People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research

University of Tlemcen

Faculty of Letters and Languages

Department of English

The 2003Invasion of Iraq: Behind the Curtains

Dissertation Submitted to the Department of English as a Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for Master's Degree in Literature and Civilisation

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Academic Year: 2022/2023

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I, hereby declare that this dissertation, titled "The Invasion of Iraq 2003: Behind the Curtains" is entirely my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the dissertation.

Signature

Chaimae Razika KHEROUA

06/10/2023

DEDICATIONS

To my beloved parents...

In the journey of life, you have been my leading stars, my unwavering pillars of support, and the embodiment of love and wisdom. With deepest gratitude, I dedicate this work to both of you, my irreplaceable heroes, with the hope that my own story may reflect the timeless love and courage you have gave me.

To my dear siblings...

you are my greatest treasures. Our shared moments have illuminated my path, reminding me that family is a tapestry that is woven with love, understanding, and pure kindness.

To my companions whom I cherish...

your friendship has been a beacon of light, guiding me through the darkest of times. Like the bonds of the fellowship, our connection transcends distance and time, for the flame of our friendship burns brightly, even when we are apart. You have summarized what Samwise Gamgee said to Frodo Baggins in their adventure in the Lord of the Rings:

"I can't carry it for you, but I can carry you!"

With all my love

ACKNOWLEGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s resulted in a unipolar world, with the United States emerging as the dominant global power. This shift in the international order influenced the perception of American military interventions and the exercise of its foreign policy.Against the backdrop of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, a momentous event in contemporary history, this dissertation delves into the surface justifications and hidden motives that shaped this significant geopolitical undertaking. The study begins by providing an overview of the historical background surrounding the invasion, emphasizing the need to unravel the complexities and undisclosed dimensions of this critical episode. The research aims at investigating the case for war presented by the Bush administration, and uncover the concealed influences and motives behind the military intervention. Employing a New Historicism approach, the study utilizes various sources such as official speeches, reports, memos, and scholarly analyses to bring the objective to light. The work dissects key events, motives, and manipulations associated with the invasion. The findings shed light on the intricate interplay of factors involved, revealing the surface justifications, alongside hidden motives. Additionally, the research exposes the manipulation of intelligence and uncovers the concealed role of Britain in pre-war planning. By comprehensively exploring the invasion of Iraq and its undisclosed dimensions, this dissertation attempt to contributes to a deeper understanding of the motivations behind the military intervention and provides valuable insights into the complex nature of the decision-making process in the case of Iraq (2003).

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AIPAC: American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

ANWR: Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.

BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation.

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency.

D.C.: District of Columbia.

DPG: Defense Planning Guidance.

GAO: Government Accountability Office.

IC: Intelligence Community.

NEPDG: National Energy Policy Development Group.

NIE: National Intelligence Estimate.

NSS: National Security Strategy.

ODS: Operation Desert Shield**.**

ODS: Operation Desert Storm.

PNAC: Project for New American Century.

UK: United Kingdom.

UN: United Nations.

US: United States.

WINEP: Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

As the 20th anniversary of Iraq's 2003 invasionis marked, one cannot neglect the fact that this war symbolizes a pivotal event in 21st-century conflicts. It serves as a case study for understanding the challenges of regime change, post-conflict reconstruction, and the dynamics of sectarian conflicts. The invasion's consequences affected regional stability in the Middle East's countries such as Syria, shaped global perceptions of the United States as the world's policeman, and has significant humanitarian implications domestically, including civilian casualties, displacement,infrastructure damage and vulnerable regime. Ultimately, the impact of the military intervention in Iraq will continue to be debated and analyzed for many years to come.

This work narrows its focus on the pre-war factors that led to the invasion. Consequently, the research endeavour is pursued with the purpose of shedding light upon a series of pivotal events far from the declared ones, unlisted motives, and intricate manipulations intertwined with the invasion that had been unrevealed until its aftermath. Accordingly, the primary objectives of this study are to elucidate the following research questions:

1. To what extent did factors beyond the 9/11 attacks rooted in strategic considerations, security concerns, and geopolitical interests shape the United States' policy to build a case against Iraq?

2. How had the adopted procedures come in the apparent American policy to translate anopaque intent?

3. What is the truth behind the American pretext to conduct acase against Iraq?

4. How did Britain fulfill a crucial position in the invasion?

In order to reach appropriate answers for these questions, this dissertation is divided into two chapters to bring forth the essential meaning of the work. Chapter one serves as an

introductory source to what has been said superficially, about the events that led to the decision to launch the Operation Iraqi Freedom applying a logical order of circumstances, whereas chapter two is pulling back the curtain attempting to unveil the main intricate dynamics, clandestine alliances, and hidden motivations that shaped the course of events leading up to the invasion.

By applying a New Historicist lens to the study of the invasion of Iraq, the research has gained insights into the complexity of this tackled topic. The New Historicist analysis of the invasion of Iraq has explored various aspects in this dissertation such as the political motivations behind the decision to invade, the justifications provided by the government. Furthermore, this approach has examined a wide range of sources, including political speeches, media coverage that have been mentioned throughout this research.

In this regard, the initial element of the first chapter performs a background of the US-Iraq relation in the pre-conflict period, to be followed by a transition of ten years that had changed the relations suddenly to a tension situation. The events reached the climax after the 9/11 attacks which led the American administration to adopt a wide range of strategic decisions that translated its foreign policy as a response to the attacks. In this context, the plan of action had firstly endorsed the necessity to apply a war against terrorism in order to guarantee the global security. This decision had been followed by controversial identification that charged three nations to be the "Axis of Evil" including Iraq under Saddam Hussein regime. Therefore, the U.S. administration had narrowed its focus to charge the Iraqi regime by adopting the National Security Strategy of 2002 as a cornerstone for its future military intervention in Iraq In due course it paved the path to the democratic theory that would be achieved for the benefit of Iraqi people and the preemption policy it acquired against the Iraqi regime. As a conclusion, the American administration had established a groundwork in order to provide a rational justification for war built on the Weapon of Mass

Destruction danger, the Iraqi ties with terrorism and the violation of the United Nations Security Council resolution through exploring the arguments included in Colin Powell's speech in the United Nations. The chapter concludes by summarizing the military intervention that had been shaped after gaining an international support as a Coalition of the Willing, with a specific emphasis on Britain's involvement in the Operation Iraqi Freedom in March, 20th, 2003.

Chapter Two of the dissertation focuses on the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, revealing undeclared motives and deceptive plannings for war. The chapter delves into the influence of Israeli interests, examining the connections between crucial role of US Neoconservatives and its significance to protect the Israel interests, translating the objective behind the Clean Break strategy document. The chapter also explores the function of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), the creation of Defense Planning Guidance of 1992, and its resurgence in the Rebuilding America's Defenses report of 2000 to form the American policy towards Iraq. Additionally, it discusses the argument that oil characterized a vital factor behind the invasion, including the Cheney Task Force and its suspicious activities. The chapter likewise addresses the investigations on the Colin Powell speech and its implications which resulted in a politicization of intelligence process, revealed by aftermath investigation report. Besides, Britain's involvement in the pre-war planning, its rush to join the alliance and the Secret Downing Street Memo as a document that outlined the US-UK intention for the invasion, before building a solid ground. Overall, the chapter highlights the complexities and concealed aspects of the invasion, shedding light on the motives and planning that shaped this significant event and reflected the truth behind a set of strategical decisions that had not appeared that way before.

In a nutshell, the research paper manages an equilibrium between the preface of the invasion including the American declarations and, the truth behind the scene that represents the steering wheel that conducted the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

CHAPTER ONE

CHAPTER ONE The 2003 Invasion of Iraq, an Overview

CHAPTER ONE   **The 2003 Invasion of Iraq, an Overview**

1.1 Introduction:

The chapter begins by setting a brief historical context that includes a description of the roots of the political relations between the United States and Iraq. It also exposes the background for understanding the dynamics between the two nations especially between the period of 1990 to 2001, which is considered as the climax of tensions between the two countries. The chapter then examines the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the subsequent American responses, particularly the War on Terror and the identification of Iraq as part of the "Axis of Evil." It delves into the National Security Strategy of 2002, including the Bush Doctrine and the objective of promoting democracy in Iraq through regime change and preemptive war. Besides, it highlights the case for war, focusing on influential events such as Colin Powell's speech at the United Nations and the justifications provided to make the case for war. Furthermore, it addresses the formation of the Coalition of the Willing and the significant role played by Britain as an ally in the invasion. Lastly, the chapter concludes by providing an overview of the "Operation Iraqi Freedom" and its significance in the overall narrative.

1.2 An Overview of the U.S.-Iraqi Diplomatic Relations:

The U.S. relation with Iraq scope encompassed a historical trajectory of interactions, tracing back to the era of the Ottoman Empire and spanning the period of the British mandate after World War I, coinciding with the emergence and consolidation of U.S. oil interests. It extended to the subsequent phase of engagement with the Hashemite Monarchy[1] until its eventual overthrow in 1958, followed by a notable escalation of tensions during the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, the intricate dynamics of an uneasy alliance formed against Iran during the 1980s (Boutz and Williams).

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[1].The Hashemite Monarchy: A notable Arab family whose members are direct descendants of the founder of Islam, the Prophet Muhammad ("Oxford Reference", par. 1).

Back to the Cold War era, Iraq held significant importance as a valuable buffer and strategic asset in the geopolitical standoff with the Soviet Union. An illustrative instance of this was witnessed in the mid-1950s, when Iraq promptly aligned itself with the anti-Soviet "Baghdad Pact". This pact was formed in 1955 to safeguard the region from the Soviet expansion, including nations such as Turkey, Britain, Iran, and Pakistan in addition to Iraq (Sale, par. 5).

Diplomatically, the United States and Iraq had initiated their diplomatic relations under the dominion of the Ottoman Empire, where the first American consul in Baghdad, Mr. John Henry Heinz, assumed his post on October 8, 1888. Subsequently, as Iraq gained its independence, the United States extended recognition, leading to the establishment of the first American commission on March 30, 1931, with Mr. Alexander Sloane serving as its head. Eventually, diplomatic representation was elevated to the status of an embassy on December 28, 1946 (Iraq-USA Relations, par. 1). In the aftermath of the Third Arab-Israeli War[2] of 1967, diplomatic ties between the two nations were severed till 1984, when the diplomatic relations were reestablished again. Unfortunately, this period of renewed relations was short-lived, as diplomatic ties were once again severed in 1991 due to the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi president, Saddam Hussein's regime ("Iraq-USA Relations", par. 2).

Throughout the history of U.S.-Iraqi relations, there has been a consistent pattern of the United States prioritizing other regional interests over its relationship with Iraq. These interests primarily revolved around factors such as oil, the containment of communism[3], and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Boutz and Williams 1).

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[2]. The Third Arab-Israeli War: Six-Day War, also called June War or Naksah, brief war that took place June 5–10, 1967. Israel's decisive victory included the capture of the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Old City of Jerusalem, and Golan Heights ("Six Days War", par. 1).

[3]. The containment of Communism: George F. Kennan, a career Foreign Service Officer, formulated the policy of "containment," the basic United States strategy for fighting the cold war (1947–1989) with the Soviet Union ("Kennan", par. 1).

The relations had developed especially under the presidency of Saddam Hussein in Iraq starting from 1979. Especially that his initial interactions with US officials can be traced back to 1959. Saddam was part of a group of six individuals authorized by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) to carry out the assassination of the then Iraqi Prime Minister, Abd al-Karim Qasim. In the past, U.S. intelligence diplomats and officials acknowledge that Saddam was regarded as a staunch opponent of communism, and for more than four decades, he was utilized by them as a tool or ally, as stated by these sources (Sale, par. 1-3).

Over the course of the past ninety years following Iraq's establishment as an independent nation in the aftermath of World War I, the approach of the United States towards Iraq can be categorized into distinct phases till 1990.

1.3 US Relations with Iraq from 1990-2001:

Starting from 1990, the US-Iraqi political pivotal relation had witnessed the emergence of a number of turning points that affected their partnership. Boutz and Williams claim that the US-Iraqi political relations had passed through different stages of diplomatic engagements. The late 90's represents the edge of the two countries' relation, a period that shifted the situation to a tension affair. It had been related to the fight against Communism spread (the Soviet Union) and Post-revolution Iran (43).

After the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, the United States pursued a policy that largely mirrored its approach from the previous decade. This involved maintaining military assistance to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states that were considered friendly, as well as cautiously exploring the possibility of establishing limited relations with Iraq (Haass, par. 6).

The situation had reached the peak since the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (The Gulf War) when Iraq launched an invasion on the neighboring country of Kuwait, situated to

its southeast, with the objective of increasing its influence and dominance over the valuable oil resources in the Middle Eastern region. In this context, America began perceiving Iraq as a menace to its national interests (Ibrahim, para. 11). In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States initiated Operation Desert Shield (ODS), a strategic endeavor aimed at obstructing Iraq's further territorial expansion and its potential assault on Saudi Arabia. Subsequently, Operation Desert Storm (ODS) was launched by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Nations' armed forces with the objective of expelling Iraq from Kuwait (Department of State). The coalition led by the United States executed targeted strikes on the Iraqi army divisions, command posts, and ammunition depots. The ground offensive itself lasted for a brief period, as the destruction of vital equipment rendered the Iraqi army's ground units incapacitated and ineffective. As a result, the swift military operation achieved a successful conclusion on February 28, 1991 (Lacquement, JR.).

