday life, it is easy to notice that signs of shops, stores, commercial advertisements, and even official signs containing the names of municipalities and states and their correct directions written in French are written in proper and correct language, whereas those written in Arabic contain numerous errors of varying sizes. The reader receives the impression that the language is being assaulted, as though the matter indicates that the foreign language has people to defend and preserve it, while the Arabic

language is marginalized and there is nothing wrong with making a mistake in it. (Moussaoui, 2018, p. 05)

As for the educational sector, the Ministry of Education provided yearly reports suggesting a deterioration of the Arabic language at the three educational levels and even at the university level, particularly in big cities where people are increasingly interested in foreign languages, particularly French. These results corresponded with those provided by the Ministry of Education's General Inspectorate of Pedagogy which indicated a low level of pupils in the early educational stages in terms of writing and reading Arabic. This unstable language framework at the basic educational level leads to an even more frail reality when pupils go to university. According to Naziha Wahbi, a researcher at the University of Blida, Algerian universities are witnessing a significant decline in the level of use of the Arabic language by students. The student cannot speak a proper Arabic and avoids falling into linguistic errors in his scientific research by conversing in the colloquial language that dominates his discussions during lectures or when conducting research. This impedes the advancement of scientific studies and even the formation of qualified students to raise future generations. (Kedadra, 2020)

All these problems in the language are the result of changes and disturbances that began with colonialism and have continued to include the status of the Arabic language in the Algerian society; the French elites and the political classes that support French, the fragility of education and curricula, with the possibility of a hidden and unannounced policies for the lack of progress and promotion of the Arabic language. These challenges that face the Arabic language both at the internal and external level necessitate taking practical measures to empower it. The following are general recommendations for the advancement and rehabilitation of Arabic:

a. **At the Level of Government:**
- Dealing with language as a principle, since the principle is the origin and beginning of something, and the general law that the entire nation must follow and on the basis of which matters are measured; language should be looked upon as a principle in the sense that it is anchored in society and is not changed by what

others want or what societal interests need. Language is what differentiates one person from another, attracting a unique charm with which he is identified and from which his personality and identity is developed

- Dealing with language on the premise that it is a uniting force and that the diversity in languages and dialects of individuals in the same nation is the basis for divergence.

- Respecting the constitution that states that the official and national language in the state is the Arabic language, and proceeding accordingly, so that politicians and statesmen must use the Arabic language in their speeches, press meetings, and daily dealings.

- Create a consistent language policy and urge all educational institutions and universities to conform to it and the progression to all other sectors

- promoting the value of language by setting the requirement to learn the language for all foreign workers in the country to reduce their influence on native individuals

- Adoption of the Arabic language by state representatives in international forum

- Rethinking the law of generalizing the use of the Arabic languages

b. **At the level of the Family:**

- Given that parents are the primary motivators for teaching their children the language, parents must be made aware of the need to teach the native language before moving on to teach any other language, as well as the importance of training their children in case of a deficiency in their mother tongue. Adult literacy programs should be made available in order to achieve educational parity between parents and their children

- Encouraging children to use the Arabic language at home first by exposing them to programs dedicated to children in the Arabic language as a way to acquire the language, and then encouraging reading by providing a small library containing booklets that take into account the child's level, and reading them whether individually or collectively, with time set aside to discuss them. Parents may also give their children material gifts and incentives every time they read a book or

receive a high grade in Arabic. In this situation, a large area is made available for the use of the Arabic language, allowing the child's personality to be built on the basis of affection and acceptance of the Arabic language.

• Increase community support by increasing parental involvement in the classroom because a change in the system requires community participation

c. At the Educational Level:

It is generally known that schools and educational institutions wield enormous authority within societies. It is through these institutions and their policies of instruction that the students learn what their community values the most. It is therefore the crucial stage in a child's life when his native language is either reinforced or suppressed.

• The major decision that must be taken by policy makers is that the language used in the classroom should be that of the people themselves because employing a language other than the language of the people maintains the policy of oppression, and so the dominant power structure will continue to find its way into school curriculum.

• Developing competent professors and teachers capable of teaching and conversing with the Arabic language which would considerably aid in battling against the misconception that the Arabic language is challenging and difficult to learn.

• Hosting seminars and conferences to improve teachers' linguistic balance and promote awareness of the language importance

• to challenge all ideas that advocate the use of colloquial language in education through the teacher's full commitment to teaching in the classical language, particularly in the student's early educational stages because colloquial language use can negatively affect his learning of letters and their writing, causing him to confuse between what is spoken and written, resulting in an incorrect balance of information.

• To work on the oral use of classical Arabic in the classroom by encouraging students to converse with it and express themselves inside the school and out.