In light of the situation, the UNSC[4](United Nations Security Council) implemented comprehensive economic sanctions against Iraq. The UNSC Resolution 687 was issued by the United Nations on April 03, 1991, serving as a framework for a ceasefire and an exit strategy subsequent to the liberation of Kuwait. This resolution established a set of responsibilities that were imposed on Iraq by the UN Security Council. These obligations encompassed the dismantling of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction[5] (WMDs) program and allowing UN Special Commission and International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors to conduct verification inspections. Furthermore, Iraq was obligated to provide reparations,

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[4]. UNSC: The United Nations Security Council (UNSC, or UN Security Council) is one of the five primary organs of the United Nations, responsible for maintaining international peace and security […] The UNSC was established on January 17, 1946 and includes the five permanent members (United States, Russian Federation [as a state successor to the USSR], United Kingdom, China and France) which hold veto power ("United Nations Security Council").

[5].WMD: […] A weapon of mass destruction is a nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological, or other device that is intended to harm a large number of people ("Weapons of Mass Destruction", par. 1).

return looted items to Kuwait, and address matters concerning prisoners of war (Wedgwood 724).

Although the coalition forces successfully expelled Iraq from Kuwait, the sanctions were not lifted by the Council. They were maintained as a means to exert pressure for Iraqi disarmament and prevent rebuilding Iraqi military capacities. Despite their detrimental effects on the lives of innocent Iraqi civilians and the apparent ineffectiveness in influencing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, the sanctions persisted. In an attempt to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, the UN introduced the "Oil-for-Food Program"[6] in late 1997, but the situation remained critical. As a reaction, the US and UK policymakers consistently emphasized their intention to prevent any removal or significant modification of sanctions as long as Hussein remained in power. ("Sanctions Against Iraq", par. 1-2).

Another factor which played a vital role in the US-Iraqi affairs is the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act in November 1998. The act represents a piece of legislation, signed by the American President Bill Clinton, in collaboration with the British Prime Minister Tony Blair. The Act in question outlined a significant provision stating that the policy of the United States necessitates the ousting of Saddam Hussein and expressed its commitment to backing a fresh and democratic government in Iraq (Musawi, par.6). Clinton reflected the intention of the act in his speech delivered in the White House, saying that:

> This Act makes clear that it is the sense of the Congress that the
> United States should support those elements of the Iraqi
> opposition that advocate a very different future for Iraq than the
> bitter reality of internal repression and external aggression that
> the current regime in Baghdad now offers […] In the meantime,
> while the United States continues to look to the Security
> Council's efforts to keep the current regime's behavior in check,

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[6]. Oil-For-Food Program: The UN Security Council started the Oil-For-Food Program in 1996 to allow Iraq to sell enough oil to pay for food and other necessities for its population, which was suffering under strict UN sanctions imposed after the first Gulf War (Otterman, par. 1).

> we look forward to new leadership in Iraq that has the support of the Iraqi people. The United States is providing support to opposition groups from all sectors of the Iraqi community that could lead to a popularly supported government ("Statement", par. 1-6).

Clinton emphasized that the Iraqi Liberation Act's primary aim was to advocate for an Iraq where its people are afforded the freedom to live within their own country. Consequently, the prospects for the desired changes occurring under the current leadership of the Saddam regime appear slim. Meanwhile, the United States places its reliance on the efforts of the Security Council to monitor and restrict the actions of the current regime. Furthermore, there is a hopeful anticipation that new leadership will emerge in Iraq, backed by the support of the Iraqi population.

Nabil Musawi states that such proposal would enable the Iraqi population to achieve liberation, establish novel administrative, technical, and humanitarian organizations, and reintegrate into the global society. Besides, the international community would also experience advantages from this initiative (par. 13-14).

Altogether, the relation had been changed to antagonism, and through these events the scene had been crystal clear that a confused relation had started between the two nations especially after the coming of the 43rd American President George W. Bush. His strategy which had a significant influence on the Administration's decisions in its initial term, was instrumental in shaping its actions after the twist that happened in the US-Iraqi relations after his appointment starting from 2001.

1.4 9/11 Attacks:

The September 11, 2001 attacks are considered to be the plot that refashioned the American foreign politics and dictated the American War on Terror. It provided a new Pearl

Harbor and traced a combative diplomacy rhetoric of the U.S. policy through the Bush administration's decisions and the political approaches adopted as a response to the attacks.

"9/11" attacks refers to a series of coordinated terrorist acts executed by al-Qaeda[7], on the morning of September 11, 2001. These attacks involved the hijacking of four commercial airplanes by 19 terrorists. Two planes were intentionally crashed into the upper floors of the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center, while another plane was directed into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia. Due to the severe damage and ensuing fires, the Twin Towers eventually collapsed. In response to the unfolding events, passengers aboard the fourth hijacked plane, Flight 93, resisted, leading to the plane crashing in an uninhabited field in western Pennsylvania, approximately 20 minutes by air from Washington, D.C.Tragically, the attacks resulted in the loss of 2,977 lives from 93 different countries. Specifically, 2,753 individuals lost their lives in New York, 184 perished at the Pentagon, and 40 were killed on Flight 93 (9/11 FAQs, par3).

There is a widespread consensus that the events of September 11, 2001, had a profound impact on the trajectory of history. However, it is important to contemplate why this particular event carried such extensive consequences. The key to understanding lies not solely within the event but rather in the response of the United States, guided by President George W. Bush (Soros, par. 1).

1.5American Responses to 9/11 Attacks:

The 9/11 attacks had a significant and lasting impact on American policy, shaping political measures and national security strategies. Therefore, following the attacks, the

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[7]. Al-Qaeda: is an international Islamist extremist terrorist network founded in the late 1980s by Osama bin Laden […] and others who were involved in the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Their aim has been to overthrow governments in the Middle East, and elsewhere in the Muslim world, which do not strictly enforce a religiously sanctioned political and social order. Attacks against the United States were intended to reduce American support for many of these governments (9/11 FAQs, par. 7).

United States responded with major military action, that in tandem with its securityand policy changes.

1.5.1 War on Terror:

A set of vital changes in the American Foreign policy followed the 9/11 attacks and, dynamic political approaches had been adopted by the Bush administration as a response to those events. It started on September20,2001, when the American President George Bush delivered a speech in live coverage addressing the Congress, where he announced: "Our war on Terror begins with Al-Qaeda but it does not end there it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach had been found stopped and defeated" ("Sept. 20, 2001 - Bush Declares War on Terror," 07:35-07:53).

The speech was an outbreak of the War against terrorism. Bush through his statement was alluding that Al-Qaeda was not the only accused group. However, he was opening the door to an enigmatic speech that accused in the first line all the groups that were considered as a menacing threat to the U.S. existence.

Clearly, the Bush administration, in its pursuit of counterterrorism, refrained from providing precise definitions of terrorism or explicitly identifying the individual's considered terrorists. Nonetheless, it vowed to vigorously combat any individuals or groups engaged in "evil" acts globally. This marked the initiation of the Bush administration's crusade against terrorism, instigating widespread apprehension and fury specifically directed towards those categorized by the government as terrorists or their allies (Leaman 240).

The operation had been implemented officially, seven days later. On September 18, the "Public Law 107-40" had been signed by the American president. It provided laws to protect the nation and to defend its soil. The Public Law gave the U.S. the right to use force against the attackers, allowing the president to apply his constitutional power in the situation

and permit the use of preventive action against future attacks of the U.S. Appropriately, "the Global War on Terror had been passed into legislation" (Parraguez and Rodriguez 82).

In this context, the American administration started building up its strategy to defend its territories from any other "evil" acts as it said. Leffler sums up the American procedures regarding the scene saying that:

> After 9/11, there was an accelerated buildup of U.S. military and intelligence capabilities. Defense expenditures skyrocketed; counterinsurgency initiatives proliferated; new bases were constructed throughout Central and Southwest Asia; a new military command in Africa was established. The war on terror became the preoccupation of the Bush administration's national security policy (35).

According to these statements, U.S. was seeking to secure its internal interests from al-Qaeda and any other danger related to it, through fortifying its military capacities and intelligences communities. Leffler expresses the conception of the adaptation of "global counterterrorism campaign" that rather than solely concentrating on al Qaeda, directed its attention towards the broader worldwide terrorist menace. He assumes the focus was not only on non-state actors causing harm but also the governments that provided them refuge and support. In order to gather valuable intelligence, it employed methods such as detention, rendition, and, in isolated instances, torture (34).

1.5.2 Axis of Evil

During his first State of the Union address on the corresponding date on January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush designated three nations, namely North Korea, Iran, and Iraq "Axis of Evil" as rogue states allegedly providing sanctuary, financial support, and assistance to terrorist factions (Glass, par. 1).

Slightly beyond the first year of his presidential tenure and after several months of engagement in a conflict that would ultimately surpass all others in duration within American

annals, President Bush had accused three nations as the principal focal points within an extensive and profoundly perilous nexus of terrorists and outrageous elements posing a significant threat to the United States. The address explicated the rationale behind President Bush's comprehensive strategy, termed the "War on Terror," a succession of military undertakings that would permanently shape the path of the U.S. foreign policy for the ensuing two decades ("George W. Bush", par. 2). While providing a set of arguments to convince the public opinion, Bush stated:

> Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens [….] This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world. States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred ("President Delivers State of the Union Address", par. 20-21).

According to this passage, Bush aimed to underscore the significant menace emanating from Iraq, asserting that it was actively pursuing the development of weapons of mass destruction and providing backing to terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda.

According to Woodward's account of National Security Council meetings, from the moment the September 11 terrorist attacks occurred, the Bush administration framed the U.S. response in terms of a global war on terrorism, with targets including not just Afghanistan, but other nations as well, including Iraq. Thus, it seems that Bush sincerely believed in the Iraq-9/11 connection (qtd. in Gershkoff and Kushner 526). Therefore, a key adopted procedure had opened the door to reshape the American political scene.

1.5.3National Security Strategy 2002:

In September 2002, President George W. Bush's initial National Security Strategy (NSS) report was published by the White House, garnering significant attention both domestically and internationally. It was regarded as a compelling statement outlining America's overarching strategy in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks. Titled "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," the document received praise for its lucidity, forward-thinking approach, and impressive response to the current threats faced by the nation (Lieber and Lieber 32).

The primary motivation behind the adoption of the strategy was the perceived threat to the national security of the United States posed by international terrorists. The events of September 11, 2001, exposed vulnerabilities in the country's security apparatus and revealed a lack of preparedness within internal security forces. The new enemy did not necessitate a large conventional army to inflict significant damage; rather, a small group of individuals armed with explosive weapons proved sufficient to deliver a devastating blow (Kaisar 21).

The first major points of contention arising from the Bush NSS can be considered as the four pillars of Bush policy. Firstly, the strategy advocated for preemptive military measures against both hostile nations and terrorist organizations that are actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Secondly, it asserted that the United States will not tolerate any foreign power challenging its global military supremacy. Thirdly, while expressing a commitment to international cooperation, the NSS emphasized that the United States will not hesitate to take unilateral action if necessary to safeguard its national interests and security. Lastly, the strategy highlighted the objective of promoting democracy and human rights worldwide, with particular focus on the Eastern world (Lieber and Lieber 32). In summary, the inception of the NSS marked a paradigm shift in U.S. policy, setting the

stage for a proactive and interventionist approach that would ultimately play a pivotal role in shaping the justification and execution of the invasion of Iraq.

1.5.3.1 Bush Doctrine:

In the days and months following the 9/11 attacks, a new shape of the American foreign policy started to be seen. After delivering a set of speeches consoling the Americans for their loss, and showing the American intention to fight the terrorist organization such as Al Qaida, these comments eventually evolved into the set of principles referred to as the Bush Doctrine, which can be officially traced back to September 2002 when the National Security Strategy of the United States was published by the White House. The American president George W. Bush successfully created a political propaganda that left an impact on the World's policies which will be remembered as the "Bush Doctrine" (Gregg II, par. 10). This reaction resulted only in one point which reversed the American strategy of 9/11 aftermath, how and what to do. In this context, Kim Quarantello states:

> The debate intensified after 9/11, a national trauma that prompted the Bush Administration to implement a grand strategy in response to an attack on American soil, balancing strategic and ideological interests at home and abroad. The grand strategy of President George W. Bush, encompassed in the Bush Doctrine, is one of the most criticized foreign policy strategies among political scholars and the American public. The Bush Doctrine significantly influenced US foreign policy pursuits in the Middle East, specifically the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, counterterrorism strategies and democracy promotion efforts (2).

These announcements provided a deep glance into the role of the Bush Doctrine in the American foreign policy and particularly in the Middle East countries. Its primary results had shaped the American military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Heajeong Lee stated in his critical appraisal of the policy that "The Bush doctrine has guided and moralized America's war on terror, subjecting terror not to the traditional confines of police action but to America's awesome military power and thereby dictating changes in the traditional terms of war and diplomacy" (32).

1.5.3.2 Promoting Democracy in Iraq:

While the United States developed a strategic plan to combat terrorism, this plan had also aimed to promote democracy and freedom in order to bring about significant changes in Iraq through a liberal grand strategy (Bouguerra 133).

The United States justified its intervention in Iraq by highlighting the value of ensuring global human security and reducing internal political violence that those factors could produce. The War on Terror and spreading the values of Democratic Peace throughout the area were at the center of US foreign policy. The US worked with a number of international organizations to achieve a peaceful, stable, and wealthy world. As a result, it was thought that promoting and spreading democracy through all available channels was a crucial goal (Mihoub 71).

The theory could be touched through the American President speeches delivered in the context of the Iraqi threat. He announced in one of his statements that:

> The current Iraqi regime has shown the power of tyranny to spread discord and violence in the Middle East [they] liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America's interests and security and America's belief in Liberty both lead in the same direction to a free and peaceful Iraq ("George Bush 2003 Speech - Democracy in Iraq," 04:07 - 04:47).

While Bush had considered Iraq to be a member of the "axis of evil" in addition to Iran and North Korea, the application of the Democracy theory was well received by Bush

administration supporters. Paul Wolfowitz, the American Deputy Defense Secretary announced that Iraq as the "first Arab democracy" would "cast a very large shadow, starting with Syria and Iran, across the whole Arab world" (BBC News).

Donald Rumsfeld, the American Secretary of Defense and Dick Cheney, the American Vice president said that the attack's main goals were to reaffirm American authority in the wake of the September 11th attacks and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. They contended that once Saddam Hussein was ousted from office, the US only had marginal interests in Iraq. Paul Wolfowitz, who served as the deputy defense secretary under President Bush, asserted that the invasion was intended to promote democratization. He argued that America wanted to make sure that Iraq was a dependable friend of the West and believed that the country's democracy would inspire other attempts to democratize the region. The reality in Iraq had not supported this assertion, and recent events there suggest that the democratic process is not firmly established in American liberal norms (Carothers 77).

Bush's speeches had showed a focus on the American good intention to destroy Weapons of Mass Destruction from being used as a domestic threat and to elevate the democratic state in Iraq as it cited in the NSS 2002. He mentioned his evidences based on intelligence investigations saying that: "I take the threat very seriously. I take the fact that he develops weapons of mass destruction very seriously. I remember the fact that he has invaded two countries before. I know for a fact that he's poisoned his own people. He doesn't believe in the worth of each individual. He doesn't believe in public dissent" ("Bush speech on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction," 00:18- 00:48).

The American president had shed the light on the past Iraqi military involvement (Kuwait and Iran) to guarantee a support from the public opinion. Therefore, Bush suggested to take all the procedures in order to prevent Saddam to use the WMD on his civilians through achieving regime change.

Following the conclusion of the Cold War, a series of significant factors surfaced, contributing to the Bush administration's inclination towards endorsing the idea of direct military intervention by the United States as a means to effect regime change in Iraq. The primary objective behind such intervention was to foster the advancement of democracy within the region (Bouguerra 134).

The period following the September 11 attacks can be seen as the pinnacle of the development of the US new ideology and the most opportune time to implement democratization policies. The 9/11 attacks prompted the American government to swiftly denounce Saddam Hussein's regime and determine that it could no longer be tolerated. They believed that relying on Iraqi opposition groups alone would no longer suffice for the United States to achieve its policy objectives in Iraq (Bouguerra 134). This adopted policy had contained the new American approach is the so-called "Bush Doctrine" and the fourth pillar of the NSS which reflected Bush effort to move towards an alternative era after the 9/11 plot.

1.5.3.3 Pre-emption Policy

Pre-emption policy is known to be the heart of the Bush doctrine, and the main first stage that conducted the military campaign in Iraq according to the National Security Council's procedures. Ana Dresner confirms that the American foreign policy adopted the Bush doctrine to be the touchstone of the Bush administration's decisions after the 9/11 attacks, and to defend its policy directions and transformations. It conveyed what is known as the "policy of pre-emption". According to the pre-emption policy principles, if a nation poses a security danger to the United States, it has the right to invade that nation and overthrow its government. Dresner also mentioned that this danger can be shaped to be a terrorist action or a threat of developing weapons of mass destruction by any political regime. From another standpoint, this policy had been considered to be the pillar of democracy all over the world in the Middle East countries in particular, and to be the motivator behind the Iraq invasion after

claiming that Saddam Hussein owned WMD (Dresner282). Therefore, the American policymakers revealed the intention to appeal the pre-emptive action as a military strategic necessity to defend its security from any similar danger to the 9/11 attacks.

In his speech delivered for "West Point Commencement" on June 1, 2002; President Bush had officially presented the pre-emption policy that the U.S. would accomplish to assure the American security against any "evil" action. Therefore, he addressed the military forces saying:

> Our security will require the best intelligence, to reveal threats hidden in caves and growing in laboratories. Our security will require modernizing domestic agencies such as the FBI, so they're prepared to act, and act quickly, against danger. Our security will require transforming the military you will lead — a military that must be ready to strike at a moment's notice in any dark corner of the world. And our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives ("Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush" 128).

Aylin Seker Görener stated that "it is not entirely clear whether pre-emptive force will also be used against other states that the Bush administration finds threatening (33)". However, the Bush doctrine elucidated that the pre-emptive war had been adopted as a US security approach in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Logically, this force should be justified according to the International Law to be politically feasible otherwise, these pre-emptive strikes could be seen as coercive acts which could not fit the laws (34).

In the world political arena, the Iraq war is considered as the first pre-emptive war witnessed in the 21st century. The American congressmen conducted the pre-emptive war under the blueprint of the "Operation Iraqi Freedom". (Parraguez and Rodriguez 86). And for

realizing such political decision that should result a military intervention, the U.S. administration had built up the case to legalize the case for the invasion.

1.6 Making the Case for War:

The argument put forth to justify the invasion of the Middle Eastern country was constructed upon three fundamental assertions: firstly, that the Saddam Hussein regime possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD); secondly, that it was actively working on producing additional WMDs that could benefit "terrorist" organizations; and thirdly, that establishing a "friendly and democratic" Iraq would serve as a model for the surrounding region.

1.6.1 Colin Powell Speech in the UN:

The Bush administration strategically emphasized the purported presence of weapons of mass destruction as a primary rationale motive for the use of force in removing Saddam Hussein from power. This choice was made due to its political expediency (Usborne, par. 1). Therefore, Mr. Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, likely suggested that the notion of weapons of mass destruction provided a justification for the attack on Iraq that was widely acceptable. This assertion primarily referred to the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who was the final influential member of the administration to endorse the concerted effort earlier, aiming to convince the international community that the only remaining viable option was to forcibly remove Saddam (Ibid., par. 9).

On February 5, 2003, Colin Powell, the United States Secretary of the State delivered a high-profile speech to the United Nations Security Council. This speech is considered to be the United States' most detailed case against Iraq, aimed at justifying military action (Zarefsky 275). Powell asserted that the information he presented to the UN was grounded on reliable intelligence, as he emphasized the existence of biological weapons in Iraq ("Secretary of State Colin Powell", par. 5). He addressed the United Nations and the public,

saying that "every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence" (Roberts et al. 239).

To build up the speech, the National Security Council (NSC) asked the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to work on a presentation as a response to the Iraq's declaration in the UN. The CIA was aware that that presentation will be used in a public manner therefore, a number of analysts and officials started preparing the draft weeks before. Most of the intelligence information provided in the speech were derived from and founded on the Intelligence Community products basically, the NIE[8] (National Intelligence Estimate) of 2002 due to the previous assessments it offered in addition to other materials (Roberts et al. 239).

The National Intelligence Estimate, had provided the intelligence which expressed the majority perspectives about the Iraqi reconstruction of the nuclear weapons program. The outcomes of the analysis were built on three elementary bodies: Iraq effort for the acquisition of materials as the aluminum tubes magnets, high speech balancing machines and machine tools. Besides, the Iraqi intention to found a structure in order to develop a cadre of weapons personnel and the suspicious sites of nuclear weapons they existed in (Roberts et al. 239).

In his address, Powell did argue that Iraq had been obstructing and impeding UN inspections, which he presented as a violation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1441 of November 3rd, 2002. The latter aimed for disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction as an obligatory procedure. The speech tackled a number of points where Powell presented the Iraqi regime as a significant threat to the international security. Each section of the speech provided a variety of evidence to back up his assertions during his address, including satellite

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[8]. National Intelligence Estimate: The NIE is the highest-level document generated by U.S. intelligence agencies. The one issued in October 2002 was titled "Iraq's Continuing Programs of Weapons of Mass Destruction" and was produced in just a few weeks because Congress was nearing a vote on going to war with Iraq ("The October").

images, intercepted conversations, and reports from informants("Remarks"). Powell had asserted that Iraq had been aggressively impeding UN inspectors and hiding its WMD development. Furthermore, he stressed Iraq's purported existence of chemical and biological weapons, which he claimed might be readily transferred to terrorist organizations. The speech also discussed the mobile labs, chemical agents, and Iraqi efforts to create unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver such weapons. Another key aspect of Powell's statements which crystalized his attempt to establish a connection between Iraq and Al-Qaeda, the terrorist group responsible for the 9/11 attacks. Therefore, he cited alleged meetings between Iraqi officials and Al-Qaeda operatives as evidence of collaboration. Therefore, he concluded his speech by calling on the international community to take decisive action against Iraq where he argued that diplomacy and inspections had failed to disarm Iraq, and military intervention was necessary to eliminate the perceived threat ("Remarks".). According to the intelligence provided in Colin Powell's speech to the UN, the Iraqi regime was accused of:

a- Violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (Non-compliance with UN Resolutions).

b- The Concealment of WMD.

c- Links to Terrorism (Al-Qaeda).

While Colin Powell's speech did not directly initiate the invasion of Iraq, which commenced in March, it played a crucial role in justifying the military action to the American public and providing a certain level of legitimacy within the international community. Despite the United Nations maintaining the position that the invasion was illegal, the Bush administration and allied governments, such as Tony Blair's administration in Britain, believed that Powell's speech effectively fulfilled the objective of presenting a compelling argument for the war ("Secretary", par.7).

In a nutshell, the U.S. administration had built the case for war especially in convincing the UN members and the public community opinions. The speech succeeded to draw the features of a near invasion and, to mobilize the support of international government.

1.7 The Alliance in the Invasion: Coalition of the Willing:

The military alliance adopted was known as the "Coalition of the Willing". The White House announced in 2003 that the coalition had contained 49 countries at that time. Those countries deployed their armed forces to participate in combat operations, offered intelligence sharing and analysis to aid in planning and executing military actions, provided a logistical assistance, facilitated the movement of military assets including aircraft and transport supplies besides, provide expertise (specialized teams) in dealing with hazardous materials including biological and chemical weapons (National Archives). In other words, the Coalition approach aimed to distribute the responsibilities and costs of the war among multiple nations, while also reaping the advantages of multilateralism (Zarefsky 277).

The State department's roster of endorsers included: Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan. Additionally, there were five Arab nations involved; however, they asserted their opposition to launching an offensive against Iraq and instead focused solely on safeguarding Kuwait's defense (MacAskill, par. 6-7). Spain, known for being among the most vocal advocated of military intervention, officially announced that it would not deploy troops. Japan had limited its support to the reconstruction efforts that would take place after Saddam Hussein's regime. Meanwhile, Turkey had been counted among the "coalition" members, despite the fact that it had not confirmed its cooperation (MacAskill, par. 9-10-11).

In this Context, Daniel F. Baltrusaitis highlights the vital role that some nations made. Notably, the United Kingdom provided a considerable portion of its military capabilities to the coalition effort, due to the political scene it created from the beginning as a supporter for the invasion (10).

1.7.1 The British Alliance

During the Labor Party Conference in October 2001, Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister delivered a speech with the objective of alleviating the concerns of specific factions within the Labor Party who had doubts about the foreign policy direction of the United States following the 9/11 attacks. Blair sought to assure the conference delegates that the U.S. government was committed to collaborating with the international community in combating terrorism. He emphasized that the United States aimed to foster a progressive global environment ("Tony Blair Address at the Labor Party Conference"). Through this perspective, the British Prime Minister showed a complete support of the American foreign policy in opposing the danger of terrorism, globally. Blair had exposed his attention for a US-UK collaboration against terrorists' groups attempting to convince his administration staff about its necessity.

Starting from this context, the features of British initiative in the invasion of Iraq had been manifested after the 9/11 attacks on the US territory, especially that the United Kingdom is considered as a key partner for the US and together represented traditional allies in the region. According to the Royal Signals Museum, 46,000 British soldiers invaded Iraq on March 20, 2003, with 150,000 soldiers from the US force and smaller contingents from Australia and Poland. Operation Telic was the code name for Britain's involvement in the invasion and subsequent assistance of Iraq following Saddam Hussein's overthrow ("Royal Signals Museum", par. 1).