- to develop teaching techniques and create fresh environments that make language education more entertaining and effective, such as activating cultural clubs in the school (reading, theater...), resurrecting religious and national events via various activities, and hosting cultural contests.

Perhaps the most challenging obstacle confronting the growth of the Arabic language is the notion that Arabic is incapable of keeping up with scientific progress and is restricted to humanities, poetry, and literature, making scientific Arabization unattainable. Although everyone familiar with Arab-Islamic history testifies that the Arabic language is the mother of sciences and that contributions of Arabs in the scientific field by scholars such as al-Kindi, Ibn Sina, al-Khwarizmi, and Ibn al- Haytham are the greatest evidence that the language never failed to deliver the message of science. Yet, this notion is still being debated today, and perhaps trying to elucidate the obvious is a trap that Arab nations and supporters of Arabization fall into. When advanced nations disseminate misconceptions about the linguistic incapacity of Arabic, defenders rush to defend it with diverse arguments, resulting in a plunge into debates of the past rather than focusing on the root cause of their failure in Arabization.

Language in general is nothing but a reflection of the people's realities and a tool that expresses their current circumstances. At a time when the Arab civilization was at its peak, the Arabic language achieved the pinnacle of advancement, and as European countries emerged today; all sciences became connected to their languages. It may be argued here that the demise of a language in a country is caused by the stagnation of its people's civilization and the deterioration of scientific contribution. This was confirmed by Dr. Yousry Khamis (1977) when he said that the language is "an urgent need to express knowledge," (Abou Ghaiour, 2012, para. 05) that the language directly reflects the level of civilization of certain people and is an automatic response to the needs of that civilization. Therefore, the problem is not so much the problem of the language as it is that of those who speak the language.

In all previously colonized countries, colonialism attacked the language of the people and sought to convince them of its inability. But, despite all efforts, various

countries of the world are proud of their languages and employ it fully in the scientific field. The Japanese, Chinese, and German languages, for example, despite their difficulty, were not abandoned by their respective peoples, and despite the English language invasion of the scientific field, none of these countries, except for the Arab ones (including Algeria) dared to teach scientific matters in a language other than their own. Also, the former states' languages did not impede their scientific advancement. Rather, they are regarded as one of the most powerful economies in the world which implies that the problem of the Arabic language is a problem of a nation's failure not language inability, and in the midst of all this, the Arabic language is a mere victim who pays the price of a nation's sleep.

The reluctance of many educators and researchers to write and converse in Arabic, ostensibly due to the language difficulties in communication and inability to keep up with the times and scientific growth raises an essential question: Isn't this the era of information explosion? Is it really logical to ignore this era's capabilities in information conveyance and blame it on language? Or, to put it another way, why bother with a supposed period of scientific development and limitless information transport if a language is incapable of expression? Among the opportunities presented by this age that may be utilized to increase scientific productivity in the Arabic language today is:

- Translation: assigning facilities for translation to and from the Arabic language is something that our country overlooks. Despite the complexity of the matter in ancient times, Islamic history proves that the translation movement was active at that time. The Baghdad library contained books translated in various fields into the Arabic language, and the Abbasid Caliph Al-Ma'mun gave the weight of a book translated from another language into Arabic in gold (Al Sharkawi, 2019) This demonstrates that the language is not impotent, and that it evolves as a result of its people's attempts to elevate it.

These strategies and solutions for the revival of the Arabic language and its advancement for the aim of maintaining the Arab identity of the Algerian people are irrefutable and must be put into action. However, this decision should not be so stringent

to the point of posing language barriers that prevent people from learning other languages and benefit from other cultures. By way of criticism of theories critical of globalization that focus largely on its negative features; some scholars and researchers believe that globalization can be reshaped in a way that makes coping with it less detrimental. Useem (2002) believes that globalization imposes an inevitable linguistic imperialism that cannot be escaped, but dealing with this phenomenon depends on separate international political decisions. Therefore, power is ultimately in the hands of the people so that homogeneous globalization is not a factor that robs people of their culture against their will. (Dascomb, 2018)

Pennycook (2000), on the other hand, invented the term 'postcolonial performativity' to denote the ability to manage the global language so that individuals and cultures ascribe their own values to it and not the other way around. This theory does not necessarily negate the presence of linguistic hegemony, but it lessens the global language hegemonic priority and gives the individual the "freedom to maneuver and outwit the power plays, which strips it of its deterministic definition." (Dascomb, 2018, p.74) This was the primary goal of postcolonial theory; to dismantle the exoticism of the 'other' and strips it of the mask of idealism. Thus, to 'idealize local languages' as a response spins us in the same vicious circle of that exoticism, and if distinguishing one language over another is unjust, it is as unjust to prohibit languages and cultures from growing out of fear of change in their original cultures. (Dascomb, 2018) To address this issue, we suggest:

4.8 Intercultural Citizenship Education:

Intercultural citizenship education is a broad and profound concept that encompasses all of the terms discussed in this study, including citizenship education, language, national identity, and the close relationship between them, before presenting another dimension of language education so that to form a new, homogeneous, and distinct society. As previously discussed; citizenship education centers on the nation-state. In other words, citizenship education is viewed as a component of education in and for the nation-state. Anderson expressed this viewpoint in his book *Imagined*

Communities (1983) explaining that the nation-state is, in its whole, a community of communication that requires a common language, and this common language is generally the so-called national language. Thus, at least in the context of the nation state, linguistic identity and national identity are inextricably intertwined. (Alred et al., 2006)

However, the reality of globalization today imposes other considerations, since the borders of the state have been expanded to include new elements that do not have an official character, whether with the presence of different societies seeking to be part of the national community or seeking to deal with it; these new communities must acquire competences and requirements to cope with one another, which is referred to as intercultural citizenship education.

The concept of intercultural citizenship is an educational model introduced by Michael Byram (2008) specifically for teachers and curriculum designers, which generally aims to assist develop a person's skills and knowledge that facilitate the process of his involvement in social action, so that the person adopts different attitudes characterized by awareness and openness to the viewpoints of the other so to achieve the goals of that action. The other here, refers to various cultural groups, typically speaking different languages. It is analogous to terms like "global citizenship," "intercultural competence," and "cultural awareness," which are often used in education and other professional settings.

This concept is drawn from Byram's (1997) paradigm of "intercultural communicative competence (ICC)," which aims to create the skills and knowledge that foreign language learners require to become 'intercultural speakers' of a language other than their native one, in order to help them operate as citizens. (Wagner & Byram, 2018) To be an intercultural speaker is not about having a linguistic competence only and being able to use the right vocabulary and grammar; it is indeed about having an intercultural competence when having an intercultural dialogue, which allows for a better interaction with others in a socially and culturally proper manner.

4.8.1 Intercultural Communicative Competence:

Intercultural communicative competence may be characterized broadly as the capacity to comprehend cultures, including one's own, and to use that understanding to successfully interact with people from a variety of cultural backgrounds. In other words, it is the capacity to communicate and engage correctly and efficiently across linguistic and cultural boundaries. As Sptizberg and Sahgnon put it; Intercultural communicative competence is "the appropriate and effective management of interaction between people who, to some degree or another, represent different or divergent cognitive, effective and behavioral orientations to the world." (Gerra & Gonçalves, n.d., p. 401) to guarantee the effectiveness of people's interaction; Byram introduced an intercultural communicative competence model:


Figure 4.1: The components of intercultural communicative competence (Alred &Byram, 2006, p. 117)

As the figure above illustrates; Intercultural Communicative Competence (ICC) model combines linguistic, sociolinguistic and discourse competencies, in addition to 5 dimensions of intercultural competence that can be helpful in foreign language teaching.

As Mourão et al (n.d) puts it, these dimensions are interrelated like the strands of a rope that are braided together to make it thick and strong.


Figure 4.2: Dimensions of Intercultural Communication competence (ICC) (Mourão et al, n.d.)

1- **Knowledge:** to have the necessary information about social groups and their products (tangible/ intangible: such as food, clothes, music, laws, regulations...) and practices in their region and in that of the speaker to set the scene for their possible interaction.

2- **Skills of interpreting and relating:** the speaker should have the ability to interpret the different products and practices of other social groups, explain and relate them to his own

3- **Skills of discovery and interaction:** this relies on the speaker's capacity to learn new information about certain people's culture and cultural practices, as well as the ability to utilize this knowledge for communicative purposes. He should also adopt tolerant and positive attitude towards ambiguous and irrelevant information while asking questions to clarify the cultural differences and ease the interaction process.

4- **Attitudes:** the speakers should have the 'curiosity,' 'openness,' and 'readiness' to lift all the prejudices and the skeptic behaviors towards other cultures while maintaining faith in one's own.

5- **Critical cultural awareness:** to develop abilities of observing, identifying, and critically evaluating on the basis of explicit criteria, the products and practices of their own society and others. (Wagner & Byram, 2018, p.01)

Intercultural communicative competence allows for an examination of one's own culture and social group via the openness on other cultures to adopt a fresh perspective on the language and culture of the other. For language learners; this process should be carried out by an experienced language instructor who works along with his educators to acquire critical awareness of their own language and culture and those of others while behaving respectfully towards the different products and practices received from different social groups.