When taking the British policy makers' statements regarding the war, one cannot neglect the active participation of Blair in the invasion. Tony Blair in his speech where he addressed the House of Commons on March 18, 2003,had outlined the evidence against Saddam Hussein's regime and expressed the UK's commitment to supporting the United States in enforcing United Nations resolutions, stating that: "I have never put the justification for action as regime change, we have to act within the terms set out in resolution 1441 that is our legal base" ("The Iraq War: Tony Blair's Speech 10 Years Later," 0:13 - 0:21). Blair announced that the British role in the invasion of Iraq would be based on a legal ground which is the Resolution 1441.

To make his case for war, Blair added: "in this dilemma no choice is perfect no choice is ideal but, on this decision, hangs the fate of many things of whether we summon the strength to recognize the global challenge of the 21st century and meet it, of the Iraqi people groaning under years of dictatorship" ("The Iraq War: Tony Blair's Speech 10 Years Later," 4:21 – 4:39).

This passage from the British Prime Minister's speech conveyed the belief that the Iraqi dictatorship regime portrayed a global challenge of the 21st and a threat for its population and for the nations of the world. He outlined the evidence against Saddam Hussein's regime and expressed the UK's commitment to supporting the United States in enforcing United Nations resolutions.

James Strong in his investigations on Tony Blair's public statements and speeches regarding the Iraq file, declares that Blair's attempts were undertaken to establish the legitimacy of the Iraq invasion in the perspective of the British public, first and to guarantee a national endorsement of military operations (1-2).

Both the United States and the United Kingdom had built the case to undertake a joint military operation to invade Iraq. The publicly stated objective behind this military

intervention was twofold: first, to eliminate any existing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that were believed to be in Iraq's possession, and second, to liberate the Iraqi people from the oppressive regime led by Saddam Hussein. It is important to note that this decision to invade was not taken lightly but followed a lengthy period of diplomacy and United Nations weapons inspections (Featherstone, par. 2). In general, the initial spark has illuminated the imperative to initiate the military operation with utmost expediency.

1.8 The "Operation Iraqi Freedom"

The situation reached its peak on 19 March 2003. It started with deep ramifications to reflect the American foreign policy choices. From Washington, on 19 March 2003. Bush was addressing "The Nation on Military Operations in Iraq":

> My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger. On my orders, coalition forces have begun striking selected targets of military importance to undermine Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war. These are opening stages of what will be a broad and concerted campaign. More than 35 countries are giving crucial support from the use of naval and air bases, to help with intelligence and logistics, to the deployment of combat units. Every nation in this coalition has chosen to bear the duty and share the honor of serving in our common defense ("Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush" 175).

Clearly, Bush conducted a media coverage to announce the military intervention in Iraq guided by the U.S. forces, portrayed the coalition of more than 35 countries and a condensed support for the war to topple Saddam Hussein's regime.

As an advance assessment of the situation, planning was effective in producing a quick and decisive defeat of Iraqi military forces to launch the operation salvo of "Operation

Iraqi Freedom". Their target was a bunker believed to be sheltering the top leaders of the Iraqi regime in Baghdad. During the first two days, the military alliance drove a "Shock and Awe" air campaign. Shortly after, the force implementation took place in different parts of Iraq, initiated with U.S. Army divisions; one maritime division, British division; until its surrender to coalition troops. Hence, it announced the victory of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln battleship on May 1, 2003(Parraguez and Rodriguez 88-89).

Bush declared "mission accomplished" in his transcript addressing the battle leaders on May 1, 2003:

> Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed [….] The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September 11, 2001[….] The liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We've removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding. And this much is certain: No terrorist network will gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime, because the regime is no more ("President Bush", par. 1-14).

The speech, delivered within a span of two months following the commencement of U.S. military operations in Iraq, has gained notoriety under the phrase of "Mission Accomplished." As Bush claimed, the invasion of Iraq was getting rid of a major part of the war on terror. Furthermore, the coalition forces succeeded on the elimination of the major sponsor of terrorism.

1.9 Conclusion

This chapter provides an introduction to the topic and an overview of the US-Iraqi relations. It examines the period from 1990 to 2001 and the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the United States in addition to the American responses to the attacks, including the declaration of the War on Terror and the identification of Iraq as part of the "Axis of Evil." Furthermore, it discusses the National Security Strategy of 2002 and its components such as the Bush

Doctrine, promoting democracy in Iraq, and the concept of preemptive war. It also analyzes the case for war, including Colin Powell's speech at the United Nations, and looks at the formation of the Coalition of the Willing with a focus on Britain's role. The chapter concludes by setting the stage for further exploration of the complexities and hidden motives behind the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It recapitulates a preface to a shift in the policy adopted by Bush administration, far from the 9/11 ground and the frame it guaranteed to create a legitimate military intervention in Iraq. This chapter opens the door to another part that seeks the uncover of a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the invasion, highlighting the multifaceted nature of geopolitical actions and the complexities of the Iraq 2003 case.

CHAPTER TWO

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2.1 Introduction

The second chapter delves into what is behind the curtains, it exposes the fact that the American declared policies were a superficial justification that had nothing to do with the real motives. Besides, the story was not built only on the case of the 9/11 attacks' base for their connecting threads as the U.S. administration had assumed.However, the U.S. policy makers were outlining what is beyond the 9/11 attacks to strengthen their arguments. Far from the acts taken, the strategies adopted to reflect how the invasion was conducted on a logical ground, the aim of those facts were far-off the real case. Through this chapter the image will be clearly reflected through the veritable mirror of the invasion, regarding the main intentions, what was behind Powell's speech and the political objectives behind the British alliance.

2.2 Hidden Motives

While the official justifications for the invasion centered around concerns about weapons of mass destruction and the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime to establish a democratic Iraq, the revealed documents and studied reports that had been enlightened in the aftermath of the invasion have delved deeper into the hidden motives that may have influenced this military intervention. This part of the chapter aims to explore three underlying factors or motivations that went beyond the publicly stated reasons, enlightening the complex web of geopolitical, strategic, economic interests that may have played a role in the decision to invade Iraq. By scanning these hidden motives, one can gain a more comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted nature of the Iraq War far from the 9/11 attacks and even before it happened.

2.2.1 Israel Interests

Israeli interests in the war were multi-faceted and influenced by notable factors, in which it played a prominent role in the pre-war period as a motive behind the curtain that reflected in the first line, a political determination of the policy scene at that time.

2.2.1.1 US Neo-conservatives and Israeli Likud Government

Neoconservatism is a nationalist ideology that originated in the 1990s, rooted in the history of American exceptionalism[9], that advocates for aggressive assertions of U.S. political and military power in strategic areas in order to promote democracy and liberalism (Dunn, par. 3). Through shedding the light on American political groups that support the invasion of Iraq. One cannot neglect the neoconservatism extant in the Bush administrative decisions regarding the American foreign policy arena. The neoconservatives were leading the White House to a reformulation that touched the American foreign policy spectrum. This reformulation basis had considered the 9/11 attacks as a new direction for the Iraqi-American relations that ended with an atrocious intervention. Therefore, it resulted a neoconservative command on the Bush doctrine. "The neoconservative vision of American foreign policy provided the theoretical and policy content of the Bush Doctrine, which in turn underpinned the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and depose the leadership of Saddam Hussein (Schmidt and Williams 194)".

There has been ongoing discussion about the neo-conservatives within the Bush administration and their ties to Israel. Bill and Kathleen Christison, enlighten the notion in their article entitled "Bush Dual Loyalties" where they mention the recent revelations that have shed light on the fact that removing Iraq's leader and addressing its weapons arsenal had been a long-standing goal among neo-conservatives even before the Bush administration. However, the connection between this objective and the neo-conservatives' desire to enhance Israel's security has not been extensively discussed. Bill and Kathleen Christison believe that after examining the people who were active in policymaking during the Bush administration, the investigations resulted a pro-Israel activists' presence.

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[9]. American exceptionalism: idea that the United States of America is a unique and even morally superior country for historical, ideological, or religious reasons ("American exceptionalism", par. 1).

According to Joel Beinin, those American Israeli involvements did not initiate its activities till Bush administration however, it had emanated from the pro-Israel politics group known as American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) in 1963 which performed first and foremost the guarantee of the Israel's enhancement in the Middle East region as a replacement of the US military power. Furthermore, Beinin clears up the existence of another influential pro-Israel American think tank[10] so-called Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP) in 1985. The latter sought to promote the US-Israeli coalition through the aid of media tools and the impact on the White House decisions (pars. 4-5). Briefly, these prominent organizations were among the political groupings which had been actively engaged in lobbying efforts, mobilizing grassroots support, and building relationships with policymakers. Over the years, the pro-Israel lobby[11] had maintained a significant presence in Washington, D.C., and had been successful in shaping US foreign policy towards Israel. Its influence can be seen in areas such as military aid, diplomatic support, and the US stance on issues related to Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Neoconservative policies have mostly been developed and put into effect with Israel's security and interests in mind. Many observers believed that the neoconservatives' agenda is largely motivated by Zionist interests, putting the welfare of Israel as a key target and, resulting an Israeli influence on them (Charaoui and Naoui 12).

Back to the point where one cannot dismiss the fact that the policy hawks of Bush administration including the Vice President Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, the Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Douglas Feith, Undersecretary for Defense and others; were the key shapers of the White House decisions. These

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[10]. Think tank: think tank, institute, corporation, or group organized for interdisciplinary research with the objective of providing advice on a diverse range of policy issues and products through the use of specialized knowledge and the activation of networks (think tank, par. 1).

[11]. Pro-Israel lobby: one of, if not the most, powerful international issue lobby is that of the pro-Israel crowd. Well-financed and politically powerful, the pro-Israel lobby is a major force on American foreign affairs that looks to continue America's military and fiscal support of the Jewish nation-state (Pro-Israel, par. 1).

individuals, among others, were often identified as proponents of a more assertive U.S. foreign policy and were influential in shaping the administration's stance on the Iraq War 2003, conducting a neo-conservative agenda.

Commentators like Pat Buchanan confirms the conviction that this political grouping wants to employ American military action to protect Israel. According to this perspective, the war in Iraq was the entire result of Israel's influence and alliance with specific American political groups (qtd. in Waxman 3). Prior to the first WMD inspections in Iraq and well before September 11, this group of neo-conservatives including influential officials and experts in Washington advocated for the removal of the Iraqi government where they were seeking a pre-war planning through their links with the Likud government. The latter represented a right wing Israeli political party that was calling for a clean break to open the door to a new policy adopted by the Israeli government at that time.

2.2.1.2 A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm (1996)

The Clean Break strategy, officially titled " Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm," is a policy document that emerged in 1996, prepared by a Washington study group led by Richard Perle, the United States Assistant Secretary of Defense for the new elected Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This groundbreaking document outlined a fresh approach to addressing Israel's security challenges in the Middle East, emphasizing the promotion of Western values and advocating for a more assertive stance in regional affairs. The document has been utilized to present questionable evidence suggesting that Israel or Zionists played a significant role in provoking the United States' involvement in the Iraq War through aggressive new policy to topple Saddam Hussein ("A Clean Break").

Dan Sanchez in his article "Clean Break to Dirty Wars" claims that: "A Clean Break" slated Saddam Hussein's Iraq as first step for regime change. This is highly significant, especially since several members of the Clean Break study group played decisive roles in

steering and deceiving the United States into invading Iraq and overthrowing Saddam seven years later" (par. 10).

In light of this statement, the US Neo-conservative's membership played a significant role in the development of the document. Several individuals associated with the neo-conservative movement, including Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and, David Wurmser, Middle East Adviser to former US Vice President Dick Cheney; were members of the study group that authored the document.

This connection within the study group believed in a more assertive and proactive approach to security, emphasizing the use of military force and regime change to reshape the Middle East. They saw the removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq as means to advance Israeli security interests and enhance regional stability. As Beinin claims, the engaging in a preemptive war against Iraq would establish the principle of using military force to address Israel's diplomatic and political challenges in the region (par. 14).

Kathleen and Bill Christison state that even as early as 1996, the "Clean Break" document advocated for containing the threat against Israel by forming close alliances with Turkey and Jordan. The authors of this political document saw Iraq and Syria as the primary threats to Israel's security. They recommended focusing on the removal of Saddam Hussein as a means to simultaneously undermine Syria's regional ambitions. Interestingly, the blueprint discussed Israel's interest in overthrowing the Iraqi leadership and replacing it with a more compliant monarchy. The blueprint referred to Saddam Hussein's removal as "an important Israeli strategic objective" and acknowledged that Iraq's future had the potential to significantly impact the strategic balance in the Middle East, ultimately granting Israel dominant influence in the region. Consequently, the authors encouraged Israel to support the Hashemite dynasty's restoration in Iraq in order to eradicate the existence of a powerful regime adversary (par. 21).