It is worth noting that an intercultural speaker differs from a bicultural speaker. The intercultural speaker is an individual/ language learner who obtained an ICC that allows him to participate in a constructive dialogue and engage with individuals of diverse languages, cultures, and settings, whether in his own country or abroad, whereas a bicultural speaker is recognized as a member of two contrasting groups with their differing languages and cultures. A bicultural is a mere imitator of a native speaker and by adopting his language has to abandon all what distinguishes him from the native speaker. Bilingualism or 'native speaker model' emphasizes on achieving the proficiency of the native speaker and assimilation into the new culture without taking into consideration the learner's experiences, beliefs and values, resulting in power imbalance that favors the native speaker language while lowering the self-esteem and negating the learner's social and cultural identity . On the flip side, The intercultural speaker is allowed to retain his or her social, linguistic, and cultural identity while acting as an 'intercultural mediator' for those who do not speak the language or lack the competence to do so by learning to understand and present his or her own and others' beliefs and values, and drawing differences and similarities between them.

In today's world, the task of creating an intercultural speaker is that of language learners and teachers to attain. It is necessary to form a speaker that is able to interact with others on equal terms and who has managed to develop his or her own third way, in between the other cultures he or she is familiar with, to be able to mediate in different contexts. The 'intercultural speaker' model can be accomplished by educating language learners to be multicompetent language users rather than native speaker imitators. This will set the language free of all colonial, political or economic strains, and redefine

language as a tool of communication for better knowledge and understanding rather than a tool for imperialistic and hegemonic purposes.

As an addition to language teaching to achieve an intercultural communicative competence; Intercultural citizenship education combines both: Intercultural communicative competence and learning democracy. This adds to the aim of learning language for intercultural communicative purposes, the aim of having an action in the community. Learning democracy, here, isn't about creating an involved individual in political practices, but is about helping student simultaneously with the use of a foreign language to work collaboratively to solve issues and problems related to their own state and community. By encouraging students to look beyond the nation state's boundaries and communicate with other students from various countries of the world; they can be able to consider new perspectives and solutions to their issue and develop an intercultural citizenship.

4.8.2 Teaching Intercultural Communicative Competence in the Foreign Language Classroom:

Perhaps one of the most challenging tasks a teacher encounters while attempting to produce an intercultural competent student is preparing students who are equally competent. Students usually enter classrooms with different and multiple points of view, so that it is difficult for students to grow between cultures at the same rate. As a result, several scholars characterize the classroom as a 'process' (Moeller & Nugent, 2014) or a miniature space of the world containing many orientations and perspectives that must be harmonized in order to obtain the proper knowledge to generate an effective student interaction.

In this 'process' or intercultural environment; the learning setting must be defined as learner centered, and the student must react as an 'inquirer,' 'a researcher,' or 'a discoverer' of knowledge, similar to an anthropologist who investigates a topic both within and outside of the classroom, whereas the foreign language instructor does not impart specific knowledge about the cultures being studied, he or she serves as a guide and facilitator, guiding and evaluating pupils as they go through the learning process.

One of the key responsibilities of the instructor is to instill in his pupil a set of behaviors and abilities that will assist him in becoming a proficient intercultural speaker. To that end; we propose the following:

a- Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity (DMIS):

This model is based on Milton's Bennett theory (1993), which is centered on perception and communication theory. Bennett states in this theory that human experiences in reality are governed by perception, and the more complicated someone's perception of cultural difference gets; his cultural experience become more sophisticated, and by identifying how cultural difference occurs; estimates about the success of intercultural communication may be established. The developmental model of intercultural sensitivity describes six developmental stages, beginning from denial and arriving to integration:

Figure 4.3: Developmental model of intercultural sensitivity (Organizing engagement, n.d.)

1- **Denial**: When a person or a group is unable to notice cultural differences, when they do not acknowledge or grasp the presence of these differences, or when they deem them irrelevant or insignificant, they are in the denial stage. Denial also occurs when cultural differences are viewed as simple and indistinguishable, and people deny by categorizing cultures into vague categories or stereotyping people, degrading them, and stripping them of their humanity, assuming that their diverse cultural behaviors are the result of some deficiency in them. So, the less complex their culture is; the less human they are.

2- **Defense:** it is the 'us' versus 'them' mechanism, in which people stand against cultural difference, so that it is perceived as a threat (for example, believing that the immigrant is taking over local residents' jobs or attacking their cultural values), and make greater efforts to glorify their cultures, which some may consider racism and bias. Their response would be to practice the oppressed or victim theory, which might drive them to be more defensive and hostile.

In educational contexts; defense may take the form of parental protests or community opposition against racial integration.