Sanchez through his analysis of the Iraq factor in the document realizes that the policy advocated involves giving up on the goal of an all-encompassing peace with Israel's neighbors in favor of a selective peace with certain of them, including Jordan and Turkey. He adds that the strategic paper promoted maintaining a steadfast antagonism toward neighboring nations including Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Israel would achieve a favorable balance of power in the area by making use of the assistance of its strategic allies. With this edge, Israel would be able to utilize secretly controlled "proxy armies"[12] and preemptive strikes to bring about the destruction of its strategic rivals. Sanchez comes to the conclusion that the ultimate objective was to redraw the Middle Eastern map, enabling Israel to influence the local environment and defeat rather than just contain its opponents.

Apparently, by weakening and restricting Syria; Israel, Turkey, and Jordan want to reshape their strategic environment. Their plan calls for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, which is consistent with Israel's own geopolitical goals. The regional goals of Syria would be hampered by this action. Jordan has sparked a competition with Syria by supporting the return of the Hashemites in Iraq, undermining Syria's ambitions. Syria had stepped up its attempts to undermine the Hashemite Kingdom in retaliation, including via infiltrating. Syria and Iran have hinted that they would favor a weakened Saddam Hussein in order to thwart and degrade Jordan's efforts to get him removed.

Brian Whitaker claims that the "Clean Break" document proposed that once Saddam Hussein would be removed and Iraq came under the influence of the Jordanian Hashemite monarchy, Jordan and Turkey, along with Israel, would form an alliance to weaken and diminish the power of Syria. He utters that the strategy suggested that Jordan could address the situation in Lebanon by distancing the Shia Muslim population from Syria and Iran and re-establishing their connections with the Shia in the new Hashemite kingdom of Iraq.

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[12]. Proxy armies: Direct or indirect use of non-state and parastate groups to carry out militarized intimidation or control territory to exert influence or achieve specific security or political outcomes ("Proxy Forces").

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Whitaker adds up that the ultimate aim, as stated in the paper, was for Israel not only to contain its adversaries but also to surpass and overcome them (par. 14).

Sukumar Muralidharan clears up the context of the "Clean Break" where he states the fact that the blueprint provided by the neoconservatives to the Israeli government reflected the ambition to design the slogan "The New Middle East" through adopting a new peace agenda as a strategy. Through alluding to the document essence regarding the Iraq case, Muralidharan determines that the approach was crystal clear. While Syria is indeed identified as a significant target, a new tactic as opposed to a direct frontal attack, was suggested by this strategy. He raises the fact that Israel was instructed in the memo to undertake a flanking maneuver by concentrating on Iraq. According to Muralidharan, this strategy was intended to establish a "natural axis" connecting Israel, central Iraq, Turkey, and Jordan. With Jordan at its heart, this axis would put pressure on Syria and possibly cut it off from the Saudi peninsula. It was thought that through compromising Syria's geographical integrity, its capabilities could be diminished (4519).

The Clean Break strategy advocated for a shift in Israel's approach to achieving peace in the region. Instead of pursuing peace with all neighboring countries, the strategy proposed selective peace agreements with certain neighbors like Jordan and Turkey, while adopting a confrontational stance towards Iraq, Syria, and Iran. By leveraging strategic alliances and covertly supporting proxy forces, Israel aimed to gain an advantage over its adversaries and preemptively topple their regimes. The strategy envisioned reshaping the Middle East's geopolitical landscape to favor Israel, allowing it to not only contain but surpass its foes, thereby shaping the regional environment in its favor (Sanchez, par. 5).

It is clear that Israel's security concerns and its relationship with the United States have had an impact on policy discussions and decisions regarding Iraq as it illustrated through the "Clean Break" document. Understanding the complexities of this relationship is

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essential for a comprehensive analysis of the U.S. decision to invade Iraq and its broader implications for the Middle East.

2.2.2 PNAC and the Revival of Defense Planning Guidance 1992

The Project for the New American Century played a vital role in the pre-war planning as an unrevealed motive according to the blueprint it tackled in the strategic documents of the US policy, that goes hand in hand with the political scene of the invasion.

2.2.2.1 PNAC

Many are unaware that certain high-ranking officials within the Bush administration were actively engaged in efforts to bring about a change of regime in Iraq long before terrorism became a major concern for the United States. In 1997, a new wave of neo-conservatives' foreign policy had established an organization called the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) with the aim of bolstering American influence in the world and particularly, the Middle East arena. The group had narrowed its focus on ousting Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq. (Stockbauer par. 2). And, during the Clinton era, the PNAC played a significant role in shaping the discourse on Iraq.

In 1998, key members of the PNAC, including Armitage, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Cheney, sent a letter to President Clinton. The letter expressed their belief that the policy of containing Saddam Hussein was gradually weakening, posing a threat to the world's oil supply. The PNAC members argued that the only viable strategy was to remove Saddam Hussein from power. This influential letter laid the groundwork for subsequent developments. Approximately ten months later, Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998, which declared the United States' policy of supporting efforts to remove Saddam Hussein's regime. This act was directly influenced by the sentiments expressed in the PNAC letter. Shortly thereafter, President Clinton officially adopted regime change as the policy of his administration. This sequence of events illustrated the impact of the PNAC's perspectives

and recommendations on U.S. foreign policy regarding Iraq during the Clinton era (Steve 195).

Prominent figures within PNAC held influential positions in the Bush administration, as cabinet member and close advisors. Among them were Vice-President Dick Cheney, accompanied by his esteemed National Security Aide, I. Lewis Libby, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz in addition to Eliot Abrams, a distinguished member of the National Security Council, and John Bolton, the Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, further strengthened the PNAC's presence within policy circles. Richard Perle, former Chairman of the Defense Policy Board, added to the group's significance. Besides these individuals, other influential PNAC members included Randy Scheunemann, the President of the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, Bruce Jackson, a respected leader within the Republican Party, and William Kristol, the current PNAC chairman and acclaimed conservative writer for the "Weekly Standard" political magazine. Notably, Jeb Bush, the president's brother and then Governor of Florida, was also counted among the ranks of PNAC (Stockbauer par. 4).

After they started their theoretical framework during Clinton administration, the majority of the PNAC group commenced their efficient plans calling for "the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from power and a shift toward a more assertive U.S. policy in the Middle East, including the use of force if necessary to unseat Saddam (ABC News)".

Altheide and Grimes find that the PNAC played a significant role in shaping and managing information for a compliant U.S. press, particularly in relation to its claims about Iraq. Importantly, it was not widely known that a small group of influential officials had been actively working to change foreign policy, with a specific focus on targeting Iraq, for nearly a decade. The evolving landscape of commercial journalism and the competitive nature of war coverage over the past two decades have contributed to the PNAC's ability to guide news

content. However, these changes have received limited critical scrutiny, resulting in minimal news attention being paid to the PNAC's actions and their implications (620).

2.2.2.2 The Defense Planning Guidance 1992

A 1992 draft classified document known as Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), authored by I. Lewis Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, and Zalmay Khalilzad, former Defense Department staffers, is widely recognized as an early articulation of the neoconservative agenda following the end of the Cold War. The DPG outlined a set of economic and military objectives aimed at establishing and maintaining a unipolar global system led by the United States (1992 Draft Defense Planning Guidance). The document was leaked from a Pentagon insider who believed that such a conspicuously imperialistic vision should be subject to public discourse, generated a significant outcry. In response, then-national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State James Baker exerted pressure to significantly moderate the content of the DPG before its official release a month later (Lobe par. 7).

Although it was rejected during Clinton's, the DPG did not completely vanish following its rejection by the White House. According to Mann, the revised and final version of the document, overseen by Libby, softened certain aspects of the earlier draft while preserving key concepts. These included actively shaping the security environment, unilateral action when necessary, and maintaining military superiority. Over the subsequent decade, many of the ideas originally presented in the draft DPG resurfaced multiple times, contributing to the establishment of a broad framework that solidified the neoconservative consensus. Ultimately, this consensus found its most prominent expression in President George W. Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy (209-215). Despite facing criticism when it was first revealed, many of the ideas put forth in the document have endured, and their influence became particularly pronounced in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent "war on terror" (1992 Draft Defense Planning Guidance).

2.2.2.3 Rebuilding America's Defenses 2000 and the Revival of DPG

In September 2000, PNAC published Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century. A 79 pages' report meant to serve as a guide for the next U.S. president in shaping the country's security strategies. Authored principally by Thomas Donnelly of the American Enterprise Institute, with Donald Kagan and Gary Schmitt serving as chairmen of the study group that produced the report. Rebuilding America's Defenses claimed that its principal source of inspiration was the 1992 draft DPG (1992 Draft Defense Planning Guidance).

The four Core Missions cited in the report, had established to be involved in U.S. military forces plans. First and foremost, to protect the United States from attacks, succeed in multiple major wars simultaneously, fulfill peacekeeping responsibilities to maintain security in important regions, and finally to adapt the U.S. military to leverage advancements in the "revolution in military affairs"("The Project for the New American Century").

Through this context, the fact realized is that the report's framework had found a way when Bush adopted policies that had taken those principles to establish a new doctrine which called to a preemptive defense posture in the after-math of 9/11 pretext. Therefore, this event had reflected a cornerstone in the resurgence of such report. Michael Meacher in his article "This War on Terrorism is Bogus" claims:

> The PNAC blueprint of September 2000 states that the process of transforming the US into "tomorrow's dominant force" is likely to be a long one in the absence of "some catastrophic and catalyzing event - like a new Pearl Harbor". The 9/11 attacks allowed the US to press the "go" button for a strategy in accordance with the PNAC agenda which it would otherwise have been politically impossible to implement (par. 17).

Put simply, these statements had asserted that the PNAC was drafting a pre-war scheme which had been achieved after the 9/11 attacks. Due to the presence of members of

the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) within the Bush administration and the perceived need to adopt a proactive approach, which aligned with the nature of neoconservatism, the foreign policy concepted of neoconservatives gained significant influence over both the Bush administration and the broader U.S. government in the political landscape following the events of 9/11 to achieve it after 10 years of planning (Dunn, par. 6).

Altogether, the PNAC organization was a catalyst for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. While they designed a work ground for the war through an earlier agenda, their existence came to no surprise that they had a powerful influence on Bush's decision to topple Saddam Hussein.

2.2.3 A War for Oil

Critics argue that the pursuit of oil has played a significant role in shaping foreign policies and military interventions, particularly in regions rich in oil reserves. They point to examples such as the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991, where Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was seen by some as an attempt to control Kuwait's substantial oil reserves. The subsequent military response by a U.S.-led coalition was seen by critics as an effort to protect oil interests.

2.2.3.1 Oil as a Factor

The Middle East plays a vital role in the overall picture of the political scene due to the potential consequences if a regional power (Iraq) were to gain greater dominance in the region and consolidate control over the Arabian Gulf[13] oil reserves. Such control would allow this power to undermine the influence of the United States in the area, thereby posing a significant threat to the U.S. economy. Given that the US relies on foreign oil for more than 62% of its consumption, any adverse disruption or substantial increase in oil prices resulting

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[13]. The Arabian Gulf: is the body of water bordering Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman […] The Persian Gulf region produces nearly one third of the world's oil and holds over half of the world's crude oil reserves as well as a significant portion of the world's natural gas reserves ("About the Persian/Arabian Gulf". Par. 1-2).

from this dominance could have severe ramifications, potentially destabilizing the U.S. economy (McHargue 117).

For the past 24 years, the United States has maintained a clear policy regarding the security of global oil supplies, commonly known as the "Carter Doctrine." The doctrine was articulated by the president Jimmy Carter in 1980, where he stated that "any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault in the vital interest of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary including military force" (qtd in. Boadua 89).

According to J. Harding in his book *After Iraq War, Imperialism and Democracy*, this phrase implied that there was a perception that the United States had long had a desire to assert control over oil-producing regions in the Middle East. It implied that in order to gain access to oil resources, the U.S. had made obligations, including a willingness to go to war. In this regard, Saddam Hussein was seen as a key element that gave the United States a tactical opening to exert influence in the Middle East oil-producing region after his invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (Ibid).

The American approach cited in Carter doctrine was mainly based on military invasion against Iraq to protect the U.S. interests in the region regarding oil factor however, at the same time it had the endeavor to take control over the Iraqi reserves. Noam Chomsky states that if the United States could retain its authority over Iraq, which held at that time the world's second-largest confirmed oil reserves and occupies a central position in global energy resources, it would substantially bolster its strategic power and exert greater influence over its major competitors worldwide (qtd. In Boadua 90). Therefore, Bush administration did not hesitate to confirm this belief through its energy plans.

2.2.3.2 Cheney Energy Task Force

Prior to Bush presidency, the United States encountered significant scarcities in oil and natural gas across various regions, accompanied by intermittent power outages in California. Furthermore, the country witnessed a historic surge in oil imports, thereby arousing deep concerns regarding the nation's future energy security. President Bush emphasized that tackling the prevailing "energy crisis" stood as his utmost priority (Klare, par. 1).

Cheney Energy Task Force had been founded in the light of this energy turmoil, shortly after the inauguration of President George W. Bush when he ordered the creation of the National Energy Policy Development Group, which is the official noun of the "Cheney Energy Task Force", chaired by Bush closest political advisor, Vice President Dick Cheney. Its purpose sought to develop a national energy policy aiming at fostering collaboration between business, government, local communities, and citizens to enhance the private sector ("Global Energy Monitor").