3- **Minimization:** reducing cultural difference, or in other words, reducing animosity towards cultural diversity, so that the educator must persuade his student that his individual view of his culture is a common vision shared by all people of their cultures. These discrepancies must be countered and disproved by stressing commonalities and emphasizing the idea of respect, while avoiding conversations that show specific cultural biases.

4- **Acceptance:** Individuals accept cultural variety when they recognize that culture influences distinct ideas and values, that different behavioral patterns occur across civilizations, and that other cultures have legitimate and valuable viewpoints that should be respected and valued. People in the acceptance stage may become more curious or interested in other cultures, and they may seek out cross-cultural alliances and social interactions that they may have avoided previously.

Acceptance in educational institutions may emerge through curricular adjustments, such as teaching pupils about non-white historical people or having them study texts from different cultures.

5- **Adaptation:**

Adaptation to cultural difference is equivalent to the adoption of the perspective of another culture, or the ability of interaction in a comfortable and transparent manner with people from various cultures. Adaptation can highly be mistaken for 'assimilation' that is the act of relinquishing one's cultural identity and embrace another. However, adaptation entails expanding your 'repertoire' of beliefs and behaviors to suit different cultural contexts.

6- Integration:

When someone's identity or sense of being expands to absorb the values, beliefs, views, and actions of different cultures in suitable and realistic ways, this is referred to as cultural integration. Cultural integration occurs in educational settings that contain a culturally diverse demographic, and in which multicultural, and often multilingual/bilingual curricula are established to accommodate all diverse cultural backgrounds. (Organizing engagement, n.d)

In sum, Bennet suggests that we human beings are creating barriers between ourselves and others, and in many circumstances, we reject the other, making our sense of reality uncertain or equivocal. Bennett claims that these impressions are incorporated into one's personal identity and can have a significant impact on his interactions with people from different cultures. Therefore, Bennett suggests an internal evolution from 'ethnocentrism' to 'ethno relativism' and the move from avoiding cultural difference to seeking cultural difference.

b- Anxiety/Uncertainty Management (AUM) Model:

This theory is regarded as one of the most essential theories of intercultural communication since it describes the most fundamental factors for intercultural communication's efficacy. The theory was developed by William B. Gudekunst (1993) from Charles Berger and and Richard Calabrese's *Uncertainty Reduction Theory* (1975) and Henri Tajfel's *Social Identity Theory* (1979), which aims to achieve effective communication between individuals from different cultures through conscious management of anxiety and uncertainty levels during interaction. Gudekunst explains that those hoping to adjust to new cultural situations must learn to "successfully manage their anxiety in new cultural environments." (Moeller & Nugent, 2014, p.03) If feelings of anxiety (embarrassment, confusion, uneasiness) goes too high; Sojourners are less likely to understand the replies of the hosts, and if they go too low, they won't be open to all the changes that might happen during the interaction. It is much the same for uncertainty in predicting or explaining the other's behavior that might hamper intercultural communication effectiveness.

c- Multidimensional Model of Intercultural Competence:

It is Byram's (1997) model for an effective intercultural communication experience, in which he suggests that the first thing a person must consider is their mindset or 'attitude'. Byram explains that in order to engage in equal relationships, an individual must stay open to learning about new beliefs, values, and worldviews. To do so, Byram and his collaborators (2002) gave a practical solution for getting students to rethink their own viewpoints by jointly noting their preconceived assumptions about the foreign culture before the discovery or the learning process begins. This allows students to record their views before the study so that they may compare them once the procedure is completed. For the language learner to question his preconceived ideas, means to engage in a deep analysis of other cultures which includes a tendency to explore "the national identity of the home culture and the target culture" (p. 08) to be able to identify the similarities and differences.

These models of intercultural interaction must be included in the foreign language curriculum. It would help teachers to best design learning objectives to aid students in their attempt of becoming competent intercultural speakers. Teaching intercultural competency in the language classroom can lead to the creation of individuals who are able to use the language effectively and create relationships and understanding among people from various cultural backgrounds. This requires a deep analysis of someone's ideas, preconceived viewpoints, attitude and identity to form the necessary knowledge of the self and the other that can help in forming a successful relationship of intercultural reciprocity.

4.9 Conclusion:

The concept of intercultural citizenship is examined and contextualized in light of current academic concepts of citizenship and intercultural competence. The emphasis is on aiding students in gaining the knowledge, skills, and attitudes required to become effective intercultural communicators and involved intercultural citizens. This is especially relevant given the current global developments, which necessitate a rigorous

and thorough approach to intercultural citizenship education. In addition to learning active citizenship in their own country, education for intercultural citizenship presupposes that learners may gain the information and abilities required to operate in a multicultural and multinational society that includes more than one set of cultural values, beliefs, and behaviors. This sort of education varies from colonial hegemonic attempts that promote assimilation since it does not demand immersion in the language and culture of others. As a result, it is appropriate for achieving globalization's attempts to create a culturally open society while conserving man's original language, culture, and identity, and even trying to improve them so that they could traverse across borders in their proper form without distortion or exaggeration.

General Conclusion

General Conclusion:

Algeria, the land of martyrs and revolutions, has long been known for its brilliant, ambitious, and courageous young. They are individuals who have given all to their country throughout its long and glorious history, from French colonization to the civil war of the 1990s. Indeed, the Algerian revolution of 1954 has long been seen as a symbol of sacrifice, persistence, bravery, and nationalism around the world. It was a protracted fight and a terrible tragedy that the Algerian populace survived, ushering in a new period that demanded transformation and renewal.

This transitioning phase, however, was extremely challenging. All of the circumstances at the time showed that France was still in existence and Algeria was still a colony. During the colonial period, France pursued a strategy of Frenchness in order to disseminate French culture while erasing elements of the Arab-Islamic personality. France began a fierce war on educational institutions, including mosques, zawiyahs, and schools teaching Arabic and Islamic sciences, and replaced the educational system with a secular, westernized French one.

All educational programs in the colonial school were designed to create an individual with no foundations and no identity in order to easily control and force him to profess devotion to France. However, Algeria's educated elite fought to oppose these policies and carried out cultural resistance, which was the primary basis for independence. Although the cultural opposition resulted in independence, it is unrealistic to say that France's approach was a complete failure. It was primarily the driving force behind the formation of an educated elite steeped in French culture that carried its beliefs and promoted them in independent Algeria.

Algerians were divided into two groups: Arabized Algerians who supported the Ulama organization and French Algerians who supported the continuation of the colonial regime. In government, society, work, and even education, these two opposed forces were always at odds. Algeria's initial educational task following independence was to create an educational system that pleased all competing parties.

The Algerian government tried to reinstate national sovereignty via education, and resorted to Arabization in an attempt to get rid of the repercussions of French colonialism. But despite its firm belief that renouncing the colonizer's language is the first step towards independence and liberty, schooling proceeded for a long time in accordance with the French curriculum and educational system, primarily due to a scarcity of academic cadres and teaching staff, and additionally because the educational system lacked a clear approach to people's education.

When the Arabization process began, many Algerians welcomed it as a tendency that might revive the ancient Algerian character that had been forcibly persecuted by the colonialists. On the other hand, French groups and westernization advocates vehemently opposed the idea, claiming that Arab education is regressive, backward, and out of step with the times, given that job opportunities and education, particularly in scientific disciplines, are conducted in French. This disagreement was the catalyst for Algeria's civil war to break out. After the Islamic movement that supported Arabization came to power, the opposition urged that the Arabization process be halted, allowing the Francophone current to retake control over the state. This incident signaled the conclusion of the Arabization process, ushering in a new age of education characterized by new policies and curricula.

The end of the civil war coincided with the beginning of a new millennium and global ideas revolving around the globalization of politics and cultures. Algeria was affected by these ideas when attempted to renew its policies and be in line with the globalization movement. Specifically, after the events of 9/11, political groups emerged calling for the cessation of Islamic education, which many considered to be the first reason for the emergence of the conflicts. Although Algeria was not completely in agreement with this proposition, it was, in another way, ready for renewal.

After evaluating Algeria's political and socio-economic condition, it was agreed that new education policies based on techniques free of ideological disputes should be implemented. As a result, citizenship education was used to help people rebuild their national identity. This type of education aimed to develop good citizens who pay loyalty to their nation and participate positively in the society. Algeria relied on the two aspects

of citizenship education policy: the political aspect that describes the individual's place in society as well as his rights and obligations towards his community, and the cultural aspect that is concerned mainly with identity. Their goal was to create an individual with a high level of patriotism, a person capable of enjoying his rights and carrying out his duties, aware of his culture, language, and identity. But it seems that the rift left by colonialism was large. In light of the lack of appropriate conditions and the imbalance caused by the French education policy, Algeria failed to create a successful educational system that preserves the dignity and identity of the people, and divisions continued to shake the Algerian society.

With the beginning of the globalization phase, the gap of differences widened and the people divided again into supporters under the pretext of openness to the world and opponents, considering that the continuity of the dominance of the first world countries does not differ in its course from the previous colonial dominance. In this research, we suggested that despite the necessity of being open to other languages and cultures, a person should not, under any circumstances, abandon his mother tongue, but rather use it as a factor that makes him a mediator between cultures. We suggested that the solution to this problem is to resort to teaching intercultural communicative competence via intercultural citizenship education so that the person is familiar with other languages and cultures and accepts their existence (not their logic). He also works to develop his language, culture, and knowledge of himself and his identity so that he can deal as a mediator between cultures. This is what leads us to the idea of integration that is completely opposed to the assimilationist model which was consecrated by colonialism with the aim of creating a new human being who either pledges allegiance to France or is lost in a new horizon that has no connection to his country, language, or identity.