In the initial months of 2001, the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG) examined a report commonly referred to as the "Cheney Report," which was publicly released on May 17. The report put forth a recommendation to expand oil extraction in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge[14] (ANWR) as a means to enhance domestic oil production. The proposal sparked significant controversy within the United States due to concerns over its potential adverse impact on the environment. Nevertheless, proponents of the plan, including the White House, argued that it exemplified the administration's commitment to achieving energy independence (Klare 4). Through the examination of the report's chapter entitled "Strengthening Global Alliance", a different conclusion had been

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[14]. The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge: Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, vast natural area occupying the northeastern corner of the U.S. state of Alaska. It was established in 1960 as Arctic National Wildlife Range with an area of approximately 13,900 square miles (36,000 square km) and was expanded and renamed Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in 1980 (Pletcher, par. 1).

raised. The chapter underscored the critical role of the Middle East in maintaining global oil security. It advocated for endorsing the efforts of oil-producing in the region to encourage foreign investment in their energy sectors. Accordingly, Cheney plan appeared to have a basic goal which sought to find additional external sources of oil for the United States (Hebert, par. 8).

In the light of this report, Cheney maintained a veil of secrecy around his energy task force meetings starting from its establishment in 2001, and declined to provide pertinent transcripts to the Government Accountability Office[15] (GAO) of Congress. This refusal was justified by a baseless and entirely cynical assertion that subjecting White House documents to public scrutiny would undermine the autonomy of the executive branch. While it had been widely speculated, without concrete evidence, that the task force's policy proposals many of which later materialized into legislation were influenced or even drafted by major oil companies, environmentalist organizations and other interested parties were excluded from participation, leading to protests (Eley, par. 8).

Due to these events, the Sierra Club, an environmentalist organization, and the right-wing conservative legal group Judicial Watch pursued a joint lawsuit, initiated in 2001, claiming that Cheney had engaged in inappropriate communication with the oil industry while formulating the reports of the energy task force. The lawsuit aimed to obtain the release of the records and eventually reached the Supreme Court. On June 24, 2004, the Supreme Court overturned a previous ruling by a lower court that had mandated Cheney to disclose the records (Ibid., par. 9).

As a result, the Judicial Watch gained access to Commerce Department in 2003 papers that contained the task force's plans. These documents suggested that Vice President

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[15]. GAO: The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is an independent and legislative agency that monitors and audits government spending and operations […] established in 1921, GAO is also often called the congressional watchdog. It is a non-partisan agency that helps the government find efficiencies in spending, which is why it is said to work for Congress (Hayes, par. 1).

Dick Cheney's energy task force displayed some level of curiosity about Iraq's oil industry in the early months of 2001 (Hebert, par. 1).

Among the materials revealed on July 18, 2003, were a comprehensive map outlining "Iraqi Oilfields and Exploration Blocks" contained the oil reserves and exploration zones in Iraq, along with a list titled "Foreign Suitors of Iraqi Oilfield Contracts". The latter contained a full list of businesses from 30 different nations, including France, Germany, Russia, and Britain companies expressing interest in pursuing oil contracts in Iraq (Eley, par. 13).

While the apparent purpose behind the establishment of Cheney Energy Task Force was to focus on providing the assistance of the national energy policy, only one hypothesis could be raised about the existence of the documents of the Iraqi oil fields and contracts in the framework of the group. Accordingly, the White House dynamics and the refusal to expose the meetings' documents had determined a prior policy to dominate the Iraqi oil which reflected a design to a near invasion built on imperial ambitions through sharing the Iraqi oil resources between the American oil companies.

According to the former American Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill[16], Dick Cheney pushed for U.S. involvement in Iraq even before the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. O'Neill supported his claim with a confidential National Security Council document from February 3, 2001, which was recently revealed. The document, authored by a senior N.S.C. official, focused on Cheney established Energy Task Force. It instructed the N.S.C. staff to fully cooperate with the task force as it explored the combination of two seemingly unrelated policy areas: the evaluation of strategies towards countries like Iraq labeled as rogue states, and actions related to securing both new and existing oil and gas fields (Mutter, par. 7).

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[16]. Paul O'Neill: Paul O'Neill, a former U.S. Treasury secretary and Alcoa chief executive, died Saturday, April 18, 2020 […] In his 2004 memoir, "The Price of Loyalty," which was written by Pulitzer prize-winning journalist Ron Suskind, Mr. O'Neill said President Bush led cabinet meetings "like a blind man in a roomful of deaf people. There is no discernible connection" ("Paul O'Neill Obituary", par. 1-6).

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It is worthy to note in this case that the U.S. government and U.S. oil monopolists such as Dick Cheney, moved to secure pieces of the pie before the onset of the dilemma they planned for. Therefore, these evidences had shaped their suspicious activities for the concealed plan for the exploitation of the Iraqi oil.

2.3 Deceptive Bases (Hidden Plannings)

Despite the fact that the first chapter exposes a surface justification for the invasion of Iraq without any mistrustful events or announcements, what came in the second chapter has surprisingly exhibited the Colin Powell speech falsification of intelligence and Blair's plan to join the alliance for the invasion far from combating terrorism, disposing from WMD or democratizing the Iraqi people. These two factors show how Colin Powell speech and Blair intention, had made the case for war on a trickery façade that had been veiled in the aftermath of the invasion.

2.3.1 Colin Powell Speech: A Case Built on Lies

The failure to find substantial evidence of WMDs in Iraq following the invasion led to accusations that the intelligence presented by Powell and other officials was faulty or intentionally manipulated to support a predetermined agenda.

2.3.1.1 Senate Report on Iraqi WMD Intelligence 2004

Formally, entitled "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq". The report is considered as a post-invasion investigation, produced after the Committee's analysts started the collection of the data shortly after the invasion, to be released on the 9th of July 2004 (Prados, par.2). Broadly, the report of 511 pages was collected to conduct a detailed review about the American Intelligence performance on the case of Iraq, concerning the possession of WMD and the programs of its development, the usage of those weapons against the Iraqi civilians in addition to the investigations on the fact that Saddam had posed a danger that could menace the peace and stability state in the area.

Chapter seven of the report had precisely analyzed the data given in Colin Powell speech to the UN in February, 2003. It discussed the reliability of details given on items concerning the Nuclear Programs, Biological Weapons, Chemical Weapons and Delivery Systems. At the end, it recapitulated the conclusions obtained from the analysis of the prior intelligence products compared with the announcement of the Secretary Colin Powell. The US Senate Committee Report highlighted several issues regarding Powell's speech which led to a set of concluding points concerning the reasons behind the invasion.

Nuclear Programs

Glenn Kessler states that the intelligence community believed that Iraq's efforts to acquire aluminum tubes were for the purpose of uranium enrichment to support a nuclear weapons program. However, it was later revealed that these tubes were likely intended for conventional artillery rockets, not nuclear purposes. The committee's investigation said that the intelligence community's assessment was inaccurate and contributed to the belief that Iraq was actively pursuing nuclear weapons.

In the same context, the statements provided in the report reflected the Committee conclusion which claimed that Powell information did not match the IC[17] (Intelligence Community) information about the Iraqi attempts to acquire procurements plant. While Powell declared that Iraqi's magnets used were the same weight (20-30 grams) as those which were used prior the Gulf War, the previous Intelligence Community products did not say the same. Besides, the Department of Energy confirmed that there was no known damper design with an alnico magnet weighing less than 60 grams (Roberts et al. 243). This analysis reflected the manipulation in the indicators provided to the public regarding the Nuclear Weapons' item.

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[17]. The Intelligence Community: The intelligence community comprises the many agencies and organizations responsible for intelligence gathering, analysis, and other activities that affect foreign policy and national security ("Intelligence Community", par. 1).

Biological Weapons

Powell provided information on intelligence analysis of the biological weapons program where he mentioned that a number of sources had been provided after the publication of the NIE of 2002 (Roberts et al. 243). The file of the Biological Weapons was 98 percent provided by the "Curveball" in addition to three others HUMINT[18]primary sources, including an Iraqi civil engineer, a person who known well about the Iraqi biological weapons according to his position and, the fourth source was an Iraqi Major. Those facts translated the lack of information about those witnesses. Although, the Curveball stated that Iraq had developed mobile laboratories capable of producing biological weapons, particularly biological agents like anthrax or botulinum toxin (Roberts et al. 246- 247).

Firstly, the Curveball is a code name of an Iraqi defector, Rafid Ahmed Alwan al-Janabi. He claimed to have firsthand knowledge of the program and provided detailed descriptions of the mobile laboratories. However, the report acknowledged the critical role he played and highlighted the failure to adequately vet and validate his claims. The report had provided a clear investigation about the Curveball claims, which clarified the absence of the credibility in the policymakers' decision.

According to the report, a Department of Defense detailee that worked as a technical advice to the CIA, had worried about the sources of these HUMINT in the speech after he read the Biological Weapon section of Powell's speech and after he met the Curve Ball. He sent an e-mail to the Deputy Chief of CIA's Iraqi Task Force a day before the speech had been delivered, stating that the intelligence community required additional investigations before using the Curve Ball as a pillar in the case. He added that the second source had provided paradox information that could not add any credibility in the speech and concerning the Iraqi Major, the detailee stated that his testimony was fabricated (Roberts et al. 247-248).

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[18]. HUMINT: Human Intelligence, refers to the collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information gathered from human sources, such as interviews and interrogations, to provide valuable insights into various matters of interest (Eller, par. 1).

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The peculiar thing noticed was that the Deputy chief had replied to the detailee saying that: "let's keep in mind the fact that this war's going to happen regardless of what Curve Ball said or didn't say". Furthermore, he added that he acknowledged the concerns raised by the detailee, but explained that the speech was already in an advanced stage, making it impractical to address those concerns at that particular moment (Roberts et al., 249-250).

Years after, the investigations had been confirmed later by the Curve Ball in one of his interviews with the Guardian Newspaper after the invasion. Therefore, it is stated that:

> Everything he had said about the inner workings of Saddam
> Hussein's biological weapons programme was a flight of fantasy
> - one that, he now claims was aimed at ousting the Iraqi dictator.
> Janabi, a chemical engineering graduate who had worked in the
> Iraqi industry, says he looked on in shock as Powell's
> presentation revealed that the Bush administration's hawkish
> decisionmakers had swallowed the lot (Chulov and Pidd, par. 4).

The Committee's report outcomes in addition to this declaration, had showed the lack of assertiveness of the data provided by Janabi and the absence of standards in collecting such data without taking into consideration the reliability of the information and the credibility of the informant which reflected the intelligence's serious errors regarding the Biological Weapon Program.

Chemical Weapons

The committee mentioned that some evidences provided in the speech concerning the chemical weapons were different from the previous Intelligence Community assessments despite the fact that most of the data had been obtained from the 2002 NIE. Powell claimed that the information was provided by the human sources where they confirmed the happening of the movement of the chemical munitions. However, the report showed a distinction between the happening and the imagery reporting provided by Powell during the speech (Roberts et al. 251-252-253). In a nutshell, the intelligence community (CIA) did not

adequately differentiate between Iraq's pre-1991 Gulf War chemical weapons stockpiles, which were largely destroyed or degraded, and active chemical weapons programs. This failure to make the distinction led to overestimations of Iraq's current capabilities.

Delivery Systems

Concerning the Delivery Systems details provided in the speech had been highly compatible with the subsequent assessments. The analysis delivered comprised intelligence based on classified and unclassified products as the case of the White Paper[19](unclassified) and the NIE (classified) of October, 2002. (Roberts et al. 253).

The general conclusion concerning the Committee report asserted that most of the data provided form the Central Intelligence agency, was exaggerated, deficient and falsified (Ibid.). The reflection resulted through the report had exhibited the absence of solid sources in such fateful investigations revealed the illogical motives behind the military intervention and the lack of professional standards which led to a catastrophe in the economic Iraqi sector and a dilapidation state where thousands of civilians had died in vain. Ultimately, the Iraq violation of the UNSC Resolution 1441had been a propaganda that shaped the missed piece of the puzzle of the invasion's surface after the failure to find substantial evidence of WMDs in Iraq after the invasion

Terrorism Portion

The Report did not conduct an investigation on the WMD file only yet, it analyzed also the terrorism section provided in Powell's speech. Generally, the report stated that the terrorism portion of Secretary Powell's speech relied on thoroughly reviewed and analyzed information provided by the CIA's terrorism and regional analysts. Besides, the intelligence

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[19]. The White Paper: The Director of Central Intelligence released an unclassified version of the estimate, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs", in October 2002. Three aspects of this NIE merit particular attention: It was produced far more quickly than is normal for such documents; it went far beyond the consensus intelligence assessments of the preceding five years; and, it had more serious dissents to its key findings than any other declassified NIE. Importantly, the unclassified October version, presented to the public before the war, notes only that some "specialists" disagreed with the claim that Iraq was importing aluminum tubes for nuclear weapon production ("Iraq's WMD Capabilities", 16).

reporting presented in the speech was consistent with earlier assessments published by the CIA, indicating no major deviations. However, due to the lack of access to all working drafts of the speech, the committee was unable to ascertain whether any modifications or omissions were made before its delivery, especially that the Central Intelligence's Director did not permit to provide all the drafts which the speech was based on, which made the case somehow ambiguous (Ibid., 369-370).