Appendices

Appendices

Appendix I

Chronology of French Occupation of Algeria:

- July 1830: French troops invade and occupy Algiers and surrounding territories.

- Military Directive of 22 October 1830 recognizes the jurisdiction of "local" "Muslim" and "Israelite" (their term for Jewish) courts and law nover their respective communities.

- Ordinance of 22 July 1834 annexes French-occupied land "Algeria" to France.

- Ordinances of 22 July 1834 and of 28 February 18 4 1 limit purview of local law to "civil" or personal status: marriage, divorce, paternity, and inheritance.

- 1848: The Second Republic extends department status to France's Algerian territory.

- Senatus-Consulte of 14 July 1863 asserts that every "indigenous Muslim is French," establishes possibility for qualified "indigenous" men to obtain French citizenship.

- Crémieux Decree of 24 October: "The native Israelites of the Algerian departments are declared French citizens."

- Law of 26 June 1889 affirms that any individual born in France (including Algeria) of a parent (French or foreign) born in France is automatically French.

- Law of 4 February 1919 proposes a simpler and more widely accessible means for men from Algeria with Koranic local civil status to acquire citizenship.

- Ordinance of 2 August 1945 guarantees adult French women the vote, a right first promulgated under the French Committee for National Liberation in Algiers on 2 1 April 1944.

- Statute for Algeria of 20 September 1947 which established the Algerian Assembly and affirmed that all Algerians have French citizenship.

- 1 November 1954: A series of armed attacks and a communiqué announce the existence of the National Liberation Front (FLN), which demands the "reestablishment of the sovereignty of the Algerian nation."

- May 1958: Protests in Algiers on 13 May in defense of "French Algeria" lead the French government of Pierre Pfimlin to resign; Charles de Gaulle goes to Algiers, then agrees to lead a government that will propose a new constitution.

- 4 October 1958: The Constitution of the Fifth Republic, adopted by a referendum on 28 September 195 8, takes effect.

- 16 September 1959: De Gaulle calls for "a peace of the brave" with the FLN and embraces the previously taboo idea of Algerian self-determination.

- January 1960: The "Week of the Barricades" in Algiers: a failed coup d'état in defense of French Algeria.

- 21 April 1961: Failed coup d'état in Algiers, led by Generals Challe, Jouhaud, Salan, and Zeller.

- The Boulin Law of 2 6 December 19 6 1 establishes repatriate status.

- 18 March 1962: Signing of the " Evian Accords" between representatives of the French Republic and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA).

- 19 March 1962: Official announcement of the Evian Accords.

- Referendum of 8 April 1962, in which inhabitants of the Algerian departments do not participate, approves the Evian Accords.

- Law of 13 April 1962 incorporates the decisions approved by referendum into French law.

- 14 April 1962: Appointment of Georges Pompidou as prime minister after Michel Debré resigns.

- 20 April 1962: Arrest of ex-General Raoul Salan, head of Secret Army Organization.
  Referendum of 1 July 1962 in the departments of Algeria supports independence in cooperation with France.

- 3 July 1962: The French Republic recognizes results of the 1 July referendum; all deputies and senators from Algeria are excluded from the French Parliament.

- 5 July 1962: Declaration of the Algerian Republic in Algiers.

- Ordinance of 21 July 1962: Requires French citizens from Algeria with local civil status to apply for French nationality before 1 January 1963.

  Referendum of 28 October 1962 approves the election by direct universal suffrage of all subsequent presidents of the Republic.

- 18 and 25 November 1962: Legislative elections in France produce a proGaullist majority and see the reemergence of a " Popular front" -style alliance on the left

Glossary:

Acculturation: cultural modification of an individual, group, or people by adapting to or acquiring traits from another culture from infancy

Al Jihad: is a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty.

Al Khilafah: (the Caliphate) an institution or public office under the leadership of an Islamic steward with the title of caliph

Al Ummah: the Muslim community or 'nation'.

Arabian Peninsula: Also known as Jazīrat al-ʿArab, Shibh al-Jazīrah al-ʿArabīyah or simply Arabia. It is a piece of land in southwestern Asia. It is the original homeland of the Arab people. It is also the birthplace of the religion of Islam.

Arabization: is a sociological process of cultural change in which a non-Arab society becomes Arab, by promoting Arabic and Islamic cultural values throughout society

Assimilation: refers to the process through which individuals and groups of differing heritages acquire the basic habits, attitudes, and mode of life of an embracing culture.

Islamic conquests: a military movement by Muslims to spread Islam

Kharijite: early Islamic sect, which formed in response to a religio-political controversy over the Caliphate

Pan-Arabism: nationalist notion of cultural and political unity among Arab countries. Its origins lie in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when increased literacy led to a cultural and literary renaissance (known as the Nahda or al-nahḍah al-adabiyyah) among Arabs of the Middle East

Third Republic: French government from 1870 to 1940.

Frenchification: Francization, Francisation or Frenchification, is the spread of French language use either through willful adoption or coercion by more and more social groups who had not previously utilized the language as a common means of expression in everyday life.

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Summary:

This research aims to discover the possible ways of reconstructing a national identity in a postcolonial community. Taking Algeria as a sample; this thesis offers a deep analysis of the pre-colonial era and the prevailing educational system at the time. Algeria was the nation that experienced the longest era of colonialism; after 132 years of French dominance and more than seven years of war, Algeria gained independence, but with a heavy load of dependency on France and a loss of identity. During the colonial period, and through education, France implemented the Francization policy, through which it sought to strike at the foundations of Algerian national identity in order to create an individual easy-to-manipulate and easy to assimilate. Algeria tried to fight this policy and regain its identity after restoring its national sovereignty, so it resorted to Arabization and Islam as the main and essential components of Algerian identity, but after the black decade and the change of government policies, in addition to globalization, the requirements of the era changed and Algeria was forced to resort to new solutions to restore its national identity.

Keywords : Colonial Algeria, Francisation, Arabisation, Islam, National Identity.

الملخص:

يهدف هذا البحث إلى اكتشاف الطرق الممكنة لإعادة بناء الهوية الوطنية في مجتمع ما بعد الاستعمار . وبأخذ الجزائر كعينة ؛ تقدم هذه الأطروحة تحليلًا عميقًا للمجتمع الجزائري قبل الاستعمار الفرنسي بالإضافة إلى النظام التعليمي السائد في ذلك الوقت. الجزائر كانت الأمة التي عاشت أطول حقبة من الاستعمار: بعد 132 عامًا من الهيمنة الفرنسية وأكثر من سبع سنوات من الحرب، نالت الجزائر استقلالها، ولكن مع عبء ثقيل من الاعتماد على فرنسا وفقدان للهوية. على امتداد الفترة الاستعمارية، ومن خلال التعليم، نفذت فرنسا سياسة الفرنَسة، التي سعت من خلالها إلى ضرب أسس الهوية الوطنية الجزائرية من أجل خلق فرد يسهل التلاعب به ويسهل استيعابه. حاولت الجزائر محاربة هذه السياسة واستعادة هويتها بعد استرجاعها لسيادتها الوطنية ، لذلك لجأت إلى التعريب والإسلام كمكونين أساسيين للهوية الجزائرية ، ولكن بعد العشرية السوداء وتغيير سياسات الحكومة ، بالإضافة إلى العولمة. تغيرت متطلبات العصر، واضطرت الجزائر إلى اللجوء إلى حلول جديدة لاستعادة هويتها الوطنية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الجزائر الاستعمارية ، الفرنسة ، التعريب ، الاسلام ، الهوية الوطنية.

Résumé :

Cette recherche vise à explorer les voies possibles de reconstruction de l'identité nationale dans une société postcoloniale. Prenant l'Algérie comme échantillon ; Cette thèse propose une analyse approfondie de la société algérienne avant la colonisation française ainsi que du système éducatif en vigueur à cette époque. L'Algérie a été la nation avec la plus longue période coloniale : après 132 ans de domination française et plus de sept ans de guerre, l'Algérie a obtenu son indépendance, mais avec un lourd fardeau de dépendance à l'égard de la France et une perte d'identité. Pendant la période coloniale, et par l'éducation, la France a mis en œuvre une politique de francisation, par laquelle elle a cherché à frapper les fondements de l'identité nationale algérienne afin de créer un individu facile à manipuler et à assimiler. L'Algérie a tenté de lutter contre cette politique et de restaurer son identité après avoir restauré sa souveraineté nationale, elle a donc eu recours à l'arabisation et à l'islam comme deux composantes fondamentales de l'identité algérienne, mais après la décennie noire et le changement des politiques gouvernementales, en plus de la mondialisation. Les exigences de l'époque ont changé et l'Algérie a dû recourir à de nouvelles solutions pour restaurer son identité nationale.

Mots-clés: Algérie Coloniale, Francisation, Arabization, Islam, Identité Nationale.