Ultimately, these investigations' outcomes concerning the speech on the factors of WMD and Terrorism, had displayed a political pressure to take action against Iraq, driven by concerns over national security, the post-9/11 environment, and the desire to enforce United Nations resolutions. These pressures may have influenced the intelligence community's analysis and reporting.

The controversy surrounding the intelligence used to justify the invasion had raised important questions about the relationship between intelligence and policy, the accountability of intelligence agencies, and the ethical considerations of intelligence gathering and analysis. Prior to the war, the American administration was reading intelligence that was often vague, sometimes contradictory, rarely definitive as the case of Colin Powell speech.

2.3.1.2. Collin Powell speech: Politicization of Intelligence

A widespread consensus holds that the act of gathering intelligence is distinct from political judgments, and the link rests in the differences between the two. The essence of the intelligence community's duty is to acquire, evaluate, and analyze data in order to give credibility and dependability to other essential information that may aid US objectives. Therefore, policymakers' role may affect the topic to be delivered rather than the outcomes of the information obtained (Pillar 16).

However, in Colin Powell's speech to the UN Security Council, only one understanding could be noticed, which said:

Powell was exploited by the Bush White House for his credibility

among the world's diplomats and his reputation for caution, and

he was comprehensively misled. He was told for example that his

speech had been prepared by the national security council under

Condoleezza Rice, but it was actually written by Vice-President

Dick Cheney's office, which had led the charge in browbeating

CIA analysts into coming up with evidence and when that failed,

going around the CIA altogether (Borton, par. 11).

According to Borton's passage, Powell believed that the speech draft was prepared by

the NSC group led by Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. National Security Advisor. Yet, the speech

was written under the table. Dick Cheney, the American Vice and his office members sought

to manipulate the data provided by the CIA to be presented as an argument that strengthens

the American intention behind the invasion, to make the case for war. Clearly, this fact

implied that the speech that should perform a cooperation from the U.S. Intelligence

Community, had been presented as a policy speech rather than an intelligence report as the

US Senate Committee report investigations said.

Paul R. Pillar clarifies that the difference was not just muddled by the Bush

administration's exploitation of intelligence on Iraq. The administration employed

intelligence to support a judgment that had already been taken rather than helping in

providing a validity in the decision-making process. It apparently did not obtain or take into

account any strategic-level intelligence evaluations on any element of Iraq before going to

war. (17).

According to Bill McLaughlin's testimony regarding Powell's speech: "Once the case

was revised, after we got back to CIA, people worked on it again for another month and then

it was sent down to the White House for their review. Eventually, while it was at the White House, they had added in a whole additional section on terrorism." (qtd in. Malone, par. 10).

McLaughlin's claims reflected the U.S. policymakers link with the speech components. In other words, the Bush staff had fabricated other data to be added in the terrorism section of the speech to make sure that "building the case" process would be definitely successful in the eyes of the public and the UN particularly.

The disclaimers and opposing facts from US policy makers own intelligence agencies were what was troubling from all of their speeches and media appearances. The Intelligence Community failed to fulfill its core purpose effectively. Instead of providing accurate and reliable details, they made mistakes and lost the credibility of its process. This characterization implied that the Intelligence Community's failures were not isolated incidents but rather indicative of deeper problems within the organization.

Greg Thielmann, a former officer in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the U.S. State Department announces in one of his interviews that:

> They were cherry-picking the information that we provided, to use whatever pieces of it that fit their interpretation. And worse than that, they were dropping qualifiers and distorting some of the information that we provided to make it seem more alarmist and more dangerous than the information that we are giving them ("Truth, War and Consequences (full documentary)," 00: 30: 35 – 00: 00: 30: 54).

Through these words, one cannot neglect the "politicization" process practiced by the US policy makers concerning the intelligence community tasks. The post-9/11 climate of heightened security concerns and the desire to take decisive action against potential threats may have influenced the policy context within which intelligence assessments were made.

This process had touched a number of aftermath reports and investigations which had showed the fact that the intelligence cited in these speeches was later found to be flawed,

faulty and gave the complete priority to the US to build its apparent justifications in Iraq's agenda as the case of Powell 's speech and the post-invasion report "US Senate Committee Report of 2004". To drive home the point, the CIA and other members from political background sought to create a prelude to a faulty intelligence of a big Iraq speech.

As became clear, questionable US intelligence reports had been cherry-picked and elevated to support President George W Bush's propaganda drive to convince Americans that war against Iraq was necessary. Powell's UN speech was pivotal in swaying US public opinion (Robert, par. 16).

Overall, the case of Iraq; high officials in the Bush Administration accepted without critical examination the conclusions of the intelligence community that fit their policy preferences. However, they challenged, pressured, and bypassed the intelligence community when intelligence products did not fit their expectations. As a result, the flawed decision-making process, combined with misinterpretation of intelligence, led to a war based on mistaken premises (Edwards III and King 213).

2.3.2 Britain and the Pre-War Planning

Britain's role in pre-war planning, specifically leading up to the Iraq War in 2003, was significant. The British government, under Prime Minister Tony Blair, actively and indirectly supported and participated in the planning and preparation for the invasion alongside the United States.

2.3.2.1 Blair's Rush for War

Despite significant domestic and international opposition, Tony Blair's rapid alignment with the decision to invade Iraq and become a steadfast ally is a notable aspect of his political legacy. Exploring the factors that influenced Blair's decision and analyzing its consequences can provide valuable insights into the complexities of this political decision-making, and the enduring legacy of the Iraq war.

In this context, Nick Gass in his article, analyses the apparent image of the US-UK alliance saying that:

> Bush and Blair had discussed a potential invasion of Iraq dating back to at least early December 2001, when the two leaders spoke on the telephone. Removing Saddam from power, Blair said, "would be excellent," but there "needed to be a clever strategy for doing this." Blair reiterated later in the conversation that he was not opposed, but that "an extremely clever plan would be required."

The discussion provided by Gass, translated the British intention led by the Prime Minister Tony Blair to topple Saddam's regime and to be a proponent for Bush decision regarding the invasion.

The Chilcot report[20] had answered several questions that translated the British role in joining the invasion, built on set of verities that was vague in the pre-war planning. According to the report, the British intelligence community operated under the mistaken assumption that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) right from the beginning. They excluded the possibility that he had actually disposed of those weapons, which was indeed the case ("Chilcot report", par. 8). In other words, Blair prematurely relied on intelligence regarding Iraq's alleged possession of WMDs without thoroughly scrutinizing the evidence.

Another point that could clarify the British position in the invasion said that eight months before the Iraq invasion, Tony Blair wrote a confidential letter to George W. Bush, expressing his unconditional support for the war even before the completion of the UN weapons inspections in Iraq. In the letter, marked as secret and personal, the former British

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[20]. The Chilcot report: the Chilcot Report, the findings of a seven-year inquiry into Britain's role in the war (including the decision to go to war, whether troops had been adequately prepared, and planning for the war's aftermath). The inquiry was launched in 2009 by Prime Minister Brown and led by Sir John Chilcot, a career civil servant. Evidence was provided by about 150 witnesses including Blair, who testified twice and some 150,000 documents, among which were communications between Blair and Bush ("Life", par. 2).

Prime Minister assured the US President in July 2002 that he would stand by him "whatever" and stated that the removal of Saddam Hussein would have positive regional consequences, even if the Iraqi people may have mixed feelings about the invasion. This letter was one of 29 correspondences Blair sent to Bush throughout the pre-war period, the conflict itself, and its devastating aftermath, which were made public as part of the Chilcot report (Ibid., 4).

These key points from the inquiry report, had thrown the light on how Blair drafted his strategy and the different factors can be realized through the Blair's rush to go to war in Iraq. Firstly, Tony Blair decided to join the United States in invading Iraq because he believed it was in the best interest of the United Kingdom. He saw it as an extension of the strong relationship between the US and the UK, especially considering their collaboration in enforcing no-fly zones[21]in Iraq. Blair viewed the invasion as a way for the UK to maintain its role as America's closest ally when dealing with difficult global matters (Coates and Krieger 9). Besides, the British administration believed that if it didn't fully support the US on Iraq, it could harm important areas of collaboration between the two countries (Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors 51).

Concerning the British military involvement, the American and the British intentions were different in term of the goal behind the alliance. Pipe and Vickers claim that Bush cabinet members were not for a need of the British military assistance. However, the British troops would have played a political importance as being the cornerstone to make the invasion appear "lawful". In other words, the British support could add the legitimacy for the invasion where the US would not stand in alone position. On the other hand, Pipe and Vickers announced that Tony Blair was following the Bush choices in order to enhance the relationship between the traditional allies and to refresh the British position in the political

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[21]. No-fly zone: The Iraqi no-fly zones conflict was a low-level conflict in the two no-fly zones (NFZs) in Iraq that were proclaimed by the United States, United Kingdom, and France after the Gulf War of 1991. Iraqi aircraft were forbidden from flying inside the zones […] the policy was enforced by the United States and the United Kingdom until 2003, when it was rendered obsolete by the 2003 invasion of Iraq ("About: Iraqi No-fly zone conflict").

arena (208-207). The notion crystalized another factor which said that the British aim behind the invasion was to restore its political position in the new world order led by the US.

Blair's choice to align with the US in the Iraq War was influenced by past examples of UK Prime Ministers supporting US Presidents in military interventions. This included instances like Prime Minister Attlee's support during the Korean War and Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major standing with the US in the first Gulf War. Blair saw his decision to stand alongside the US in the Iraq War as following the historical pattern set by his predecessors (Coates and Krieger 9). Therefore, the right answer in this case is that Blair's decision-making process did not solely revolve around whether the UK should invade Iraq. Rather, the central question he faced was whether to provide support to President Bush, who had already made the decision to remove Saddam Hussein (Richards, par. 8). From this point, a high clarification could be noticed through different investigations on this process.

2.3.2.2 The Secret Downing Street Memo

The Downing Street Memo, also known as the July 23, 2002 memo or the Downing Street Minutes, holds a significant place in the history of the Iraq War after its revelation in May, 2005. As one of the most notable leaked government documents, it has sparked intense debate and scrutiny regarding the decision-making processes leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. It is a memorandum documenting a briefing provided to Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, approximately eight months prior to the Iraq invasion. At that time, the United States had already assumed control in Afghanistan, and CIA Director George Tenet had recently met with Richard Dearlove, his British counterpart, in Washington. Meanwhile, President Bush was intensifying his public statements regarding Saddam Hussein. This confidential memo, marked as secret and intended for exclusive UK access, outlined a meeting between Richard Dearlove, referred to as "C," and Prime Minister Blair (Shuster, par. 1-2).

CHAPTER TWO Revealed Motives and Plannings Behind the Invasion

At the outset of the memo Rycroft wrote that the intelligence being gathered to justify military action in Iraq was being "fixed" or manipulated to support the predetermined policy of invasion, rather than forming a policy based on an objective assessment of the available intelligence and facts. Yet, the memo noted the lack of a post-invasion plan where the U.S. officials appeared to have little or no detailed planning for the aftermath of the invasion and the potential challenges that would arise in stabilizing Iraq post-Saddam Hussein (Rycroft, par 2).

Furthermore, the US forces had emphasized on the necessity of the UK involvement throughout the use of its bases in Diego Garcia[22] and Cyprus[23], in addition to incorporating evaluations via sea and air, along with a potential involvement on land of approximately 40,000 troops, there could be a discreet engagement in Northern Iraq through Turkey. This operation would effectively engage and occupy two divisions of the Iraqi military. Therefore, these military options mentioned by American administration had shaped the UK's obligation to develop its participation in the invasion.

Another prominent point had enlightened the American earlier "spikes of activity" which was a reference pertaining to the escalated surveillance operations carried out by the United States and the United Kingdom in the no-fly zones over Iraq. The heightened frequency of attacks on Iraqi military facilities was initiated by Donald Rumsfeld, the American counterpart of Geoffrey Hoon, in May 2002. Notably, this occurred five months prior to Congress authorizing military action and six months before the United Nations adopted Resolution 1441.

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[22]. Diego Garcia: Diego Garcia, coral atoll, largest and southernmost member of the Chagos Archipelago, in the central Indian Ocean, part of the British Indian Ocean Territory. Occupying an area of 17 square miles (44 square km) […] Numerous air operations were launched from Diego Garcia during the Persian Gulf War (1990–91), U.S.-led strikes on Afghanistan (2001), and the initial phase (2003) of the Iraq War (Diego Garcia", par. 1-2).

[23]. Cyprus: Britain maintains a number of Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in Cyprus which include Akrotiri, Episkopi, Dhekelia and Ayios Nikolaos. These have remained under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom on the island of Cyprus since its independence in 1960 (Beckett, par. 3).

CHAPTER TWO   **Revealed Motives and Plannings Behind the Invasion**

Michael Smith, the Defense Correspondent of the London Sunday Times and the one who published the copy of the memo; sheds the light on the spikes of activity sayings that:

> The "spikes of activity" are another important point to come out of the Downing Street Memos that has largely been lost in subsequent reporting. Data released to the British parliament in response to written questions from MPs show a marked increase in the amount of bombs dropped on Iraq which began in May and reached a peak between September and December 2002[…] that allied aircraft flew 21,736 sorties dropping more than 600 bombs on 391 carefully selected targets before the war officially started in March 2003. The nine months of allied raids that preceded the ground war ensured that allied forces did not have to start the war with a protracted bombardment of Iraqi positions (5).

This clarification provided by Smith had revealed the readiness of the pre-war plans which made clear that both governments were taking the decision to start the war months before, where they commenced using their military powers.

Rycroft recorded that Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary claimed that even if the exact timing of the military action against Iraq was not yet established, it appeared that Bush had already made up his decision to do without the UN Security Council resolution authorization of the military action. Despite the fact that the case was weak and Saddam did not pose a danger to his neighbors, and his access to WMD was inferior to that of Iran, North Korea, or Libya, the US had already made up its mind to invade Iraq.

At a certain juncture in the memo, Tony Blair referred to a tricky plan that could provide a legal base to remove Saddam form power through the UN inspection process. Rycroft stated that Blair emphasized that if Saddam refused to permit UN inspectors, it would have significant political and legal implications. The connection between regime change and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was that the regime itself was responsible for producing those weapons. If the political conditions were favorable, people would back the

idea of regime change. The crucial factors were the effectiveness of the military plan and having a political strategy that allowed the military plan to succeed.

On the other hand, Lord Goldsmith, the UK government Attorney-General, showed his objection of the decision where he considered the rush to topple Saddam regime needed a solid ground. He also suggested three legal cornerstone motives. Either to utilize the self-defense base, reflecting a humanitarian intervention to protect the Iraqi civilians or seeking the authorization of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). However, those justifications were far from the outlined plan they drew.

Mark Danner in his book *The Secret Way to War* analyses the memo's points as it was considered as key evidence for the American British cooperation in the Iraq case. He claims that the memo displayed a political tactic that sought to lead the military action's rhythm to adopt a lawful path through the usage of the United Nations inspectors' motive as a legal base. Blair government had called for another UN inspections in order to reach its ruse to make the war appears legitimate. Hand in hand with the British decisions, Collin Powell had shared the agreement regarding the strategy and sought to convince Bush to be on their side rather than adopting a unilateral action that might not be pleasant regarding the invasion. Nevertheless, all their plans had gone in vain, when Saddam permitted another UN inspection where no WMD had been founded (qtd. in Dagnes).

The conclusion said that Bush and Blair governments made the decision to go to war in April 2002, six months before seeking support from Congress for legal action and seven months prior to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (Smith 3).

The Downing Street document can be added to the ongoing debate surrounding the politics and pragmatics of truth in relation to the Iraq War. It summarized Tony Blair's position to take a gamble on a future dominated by the United States to fortify the Anglo-American leadership. The Memo provided insights into the British role in the invasion,

suggesting that the UK government was aware of the United States' intention to go to war and was actively involved in discussions surrounding the decision. Overall, it implied that the British government was aware that intelligence and facts were being manipulated or "fixed" to fit the predetermined policy of invading Iraq and, highlighted the level of involvement and awareness of British officials regarding the motivations and flawed decision-making leading up to the invasion.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter summarizes the essence of the research dissertation. Through a chronological order of the strategies supported by revealed documents. These documents were brought to light after the invasion, and others were analyzed through several investigations conducted in the aftermath of the war to make a link between the events. It started with Israel and the neoconservatives' support of the Zionist interests through adopting a set of plannings summarized in the Clean Break strategic paper. The second motivation had narrowed its focus on the national interest through the establishments of the PNAC and the revival of Defense Planning Guidance to a new appropriate strategy that fitted the American policy and its activities domestically and globally. Besides, the American endeavor to take control over the Middle East's oil or the Iraqi oil particularly, through suspicious activities of Cheney Energy Task Force as a national American energy policy. The chapter widens its studies to meet the recent investigation on Colin Powell's speech presented in a report with valuable findings. The latter crystalized the U.S. policy makers' planning to justify the invasion basing on falsified, politicized data. Furthest, the British prime minister and his political position in the invasion, the reason behind the British support of the alliance. This element was supported by the Secret Downing Street memo as a mirror to reflect the UK followship of the U.S. policies in the pre-war decisions.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

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On the outset of March 20, 2003, a major geopolitical event shook the world and became the highlight of the century. The latter represents the illegal military intervention launched by US and its allies in Iraq, under the slogan of "Operation Iraqi Freedom" upon falsified reasons under the declared surface. The motives, however, had conducted several national interests, as well as interplayed international policies. The invasion of Iraq was triggered by US intelligence and based on fabricated grounds about WMD, which was mentioned in Colin Powell's speech without the slightest bit of evidence. The matter was not limited within American's validities only, but rather included other major powers such as Great Britain. Hence, the alliance policy of the British prime minister was adopted to guarantee the British position in the Iraq war, while blindly following US policymakers' decisions.

The invasion first, was seeking a regime change pushed by the American neoconservatives' beliefs. The association of neoconservatism and the Israeli interests regarding Iraq had been crystalized in the creation of the Clean Break strategy. Generally, this factor lies in the shared belief in a more assertive U.S. foreign policy, including the use of military force to address perceived threats and promote Israeli interests and Western values in the Middle East long before 9/11 attacks. The neoconservatives then gave birth to the PNAC group, the latter had applied their vision for American global leadership and military supremacy by arguing for a more robust U.S. military posture and highlighted the need for regime change in countries deemed threats to U.S. interests such as Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. The page had turned to another strategic, geopolitical factor that shaped the core of the military intervention which was oil. The American endeavor was attempting to take control over the Middle Eastern oil starting from Carter Doctrine, to be then progressed to represent an interest in the American energy policy file which was the case of Cheney Energy Task Force and the revelations of Iraqi oil fields in its activities' documents which were

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marked secret and highly important. This triadic ground could create a clear image that paves the path to understand the dynamics of the White House that ended by a lawful invasion far from the 9/11 links.

In this context, the American administration during Clinton's presidency till the Bush period, had implemented procedures including actions and strategic papers. These political adaptations had at first hand served the benefit of the American policy, while revealed objectives were superficially presented. It is the case of the Iraq Liberation Act, the National Security Strategy and the Democratic theory as major decisions. The reflection given, translates the solid blueprint provided by the American policymakers to formulate the road to a legitimate invasion of Iraq.

The planning was not limited to the pre-9/11 plot only or the development of the events in its aftermath; however, the planning had touched the process in which the case was built behind the curtains. In this regard, one cannot neglect the propaganda of Iraqi WMD and Saddam links with terrorism which Colin Powell's speech had underlined. Perhaps the justification at that time was crystal clear but the truth had changed after the aftermath investigations of the file. Clearly, the case was nothing except a politicization of the data provided by the Intelligence Community, a manipulation to conduct the war and a cherry-picking process of sincerity.

It was not specifically for the American side; the same tactic was shaping the British decision. Tony Blair and the swift determination he made regarding the war, had listed a set of aims behind it. After several analyses of his response for the invasion, it appears that Britain was playing a complementary function in the alliance. It was for a way or another a follower of the American superior decision to drive the justification to a secure road applying tricky tactics and following illegal measures.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

Overall, this research paper strives to reach the objective of excavating the concealed base of what prompted the United States to invade Iraq and how the imperialistic ambition had influenced the American policy to achieve a strategic surface provided for the public opinion to make legitimacy behind the military intervention.

The future of Iraq was profoundly impacted by a colossal falsehood that shattered the hopes and aspirations of an entire nation. The repercussions of this deception continue to fuel an ongoing debate, spanning from the initial deception itself to the broader questions of how and why the lives and destinies of millions of Iraqi people were tragically squandered.

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ABSTRACT

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s resulted in a unipolar world, with the United States emerging as the dominant global power. This shift in the international order influenced the perception of American military interventions and the exercise of its foreign policy. Against the backdrop of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, a momentous event in contemporary history, this dissertation delves into the surface justifications and hidden motives that shaped this significant geopolitical undertaking. The study begins by providing an overview of the historical background surrounding the invasion, emphasizing the need to unravel the complexities and undisclosed dimensions of this critical episode. The research aims to investigate the case for war presented by the Bush administration, and uncover the concealed influences and motives behind the military intervention. Employing a new historicism approach, the study utilizes various sources such as official speeches, reports, memos, and scholarly analyses. The work dissects key events, motives, and manipulations associated with the invasion. The findings shed light on the intricate interplay of factors involved, revealing the surface justifications, alongside hidden motives. Additionally, the research exposes the manipulation of intelligence and uncovers the concealed role of Britain in pre-war planning. By comprehensively exploring the invasion of Iraq and its undisclosed dimensions, this dissertation contributes to a deeper understanding of the motivations behind the military intervention and provides valuable insights into the complex nature of the decision-making process in the case of Iraq 2003.

Key Words: Illegal war, Invasion, Iraq, UK, US.

Résumé:

L'effondrement de l'Union soviétique et la fin de la Guerre froide au début des années 1990 ont entraîné un monde unipolaire, avec les États-Unis émergeant comme la puissance mondiale dominante. Ce changement dans l'ordre international a influencé la perception des interventions militaires américaines et l'exercice de sa politique étrangère. Sur fond de l'invasion de l'Irak en 2003, un événement capital dans l'histoire contemporaine, cette dissertation explore les justifications apparentes et les motifs cachés qui ont façonné cette entreprise géopolitique majeure. L'étude commence par donner un aperçu du contexte historique entourant l'invasion, mettant l'accent sur la nécessité de démêler les complexités et les dimensions dissimulées de cet épisode critique. La recherche vise à examiner les arguments en faveur de la guerre présentés par l'administration Bush et à découvrir les influences et les motifs dissimulés derrière l'intervention militaire. En adoptant une approche de nouveau historicisme, l'étude utilise différentes sources telles que les discours officiels, les rapports, les mémos et les analyses savantes. Le travail dissèque les événements clés, les motifs et les manipulations associés à l'invasion. Les résultats mettent en lumière l'interaction complexe des facteurs impliqués, révélant les justifications apparentes, notamment la guerre contre le terrorisme et l'identification de l'Irak comme faisant partie de l'"Axe du Mal", ainsi que des motifs cachés tels que les intérêts israéliens, les influences néoconservatrices et la quête des ressources pétrolières. De plus, la recherche met en évidence la manipulation du renseignement et révèle le rôle dissimulé de la Grande-Bretagne dans la planification préalable à la guerre. En explorant de manière approfondie l'invasion de l'Irak et ses dimensions dissimulées, cette dissertation contribue à une meilleure compréhension des motivations derrière l'intervention militaire et offre des perspectives précieuses sur la complexité du processus de prise de décision dans le cas de l'Irak en 2003.

Mots clés : États-Unis, Invasion, Irak, Guerre illégale, Royaume-Uni.

ملخص:

أدى انهيار الاتحاد السوفيتي ونهاية الحرب الباردة في أوائل التسعينيات إلى عالم أحادي القطبية، حيث ظهرت الولايات المتحدة كقوة عالمية مهيمنة. هذا التحول في النظام الدولي أثر على تصورات التدخلات العسكرية الأمريكية وممارسة سياساتها الخارجية. حدث هام في التاريخ المعاصر يكمن خلف سياق غزو العراق 2003. تستكشف هذه المذكرة المبرزات الظاهرة والدوافع الخفية التي شكلت هذه العملية الجيوسياسية الهامة. تبدأ الدراسة بتوفير نظرة عامة على الخلفية التاريخية المحيطة بالغزو، مع التأكيد على ضرورة فك تشابكاته وأبعاده غير المكشوفة في هذه الفترة الحرجة. يهدف البحث إلى التحقيق في حجج الحرب التي قدمتها إدارة بوش، وكشف التأثيرات والدوافع المستترة وراء التدخل العسكري. باستخدام نهج تاريخي جديد، تعتمد الدراسة على مصادر متنوعة مثل الخطابات الرسمية والتقارير والمذكرات والتحاليل العلمية. تفكك الدراسة الأحداث والدوافع والتلاعبات الرئيسية المرتبطة بالغزو، وتسلط الضوء على التفاعل المعقد للعوامل المشاركة. تكشف النتائج عن المبررات الظاهرة، بما في ذلك "الحرب على الإرهاب" وتصنيف العراق كجزء من "محور الشر"، جنبًا إلى جنب مع الدوافع المستترة مثل المصالح الإسرائيلية وتأثيرات المحافظين الجدد وسعي الى الموارد النفطية. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، تكشف البحث عن تلاعب المخابرات وتكشف عن الدور المستتر لبريطانيا في التخطيط قبل الحرب. من خلال استكشاف شامل لغزو العراق وأبعاده غير المكشوفة، تسهم هذه الرسالة الجامعية في فهم أعمق للدوافع وراء التدخل العسكري وتقدم نظرة ثاقبة في الطبيعة المعقدة لعملية صنع القرار في قضية العراق.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الحرب غير الشرعية ،الغزو ،العراق، المملكة المتحدة، الولايات المتحدة.